Human Rights Council
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on the Review
of the Work and Functioning of the Human Rights Council
First session
Geneva, 25–29 October 2010

Compilation of State proposals
Compilations of proposals made by States under items 3, 4 and 5

Part I: Concrete proposals on:

I. Universal Periodic Review
II. Special Procedures
III. Advisory Committee and Complaint Procedure
IV. Agenda and Framework for a Programme of work
V. Methods of Work and Rules of Procedure

Part II: No title

Part: No title

Annex: Written submissions
Part I: Concrete proposals on:

I. Universal Periodic Review

A. General

- Preserve the principles that guided the 1st cycle (universality, objectivity, non-selectivity) (Spain);
- Continue to respect and adhere to the principles of objectivity, dialogue and cooperation, non-selectivity, non-politicization and transparency within the context of the review process (Malaysia);
- Kee intact, in the context of article 3 of the IB Text, the principles of objectivity, transparency, non-selectivity, constructiveness, non-politicization and non-confrontation (Turkey);
- Maintain the basic principles and objectives of the UPR (Russian Federation);
- Maintain and optimize the existing modalities for the review (Russian Federation);
- Retain the basis of the review as well as its intergovernmental nature (Malaysia);
- Preserve the principles of peer review and modalities to ensure the continuity of the basis premise of cooperative mechanism (Bangladesh);
- Maintain the principles of objectivity, inclusiveness, non-politicization, non-confrontation and above all, avoiding double standards and ensuring equal and fair participation of all States which should remain as the fundamental requisite of this state-driven process (Nepal);
- Maintain the intergovernmental nature of the UPR process (United Arab Emirates);
- Ensure that the review reflect the fact that UPR is an intergovernmental mechanism (China);
- Maintain the UPR state-driven nature (Iran);
- Preserve the existing basis of the review as well as principles and objectives of the UPR as stipulated in the IB Package (Iran);
- Preserve the inter-governmental character of the mechanism while ensuring the contributions of other relevant stakeholders (Vietnam)
- Preserve the inter-governmental character of the UPR (Mauritania).
- Review should be a State driven exercise (Algeria)
- Preserve the intergovernmental and interactive nature of the mechanism (Algeria);
- Ensure that UPR is not only used as a tool for identifying problems but also for highlighting good practices and achievements. (Colombia)
- Draft appropriate guidelines for conducting national consultation processes (Moldova);
- Ensure that the adoption of proposals regarding the UPR be made by consensus, which will certainly contribute to the better implementation of them (Rwanda);
- All parties should give importance to the UPR process of all other countries (China);
• Give particular attention to the situation of Least Developed Countries and to land-locked developing countries and small developing island states, which face particular challenges in attaining the realization of human rights, especially of economic, social and cultural rights, when recommendations are made in the UPR. (Rwanda)

• Respect the particularity of each state as to religion, ethics and culture while non jeopardizing the universal nature of the UPR (Mauritania)

• Strengthen the assistance and cooperation role of OHCHR, together with the UN system and regional organisations, in the preparation of the reports (Uruguay);

• The Resident Coordinator to operate as a facilitation mechanism at the request of the State concerned (Uruguay);

• Focus the second round of the UPR on implementation of recommendations as well as ongoing or new human rights situations in the country (United States of America)

• Preserve the strict inter-governmental nature and the principle of equality established in the mechanism (Cuba);

• Maintain the basis, principles and objectives of UPR as spelt out in paragraphs 1,2,3 and 4 of HRC resolution 5/1 (Algeria);

• Fine tune the UPR to fulfil its potential and deliver change on the ground (United Kingdom)

• Retain the UPR as all states are subjected to it equally (Libya).

• Retain what is set out in the institution building (IB) annex in Council Resolution 5/1 concerning the UPR and its review modalities (Libya).

• Preserve the intergovernmental character of the UPR and its interactive nature (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Safeguard the basis, principles and objectives of the UPR should as contained in the IB package (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group); (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• Preserve the primacy of the UPR inter-governmental nature (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC); (India), (Libya)

• Ask the Secretariat to make a statement on financial implication resulting from the adoption of the report, more particularly relating to the requested technical assistance (Morocco)

B. Periodicity and Second cycle

1. Order of Review

• Keep existing order for the review (Russian Federation);

• Keep the same order of review of countries (Venezuela);

• Agree by 12/2011 or 3/2012 at the latest on the order or review and other arrangements (Mauritius);

• Retain order of review (Morocco)

• Maintain the order of country review from the 1st cycle for the 2nd cycle (Brazil) (Egypt on behalf of NAM)
• Keep the current cycle and use the day and a half of each session, right after the review of 16 countries and before the adoption of the 4 remaining reports of the session, when the Group currently does not meet (Morocco)

• Maintain the order of the first review and draw by lots the order of review of countries now listed within any given year (Algeria);

• Maintain the established order of review for the next and subsequent cycles to allow predictability (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group; Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• Preserve to the extent possible the current order of the review so as to ensure predictability (Malaysia);

• Maintain the order of the review in subsequent cycles (Iran);

• Keep the order of review in the UPR first cycle in subsequent cycles (Moldova);

• Maintain the order of States to be reviewed from the first cycle for subsequent cycles (Thailand);

• Maintain the order of States’ review from the 1st cycle (Australia).

• Maintain the same order of review as the first cycle (Guatemala);

2. Four-year Periodicity

• Maintain the 4 years cycle as well as the 3 reports forming the basis of the review (Spain);

• Keep the periodicity of the review as it is now: 4 years (Switzerland)

• Do not reduce the current periodicity of four years. A period of more than four years could prevent the proper functioning of the mechanism. (Argentina);

• Maintain the current periodicity of a 4 year cycle for the UPR (Austria); (Guatemala).

• Maintain the current 4 year periodicity of the UPR as it provides a realistic balance between the demands placed on SuR and the need for an ongoing action-oriented process (Belgium on behalf of EU)

• No need to make the length of the cycle longer than the current four years. (Japan)

• Keep the order of the review. Maintain a 4 year period. However, NAM’s proposal of a 5 year period could also be possible. (Chile)

3. Five-year Periodicity

• Extend the UPR cycle to 5 years (China);

• Adjust the UPR cycle to a 5 years cycle (Paraguay);

• Extend the UPR cycle to 5 years (Russian Federation);

• Extend the second/subsequent UPR cycles to 5 years (Iran);

• Increase the cycle of review to five years, with 13 States being reviewed per session (Venezuela)

• Extend the UPR cycle to 5 years (Nepal);

• Support an expansion of the UPR cycle to 5 years with 13 states examined during each UPR session (Thailand);
• Reiterate the need to expand the cycle of the UPR to 5 years (Bangladesh);
• Extend the 2nd cycle to 5 years (Saudi Arabia);
• Consider the spreading of future UPR cycles over five-year period as it could yield practical benefits including in terms of enhancing stakeholder participation (Malaysia);
• Adopt a 5-year cycle (Morocco)
• Change the UPR periodicity from four to five years having 13 countries instead of 16 reviewed during each UPR Working Group session (Philippines)
• Extend the review cycle to five years (Indonesia);
• Move the periodicity to a five-year cycle to reduce queuing by allowing more time for individual reviews, interactive dialogue in the UPR Working Group as well as the implementation of accepted recommendations (Algeria);
• Extend the UPR cycle to 5 years, thus allowing the examination of 13 States per session instead of 16, in order to, inter alia, resolve the problem of list of speakers (Egypt on behalf of NAM)
• Extend the next and subsequent cycles of the UPR to five years to allow for proper stock-taking (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Extend the second/subsequent UPR cycle to 5 years (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Extend the periodicity up to five years. (Peru)
• Improve the allocation of time for the review. Proposal to extend the periodicity of the review from four to five years is a plausible option. (Colombia)

4. Gap Year

• Observe a break of one year after the 1st cycle (China);
• Give a one-year break between first and second cycles to the States in order to settle procedural issues (Iran);
• Give one year between the 2 cycles (Saudi Arabia);
• Consider the possibility of a gap between the first and second UPR cycles (Malaysia);
• Recommend a break between the first and second UPR cycles (Singapore);
• Break up of up to one year between the end of the first cycle and beginning of the second cycle may be useful (Philippines)
• A gap of one year between the end of the first cycle and the beginning of the second cycle would be needed for countries and relevant stakeholders to prepare for the second cycle adequately (Egypt on behalf of NAM)
• Observe a break between the first and second cycles, to conclude procedural issues and to allow for the first countries to be review to prepare accordingly (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Give one year break between first and second cycles to the States in order to settle procedural issues (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
5. No Gap Year

- Start the second cycle immediately after the first cycle to ensure continuity (Venezuela);
- Second cycle should follow immediately after the first cycle (Switzerland);
- Start the second cycle without delay (Australia);
- Start the second cycle in May 2012 (Uruguay);
- Establish a gap of less than one year between the first and second cycle (Morocco);
- Second cycle to begin at the earliest possible period in 2012 (Japan);
- No need to have a break between the first and second cycle, inasmuch the modalities of the second cycle are outlined (Peru);
- No breaks or time laps between the two UPR cycles (Guatemala);
- Begin the second cycle during 2012. A short delay could be established (Chile).

6. Other

- Advise delegations to inscribe in the speakers list at least one month before a working group session (Republic of Korea);
- That there is the imperative need to strengthen dialogue and to allocate the time for the interactive dialogue with the SuR (South Africa); Apply any changes to the UPR after the end of the 1st cycle (Iran);
- Ensure that the changes that would result from the HRC review, particularly concerning the UPR mechanism take effect after the end of the first UPR cycle (Moldova);
- Apply any changes to the present modalities of the UPR in the second cycle to ensure the universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all States as stipulated in para 5(e) of GA Res 60/251 (Singapore);
- Avoid attempts to reform the UPR (Brazil);
- Dedicate the second cycle to the follow-up of recommendations accepted by States. The 2nd review should be done on the basis of the report of the State under Review and information on the implementation of accepted recommendations in the previous review to be provided by each State (Cuba);
- Provide more time for the review of each state during the UPR Working Group (Austria);
- Focus on the implementation of the recommendations accepted during the first review cycle as well as voluntary commitments (Algeria);
- The subsequent cycle of the UPR should focus mainly on outlining the current developments in the country concerned (Egypt on behalf of NAM);
- Dedicate subsequent cycles of the UPR to reviewing current developments and following-up to those recommendations made in the preceding cycles which enjoyed the support of the SuR as well as the voluntary pledges and already commitments made (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group; (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
- Focus the second cycle on the implementation of accepted recommendations as well as on the changes in the human rights situation of the country since the previous review. (Japan)
• SURs to report also on additional measures to improve the national situation and the possibility to further accept some of the recommendations it had previously declined to accept. (Japan)

• Address cases of persistent non-cooperation with the UPR mechanism. (Japan)

• Focus the second cycle on the follow-up of the implementation of accepted recommendations and voluntary pledges made by SuRs. Outline the process, modalities and documentation of the second cycle. (Peru)

• Focus second cycle on the follow-up to the implementation of previous recommendations. Favour limitation of recommendations. New recommendations should be allowed only regarding developments, which occurred after the first cycle. Reiteration of previous recommendations it is not desirable (Chile)

• Focus second cycle on the implementation of the outcomes of the first cycle. Reflect the degree of the implementation of accepted recommendations and voluntary commitments in the reports and documentation of the second cycle, including information on the achievements, challenges and obstacles. (Colombia)

C. UPR Documentation

1. Contents and Focus of Second Cycle Reports

• UPR reports should contain information on the implementation of recommendations made during the 1st cycle and presentation of the general situation of human rights in the country (Spain);

• Focus the follow-up on new developments in human rights (China);

• Focus the second cycle of the UPR should focus on 1) update of the actions carried out by the SuR since the presentation of the first national report and 2) detailed information on achievements realized while implementing recommendations accepted by the SuR (Paraguay);

• The documentation prepared by OHCHR should be objective and credible (Russian Federation);

• States to include in their national reports an assessment of the implementation of recommendations made by Special Procedures (Argentina);

• Give priority in the 2nd cycle to the implementation of recommendations that enjoy the Government’s support (Russian Federation).

• Focus the second UPR report on developments since the first report, particularly on implementation of the recommendations received during the first report (Thailand);

• Documents which serve as basis of the review are drafted in a manner that ensures both the evaluation of the current human rights situation and the implementation of previous recommendations. (Switzerland).

• Second cycle reports should concentrate on implementation of recommendations and voluntary commitments (Colombia).

• Modify the information requested in the national and stakeholder reports. Basic information on constitutional structures should no longer be needed, unless a country’s governing system has changed substantially since its previous report. The national reports provide updates on human rights situations and discuss progress in implementing accepted recommendations and pledges made in the first round (United States of America)
• Devote a special section in OHCHR reports to information coming from A-Status National Human Rights Institution of the SUR only (Morocco)

• A separate section in the documents prepared by OHCHR should provide an analysis of the NHRI based on information received by the civil society. (France)

• The three reports on each state should contain a thorough assessment of the status of implementation of recommendations that were accepted by the reviewed State during the first cycle. The reports should also contain an update on the general human rights situation (Austria);

• Include a separate section for National Human Rights Institutions in the report that summarizes the views of ‘other relevant stakeholders’ (Austria);

• The outcome document of the review should contain a provision clearly indicating that the result of such a review will not be implemented until the first cycle is concluded. A short procedural decision in this regard could also be adopted by the HRC at its next session (Algeria);

• All three reports prepared for the Review should include an assessment of the degree of implementation of the accepted recommendations, plus an update on the human rights situation to reflect changes on the ground (United Kingdom);

• Maintain the three national reports with all reports containing information on (a) the state of implementation by the State reviewed of the commitments made by it in the first cycle and (b) an appraisal of and update on the general human rights situation (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Include in the report summarizing the views of “other stakeholders” as defined in paragraph 15 (c) of the IB package, a separate section for National Institutions with “A” Status. (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Dedicate a separate section in the summary to information submitted by National Human Rights Institutions (Norway);

• Consider the proposal that national reports should be tabled in National Parliaments for discussion prior to their submission to OHCHR (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Focus the documentation and modalities of the second cycle on the assessment of the implementation of the recommendations of the first cycle. Not to exclude the possibility of incorporating new developments and the possibility to make further recommendations. Update the general guidelines for the submission of information and documentation, so as to adequate them to the second cycle. (Peru)

• Include in national reports an assessment on the degree of implementation of the recommendations of Special Procedures. (Chile)

2. Guidelines for Second Cycle Reports

• Develop guidelines for preparation of the second and third reports, and such guidelines should be compiled by the OHCHR (Thailand);

• Guidelines should be prepared for the preparation of documents by OHCHR, following UN Charter principles and the respect of States sovereignty (China);

• Closer cooperation and coordination between States and OHCHR, including in the preparation of the compilation documents, is important. More clarity on the modalities related to the preparation of those reports, including in the form of agreed guidelines are welcomed (Malaysia);
• Adjust the existing guidelines for the preparation of information for the UPR, to reflect the most recent developments on the ground, both in law and in practice, as well as with regard to the follow up to the recommendations from the previous review and the needs clearly identified needs for technical assistance (Mexico);

• Prepare specific guidelines for the drafting of reports by OHCHR (Venezuela);

• The Council should develop drafting guidelines for the next UPR documents and session. (Kazakhstan);

• That the Council should develop drafting guidelines for the two documents prepared by the OHCHR through establishing an inter-governmental body (Iran);

• Provide clear guidelines for the preparation of 2nd UPR cycle reports (Moldova);

• Adopt clear and precise guidelines for the preparation of 2nd UPR cycle reports (Moldova);

• The Council should develop drafting guidelines for the next UPR documents and session. (Kazakhstan);

• That the Council should develop drafting guidelines for the two documents prepared by the OHCHR through establishing an inter-governmental body (Iran);

• Provide clear guidelines for the preparation of 2nd UPR cycle reports (Moldova);

• Adopt clear and precise guidelines for the preparation of all documents which serve as the basis of the review (Vietnam)

• Set guidelines for the establishment of compendium reports prepared by OHCHR and stakeholders (Saudi Arabia);

• Implement guidelines for the preparation of national reports, and summary and compilation documents for the 2nd cycle (Australia).

• Consider the elaboration of revised guidelines for national reports for the second UPR cycle in view of the required emphasis on follow-up to the recommendations of the first cycle and the elaboration of some form of guidelines for the OHCHR summary and stakeholders’ submission (India)

• Discuss and agree upon guidelines for the OHCHR and stakeholder compilations for the second cycle in the Council (Philippines)

• Develop general guidelines for the second and third reports (Azerbaijan)

• Include in the national reports for the second cycle the methodology used for the drafting process of the report; an update of general information pertaining to the State; the follow-up made by the concerned State on the previous review; information on new developments since the last review, according to the template of the initial report (Morocco)

• Adopt guidelines for the drafting of OHCHR reports (Morocco)

• Preserve the documentation, as established in resolution 5/1 (Cuba);

• Elaborate a clear and transparent methodology for the elaboration of the two reports that OHCHR prepares (Cuba);

• Guidelines on the UPR Working Group report should be formulated upon (Indonesia)

• Guidelines on the preparation of the documentation that will constitute the basis of the second UPR cycle should be elaborated through an intergovernmental process. (Algeria);

• Elaborate guidelines on the preparation of the documents that constitutes the basis of the subsequent UPR cycles, in a sufficient time prior the beginning of the second cycle (Egypt on behalf of NAM);

• The Council should develop drafting guidelines for the two documents prepared by OHCHR (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• No need to adopt new guidelines for the submissions of reports from Civil Society Organizations and those of the Special Procedures. OHCHR should be afforded
some flexibility in deciding the most efficient way to include information submitted by CSOs and Special procedures. (Argentina)

- Update general guidelines included in Res.6/101 of the Human Rights Council, taking into account the experiences accumulated during the first cycle regarding the submission of reports. (Colombia)
- Maintain the current UPR documentation as the basis for the review (Guatemala);

3. Consolidation of documentation

- The clear response of the State to each recommendation should be provided in an addendum to the Working Group report. This addendum should include all the recommendations made to the State in both cycles (Belgium on behalf of EU);
- Provide comprehensive information, in an easily accessible format, on the full range of recommendations made to a State during both cycles and the position of the State on each recommendation (Ireland);
- Operationalize the UPR recommendations and produce one single report of the review, as suggested by OHCHR (Canada);
- Respect the principle that the summary of State interventions in the UPR Working Group reports should be under the responsibility of States’ making interventions (Turkey);

4. Interim Reporting

- Establish a system of mid-term reporting, including the issue of technical assistance (Norway);
- Encourage States to keep the Council informed on the follow-up made to the recommendations, notably through the presentation of a mid-term assessment within the general debate under item 6 of the agenda (Morocco);
- In addition States should be given the opportunity to systematically inform the Council on their implementation efforts (Austria);
- States to provide information on follow-up as they deem fit and on a voluntary basis to the HRC before their next review (Algeria);
- Each State to submit a follow-up report on the status of implementation of the accepted recommendations no later than two years after the adoption of the review outcome (Japan);
- Encourage the voluntary submission of follow-up partial reports. Include in these reports an assessment of the level of development of technical cooperation programmes between SuR and the UN system. (Chile);
- A submission of an interim status report on the implementation of recommendations should be encouraged (Republic of Korea);
- Mid-term review should not be compulsory (China).
- That interim reports should not become part of formal process and can be presented on a voluntary basis (Iran);
- That mid-term reporting, while encouraged, should be on a voluntary basis so as not to distract States from the actual implementation of the UPR recommendations on the ground (Thailand);
• On mid-term reports suggested by some States on the progress of the implementation of recommendations, this should remain voluntary to allow States the flexibility to do so, and not add to the obligatory reporting burden of States (Singapore);

• That there should not be any “mid-term review” exercise (Bangladesh);

• Presentation of an interim report is to remained optional (Saudi Arabia);

• Establish a voluntary follow-up report half way the process (Uruguay).

• The mid-term exercise should include information on the state’s efforts to engage the international community in the implementation of recommendations and response and assistance provided by, inter alia, the UN system, development banks and bilateral donors (Norway);

• No inclusion of mid-term reports or regular update on the implementation of accepted recommendations as part of the official exercise (Azerbaijan)

• Encourage a mid-term review of the implementation of the recommendations on a voluntary basis (Brazil)

• Assessment of the human rights situation in the SUR during the period of time between the cycles, following the same modality of three reports (Brazil);

• A follow-up analysis regarding the implementation of the recommendations received and accepted in the first cycle (Brazil);

• Develop a new additional OHCHR report for the second round that assesses country responses to recommendations from the first round. This report should list obstacles to implementation of accepted recommendations (United States of America)

• Encourage all States to report annually or every two years on the implementation of UPR recommendations. OHCHR should prepare a short table containing the streamlined, clustered recommendations, and States would simply update this table with areas of progress. Progress reports be placed on a dedicated page on OHCHR website (Maldives)

• State should make a mid-term report to the Council at the half way stage. States could include updated information on requirements for technical assistance (United Kingdom);

• A system with mid-term reporting to the Council would contribute towards strengthening the attention given to the implementation of recommendations (Norway);

• Already examined SuRs can voluntarily submit reports on the implementation of recommendations without having to wait for the next cycle. (Argentina)

• Item 6 of the Council’s agenda could be better used to allow States to voluntarily submit reports on the implementation of UPR recommendations. (Colombia)

• Commit each State to present an interim report to HRC after two years on the implementation of the recommendations accepted (France)

• Important to submit follow-up interim reports (Qatar);

• Encourage all States to carry out “mid-term-reviews”, which indicates the level of implementation of the recommendations (Turkey);

• Encourage States to make full use of Item 6 of the Council sessions to report on their implementation of the UPR recommendations (Thailand);
• Create a segment for follow-up to each UPR to allow States to make an oral report, two years after its review, on a voluntary basis, about the implementation of accepted recommendations (Bosnia Herzegovina);

5. Other

• Documentation related to UPR should be user-friendly (Indonesia);

• The limitation on pages of the National report should be reasonably grounded. (Kazakhstan);

• Elaborate a Standard Uniform Questionnaire to be addressed to all States to assess their compliance with their international human rights law and humanitarian law obligations (South Africa);

• Consult the SuR for the two UPR documents prepared by the OHCHR (Iran);

• That States should not include political considerations in the reports (Turkey).

D. Conduct of the Review in the Working Group

1. Focus of Second and Subsequent Cycle Reviews

• Focus on the follow-up on implementation of agreed recommendations, emerging human rights issues and issues of continued concern particularly on Recs. rejected (Mauritius);

• That the outcome document of the first review should be the basis of the second review (Singapore);

• Focus subsequent cycles on the follow-up of the implementation of the UPR recommendations (Thailand);

• That States should be reviewed in subsequent cycles on the basis of a) the recommendations accepted; b) the challenges faced particularly for developing countries and LDCs that may have to shift priorities and resources to address urgent incidents such as natural disasters, financial crises and food crises, etc; and c) assistance received to enhance and build its capacity to live up to its human rights obligations and commitment (Bangladesh);

• Focus the second cycle on the assessment of the implementation of previous recommendations. States having made recommendations during the first cycle ensure appropriate follow-up (Switzerland);

• Focus the second cycle on the developments and new follow-up on the recommendations of the 1st cycle (Saudi Arabia);

• Ensure that the second cycle does not only address the implementation of recommendations but also the new challenges faced (Uruguay);

• Focus second cycle on monitoring the implementation of those recommendations accepted by SUR (Mauritania).

• Focus on the implementation of the recommendations during the second cycle (Guatemala); Ensure the possibility that during subsequent reviews, the State considers other recommendations and that other recommendations be formulated by other members of the working group, keeping in mind developments on the ground (Mexico);
2. Other
   - Encourage SuR to include national experts in the composition of their delegations (Egypt on behalf of NAM);
   - The review should define an optimum limit to the number of new proposals each State could make in the second cycle (Belgium on behalf of EU);
   - Make Interactive Dialogue more effective, by clustering issues into themes. (Japan)
   - Establish a roster of independent experts to act as Rapporteurs at the end of reviews. Their role would be to assist the troika in reaching an overall picture of the unfolding of the review, the main issues raised, the challenges faced and the commitments made (Mauritius);
   - The review of any country should include an assessment of the adequacy of the assistance received from the international community to enable the implementation of the accepted recommendations (Egypt on behalf of NAM), (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
   - UN Country Teams engaged in follow up should have a specific space in the second cycle (United Kingdom).

E. Duration of Review and List of Speakers

1. General Principles
   - Every country wanting to participate to the UPR and make recommendations should be allowed to do so (Spain);
   - Allow time to all the States to intervene during the Working Group by extending the interactive dialogue of one hour to resolve the issue of the list of speakers. Take into account the recommendations made by the delegations who could not speak in the Working Group report (France)
   - In situations where time does not allow all interested delegations to speak, up to three recommendations from these states shall also be included in the report from the UPR WG (Norway);
   - Awareness and responsibility of States participating in the interactive dialogue to observe the time set by the WG President for their statements, so that the greatest possible number of delegations can actually make their statements (Libya).
   - Every States wishing to dialogue in the review and to pose questions and make recommendations should be given the opportunity to do so. More time should be afforded for the Working Group reviews (Belgium on behalf of EU);
   - When possible, include in the written report recommendations submitted from countries, which were denied the opportunity to speak. (Japan)

2. Duration of the WG Interactive Dialogue
   - A 3 hours session for the review is insufficient. The proposal to have a one day review for each country can be a solution (Paraguay);
   - Extend the time for the review in order to ensure more substantial interactive debate (Moldova);
   - Increase the time allocated to the review of each country. (Switzerland)
• Allocate more speaking time to States so that they may refer to achievements, challenges and obstacles and constraints (Mauritania).

• That the duration of the sessions of the Working Group on the UPR be extended in order to accommodate all States that would like to speak on a particular SuR - extend the three hours sessions to four hours sessions would resolve the political nature surrounding the queue process as well as address the demand to be on the speaker’s list (Israel);

• More time can be allocated for interactive dialogue and more of delegations wishing to take the floor can be accommodated (Nepal);

• Increase the time allocated to the review of each country. (Switzerland)

• Extend the time allotted to interactive dialogue for one hour whenever needed after all speakers are registered (Bosnia Herzegovina).

• Extend the length of the review so as to ensure the participation of all Member and Observer States interested in taking part. (Argentina)

• The review could be increased by one hour where necessary (Maldives).

• HRC should meet in two session and eight weeks in total. The remaining two weeks may be added to UPR to enhance the duration of UPR for each SuR and resolve the problem of speakers’ list (India)

• Duration of the WG sessions should be extended to four hours to accommodate all states who want to speak to do so. As an alternative, the HRC could convene one session per year dedicated entirely to the adoption of UPR WG reports. (Israel);

• Extend the length of the review of each country so as to enable more participation of countries in the list of speakers (Peru)

• The length of a SuR’s review should vary, commensurate with the number of states who have asked to speak (USA)

• Considering approaching with flexibility the length of the review of each country, having in mind the number of countries included in the list of speakers (Peru)

• Add another 2.5 days or about 16 hours to each UPR Working Group in which the Council would meet as a regular session to adopt UPR Working Groups reports from the last but one UPR Working Group (India)

• Have two four-week sessions for the Council, plus a third session of 7.5 days working days devoted to adopt of UPR Working Group reports spread over three parts, one with each UPR Working Group (India)

• Extend the review time (Azerbaijan)

• Increase the time allotted to the interactive dialogue by allotting one more hour for statements made by States (Morocco)

• Increase the period between the review and the adoption of the report from 48 hours to 72 hours (Morocco)

• More time for the SUR to consider the recommendations before the preliminary adoption of the outcome by the UPR WG (Norway);

• The UPR WG sessions shall be extended with sufficient time to allow for four hours, the SuR will continue to have one hour, the remaining three hours will be equally divided among the states inscribed on the speakers list, or alternatively, the order of speakers list will be decided by the drawing of lots (Norway);
• 72 hours shall pass between the end of the interactive dialogue with the state under review and the preliminary adoption of the outcome of the review by the UPR WG (Norway);

• SUR to have half of the time available rather than just one third as it stands now (Libya).

• Extend the length of the review to allow the participation of all interested States. If this is not possible, time should be evenly distributed, while ensuring that everyone knows with sufficient time the number of countries, which will intervene during the dialogue. (Chile) Extend the duration of the review from 3 to 4 hours (Kazakhstan);

• Extend the time allocated to the review of a state in the working group session to 4 hours (Republic of Korea);

• Strongly encourage the Secretariat to arrange the review schedule so that the reviews of two states can be conducted in one day by pairing a state with a long list of speakers and a state with a relatively short list (Republic of Korea);

• Make the best use of the Thursday and Friday morning of the second week of the working group sessions. In case conducting two reviews in a day is not feasible (Republic of Korea);

• Ensure universality of participation: extend time for each of the review to 4.5 hours: reduce the number of State reviewed at each session to 12, and add one additional UPR session per year; consider possible time efficiencies, such as starting each session promptly, cutting microphone on speakers automatically at time limit, continuing through lunch period (+2 hours per day), consolidating Working Group adoption of draft reports into one meeting at the end of each session (+1 hour per day); (Canada);

3. List of Speakers - General

• In relation to the list of speakers, provide equal opportunities to all States during the UPR process, which must remain a priority objective (Turkey);

• That Thailand is prepared to consider all possible options to draw up the speaker’s list in a more systemic manner, including the proposed modalities, as communicated by the Bureau in April this year (Thailand);

• That Israel is open to the proposal to allot adequate time to all delegations that wish to speak. In this regard, it would be necessary for States to register early on the speaker’s list for appropriate scheduling (Israel);

• Improve the list of speakers and allow all States that wish to speak to be able to do so (Switzerland);

• Elaborate more clear-cut modalities for inscription in the list of speakers (Vietnam).

• Reform the speakers’ list modalities. All States that wish to speak at the UPR be allowed to do so. (United States of America)

• Find a proper and longstanding solution to the list of speakers (Brazil)

• Establish as a firm principle that all States who wish to pose questions and make recommendations be allowed to do so and elicit a clear response from the State under Review (Ireland);

• Ensure that each delegation intending to pose questions and make recommendations should be given the opportunity to do so (Austria);
• Ensure that the necessary attention is given to the list of speakers and any suggestions for solving the issue will be acceptable by everyone (Libya).

• Give all countries, which wish to speak the opportunity to do so. (Japan)

• Resolve the problems surrounding the list of speakers while taking into account the periodicity and the length of the review. (Peru)

• States should have the right to speak and the system needs to be flexible enough. State could sign up two weeks in advance and the time could be divided between the number of countries (United Kingdom);

• Importance of dealing with the list of speakers problem – more time to be allocated to SuR to answer questions (Qatar);

4. List of Speakers – Specific Proposals

• The proposal of drawing lots deserve consideration in order to change the system of the list of speakers (Paraguay);

• That the order of queue be resolved by drawing the list of speakers by alphabetical order (Israel);

• Establish the list of speakers by drawing of lots or alphabetic order (Uruguay).

• Reduce to two minutes the time of intervention of all delegations to make possible that a greater number of States may intervene. (Switzerland)

• A delegation should be allowed to make a recommendation on behalf of several delegations, so that the working group can make better use of the time allocated for interactive dialogue. In such case, it should mention in its statement the names of all the other participating delegations. Any delegation, whether inscribed on the speakers’ list or not, should be allowed to take part in such joint recommendations (Republic of Korea).

• Delegations should be able to sign-up to UPR LoS via email or secure website (Maldives);

• Establish an advanced speakers list to allow the Secretariat to extend sessions when necessary or balance the scheduling of shorter and longer reviews. Disallow purely laudatory statements (United States of America)

• Divide time available by number of speakers in cases where insufficient time for all to speak (Canada);

• Further explore the idea of drawing lots combined with alphabetical approach to find a solution to the issue of the list of speakers (Indonesia);

• The time for each review shall be four hours to solve the problems of the speakers list (Norway);

• Draw lots for the list of speakers (Guatemala);

• Extend the session time to 4 hours (Guatemala);

• Select speakers by drawing of lots (Argentina) (Israel) (Morocco)
F. Recommendations

1. Clustering/Rationalization of Recommendations
   - Group and cluster thematically the recommendations (Turkey);
   - Structure properly thematic recommendations (Moldova);
   - Task the Troika, with the clustering the UPR recommendations with the necessary support from the Secretariat and with the full involvement of the SuR (Thailand);
   - Request the troika to better structure and synthesize recommendations (Switzerland);
   - Cluster the recommendations with the consent of SUR to avoid repetition of those which are similar in content (Vietnam);
   - Streamline the recommendations (Kazakhstan);
   - Cluster and organise recommendations to make them more concise, clear and manageable (Bosnia Herzegovina);
   - Consider clustering of related recommendations with the full involvement and consent of SUR (Philippines);
   - Cluster recommendations (Morocco);
   - Establish guidelines for the drafting and wording of recommendations (Morocco);
   - Establish uniform criteria for the clustering of recommendations. (Argentina)
   - Streamline the formulation and clustering of recommendations so as to ensure that they can be accepted and implemented effectively by the States under Review (Indonesia);
   - “Clustering” the recommendations with the approval of SuR and the State who made the recommendation (United Kingdom);
   - Edit and cluster the content of recommendations only with the consent of the SuR and the State who made the recommendation (Belgium on behalf of EU);
   - Avoid repeating similar recommendations in the WG reports. Such recommendations could be grouped in one, while referring to the names of the States that made them (Libya).
   - Organize recommendations by groups in the UPR WG Report, following point 3 of the Council program of work contained in Resolution 5/1 (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC);
   - Establishment of a formula that organizes recommendations into two sub-categories (positive developments and challenges) in accordance with resolution 5/1 (Costa Rica);
   - The recommendations stricto sensu must be incorporated under the sub-category of “challenges” (Costa Rica);
   - Recommendations made by States should be consistent with the basis of the review as stipulated in paragraph 1 of the IB text. (Egypt on behalf of NAM);
   - Recommendations to be clustered thematically (Qatar);
   - Allow one delegation to make a recommendation on behalf of several delegations, so that the working group can make better use of the time allocated for interactive dialogue. In such case, it should mention in its statement the names of all the other participating delegations. Any delegation, whether inscribed on the speakers’ list or
not, should be allowed to take part in such joint recommendations (Republic of Korea);

• Any country not able to take the floor should be allowed to submit up to 3 recommendations in writing to be included in the working group outcome document (Republic of Korea);

• Each country be allowed to make new recommendations or to take up previous recommendations, whether or not the latter have been accepted or not by SUR (Switzerland)

2. Number of Recommendations

• Study the possibility of limiting the number of recommendation to 3 to 5 by country (Uruguay);

• Prevent from being overwhelmed with the number of recommendations, a limit may be set on the number of recommendations (Nepal).

• Limit the number of recommendations given to the SuR (India) (Argentina)

3. Nature/Content of Recommendations

• Recommendations should be consistent with the scope of the review and human rights norms (Russian Federation);

• Consideration should be taken on existing capacities and capabilities of the SuR when framing recommendations (Malaysia);

• That the original language of discussions and recommendations made during the course of UPR Working Groups be reflected in the Working Group Reports submitted to the Human Rights Council for adoption (Israel);

• Establish clear criteria for recommendations so that they are made operational and feasible (Mauritania)

• Keep recommendations made by States for the review in line with the text on the establishment of the institution (Saudi Arabia);

• That recommendations made should recognize and be related to the SuR socio-economic contexts and be based on the basis of the review as enumerated in the IB Package (Bangladesh);

• That the outcome of the review process should be more operational and implementable to even deal with situations where the concerned State is not responsive (South Africa).

• Recommendations should be action oriented (Brazil)

• Any recommendations made within the framework of the UPR process should be realistic and implementable (Indonesia);

• Take into consideration and respect the culture and religion of the SUR when making recommendations (Libya).

• Ensure that State recommendations are limited and consistent with the basis of the review and universally recognized international human rights as stipulated in para. 1 of the IB Package; and that further principles of working methods and code of conduct could also be considered by the Council (Iran);
4. **Consistency of Recommendations with International & Human Rights Law**

- Troika with the assistance of OHCHR Secretariat to ensure that recommendations comply with international human rights standards (Switzerland);
- Recommendations to be in line with international human rights standards (Uruguay);
- Ensure the effectiveness of the UPR process through elaboration of the necessary guidelines for future State’s action-oriented recommendations, providing that the latter are consistent with international standards and with the situation on the ground (Moldova);
- Ensure that the recommendations are in conformity with international law, an independent review could be conducted during the Working Group, before the adoption of the report, by OHCHR for example (France);
- Recommendations should be action-orientated, in line with international human rights law and limited in number (United Kingdom);
- Alert the Council in those instances where States either make a recommendation or respond to a recommendation in a manner that may be incompatible with a core normative obligation. OHCHR should refer in a footnote, to possible incompatibility with legal obligations (Ireland);
- Ensure that recommendations made during the UPR are consistent with international standards (Ghana).

5. **Position of SuR on Recommendations**

- Preserve the voluntary nature of the review, which respects State sovereignty to decide on the recommendations to accept (Singapore);
- Retain the prerogative of the SuR of accepting recommendations that are constructive and that can be implemented and rejecting the ones that it cannot implement (Nepal);
- The SuR should provide a clear response to each recommendation before the adoption of the final report (Spain);
- An addendum to report should contain all recommendations with a clear indication of those accepted by the SuR and reasons for the refusal of others (Spain);
- Standardize the practice of an addendum to clearly indicate the State’s response to each recommendation and make it a requirement of the second cycle (Australia);
- A State under review should clearly indicate in writing its acceptance or rejection of the recommendations made during the interactive dialogue, at least two weeks prior to the final adoption of the outcome (Republic of Korea);
- Ensure best possible track record evidence on the acceptance/decline of the recommendations during the adoption of the final report by the Council (Moldova);
- That the language that rejects recommendations in a manner that is not in conformity with the object and purpose of the UN Charter, res. 60/251 or the IB Package be omitted from the Working Group report (Israel);
- SuR should establish its position on recommendation in writing (Norway);
- SUR to clearly express its position with regard to all the recommendations before Plenary session (India)
• Ensure that the second cycle provides an update on the status of the implementation of accepted recommendation; that SUR can be enquired on the recommendations that had been noted; that new recommendations could be formulated (France)

• State in a written document, submitted sufficiently in advance of the adoption of the final report, the accepted recommendations and those rejected. Eliminate the possibility to note recommendations (France)

• Ensure clear responses to all recommendations and promote effective follow-up: a) establish templates for States to clearly indicate to the Working Group whether each recommendation has been accepted or rejected, and to provide a concise rationale; b) establish templates to serve as a possible guidelines for voluntary mid-term reporting by States on progress achieved (Canada);

• States to mention why they reject a specific recommendation. The list of all recommendations with a clear indication of acceptance or rejection should be submitted well in advance of the adoption of the UPR outcome report and should be registered as an attachment. Failure to do so should result in the postponement of the adoption and the triggering of a specific sitting of the Human Rights Council (Austria);

• On adoption, States should indicate clearly which recommendations they accept and both the recommendations and the views of the SUR should be integrated into a single document (United Kingdom);

• The SuR review shall, prior to the adoption of the outcome in UPR plenary sessions, clearly state its position in writing on all recommendations received during the interactive dialogue (Norway);

• The SUR has the primary responsibility to implement the outcome of the UPR (Norway);

• States are invited to inform the Council of the status regarding the implementation of the recommendation 2 years after the review (Norway);

• Consideration should be given to those recommendations, which have been rejected as the situation in the SUR may have changed and some of those recommendations may eventually be considered positively. (Argentina)

• SuR to provide a clear picture of those recommendations which enjoy its support and of those which are rejected, well in advance the adoption of the outcome of the report (Peru)

G. Adoption of UPR Outcomes

1. General

• More time should be allocated to the adoption of UPR reports (Spain);

• The review in Plenary should be limited at the discussion of the UPR Working Group report (Russian Federation);

• The SuR shall be fully involved in the outcome (Norway);

2. New Mechanism for Adoption of Outcome

• The Council should create a UPR Plenary session dedicated to the adoption of UPR final outcomes. These plenary sessions could be held for 3 days immediately after a working group session and consider the outcomes of the preceding working group
session. And, reasonable time at the end of the UPR plenary session should be allotted for the adoption of the working group outcomes produced from the reviews conducted on the Thursday and Friday morning of the second week of the working group session (Republic of Korea);

- That there shall be a separate session of two weeks to adopt the reports of the UPR Working Group as well as to hold a General Debate under Agenda Item 6 (Israel);

- That Israel is open to the proposal made by some delegations to partition a portion of the Human Rights Council and dedicate it entirely to one or many mini-UPR sessions for the adoption of UPR Working Group reports (Israel);

- Organize three special sessions for the adoption of reports and withdraw item 6 of the agenda of HR Council’s ordinary sessions. Special sessions could follow on directly on the WG sessions. (Switzerland)

- Leaving the room for a session entirely dedicated to the adoption of UPR reports (Italy);

- Have a 2-week session of the HRC on adopting reports of the UPR Working Group (Saudi Arabia).

- Separate HRC plenary sessions for adoption of UPR outcome (i.e. at the end of the WG to consider outcome of preceding session) (Norway)

- HRC should devote three sessions of two and a half days for adoption of UPR reports, scheduled at the end of each WG. The reports adopted would be those of the previous WG session (Mauritius)

- Convene one session of 2 weeks in Sept./Oct. to adopt UPR WG outcome and GD item 6 (Egypt on behalf of NAM)

- Devote one of the 3 existing regular sessions to the adoption of the UPR reports (Brazil)

- Adopt the reports of the previous session right after each session of the Working Group (Morocco)

- Modify the timing of the adoption of the report in the programme of work in order to have either one special session devoted to UPR in September or at the end of each of the three current UPR sessions (France)

- Enhance efficiency and increase attention to UPR outcome reports: a) convert the final 2, unused days of each UPR session into HRC sessions for adoption of UPR reports from the past session (Canada);

- Dedicate one of the 3 sessions of the HRC annually to the discussion and adoption of the UPR working group reports as well as the final outcomes, under agenda item 6 (Indonesia);

- To add a formal period for adoption to the end of a UPR working group (United Kingdom);

- To establish separate Council sessions for the adoption of the UPR outcome. (Norway);

- The HRC shall schedule three UPR plenary sessions per year, which shall be exclusively dedicated to the adoption of the UPR outcome. (Norway);

- The final outcome of the UPR will be adopted by the Council in UPR plenary sessions (Norway);
• The UPR plenary session shall take place immediately after the sessions of the UPR Working Group and consider the outcome of the preceding session of the UPR Working Group and shall each have a duration of no more than three days (Norway);

• There should be a separate session of two weeks to adopt the reports of the UPR Working Group as well as to hold a General debate under Agenda Item 6 (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Provide one full session (of the HRC) to the examination of the UPR and provide more time for discussion (Serbia).

H. Role of the Troika

1. No modifications

• Troika should continue its role in keeping with the IB text and existing practices, and should benefit of the cooperation of the Council in this regard (Russian Federation);

• Retain the merely organizational role of the UPR troika as defined in the IB Package (Iran);

• Maintain the facilitating role of the Troika during the UPR (Singapore);

• Maintain the facilitating role of the Troika without any distortion or manipulation of the recommendations and questions that occur during the interactive dialogue (Nepal);

• Keep the role of the troika as it was for the 1st cycle (Uruguay);

• The troika as envisaged at present should be maintained (India). Maintain the current role of Troikas (Azerbaijan).

• The current role and composition of the troika should be maintained. (Algeria);

• Maintain the current arrangement and the intergovernmental nature of the Troika (Brazil)

• Preserve the current composition and procedural role of the Troika (Cuba);

2. Proposed adjustments

• The Troika must have the necessary attributions to contribute to ensuring that the reports of the working group are in line with international obligations of the State and international human rights standards (Mexico);

• The Troikas [and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights] should provide a more substantive support during the review process, for instance by clustering recommendations by thematic areas

• Troika to take into consideration all the recommendations made by States, orally or in writing (recommendations made by States which cannot participate in the interactive dialogue due to time constraints) (Switzerland)

• Troika to better structure and synthesize recommendations (Switzerland)

• Troika with the assistance of OHCHR Secretariat to ensure that recommendations comply with international human rights standards (Switzerland);
• Troika to take into consideration all the recommendations made by States, orally or in writing (recommendations made by States which cannot participate in the interactive dialogue due to time constraints) (Switzerland).

• Troika should streamline and cluster Recs. into a more manageable, transparent and implementable series of actions (Maldives);

• The Troika, with the full consent of the SuR and the assistance of the Secretariat, could play a bigger role in the formulation of the clustered recommendations. (Indonesia);

• The Troika could cluster recommendations according to subject matter so as to limit number of recommendations to a manageable total, in full consultation with States authors of these recommendations and with the State under review. (Algeria);

• Develop a guideline for the Troika and the OHCHR, especially with regard to the clustering of the recommendations. (Costa Rica);

• The Troika together with OHCHR should classify the recommendations in accordance with paragraph 27 (a) of resolution HRC 5/1, with a subcategory “positive developments” including recommendations that a) have already been implemented, b) are part of ongoing actions of the State under Review and c) the acknowledgements. For that purpose the Troika should base itself on the opinion of the State under Review, the technical assessment of OHCHR and the documents prepared for the review. The recommendations on the strict sense of the term should be included under subcategory of “challenges”. Both categories should be summarized and recommendation should appear only once as a “catalogue” (package) to be accepted by the State under Review. This would give a more tangible role to the Troika and the OHCHR. (Costa Rica).

• Each Troika should nominate a rapporteur to coordinate its work. This rapporteur would also present the main findings of the three preparatory reports to the Working Group in an introductory oral intervention (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Enhance the role of the Troikas. They should contribute, with the assistance of the Secretariat, to clarify doubts raised about the compatibility of questions and recommendations with the principles and spirit of the UPR (Colombia)

• Troikas, with the full involvement of SuRs and with the technical assistance of the Secretariat, should highlight in the outcome document the best practices and the most prominent achievements in terms of the implementation of UPR recommendations, as well as the challenges and persistent obstacles, and the areas regarding which the SuR considers that it requires further technical assistance. (Colombia)

3. Other

• Inclusion of expert contributions into the second and subsequent cycles should remain the prerogative of the SuR (Malaysia);

• Involving independent experts in the UPR process is not welcome (Russian Federation);

• The Council should develop a guiding document or methodology in order to monitor the follow-up of the implementation of recommendations and required technical assistance. In this regard the role of Troika and relevant mechanisms of Council could be examined (Kazakhstan).
• Need for a mechanism of cooperation between the SuR and the Troika and the secretariat (Libya).

• Develop guidelines for both the Troika and the OHCHR, especially concerning the grouping and filtering of recommendations (Costa Rica);

I. Role of OHCHR

• OHCHR should compile and systematize the recommendations from the UPR for each country, together with the comments from the State examined in this regard, and their voluntary pledges and commitments, and place this information at the disposal of the Council sufficiently in advance of the next review (Mexico);

• OHCHR should act as a focal point to facilitate the identification of areas of international cooperation, as well as the possible sources of cooperation, forging the links that are necessary to contribute to the national efforts in the implementation of the UPR outcome (Mexico);

• The Troikas and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights should provide a more substantive support during the review process, for instance by clustering recommendations by thematic areas

• OHCHR capacity to provide better assistance to interested States for the purpose of implementing recommendations and preparing for the 2nd cycle should be enhanced. (Mauritius);

• Replicate the experience of others UN fora, such as country strategies devised by the Peace Building Commission (PBC), to provide technical assistance. OHCHR to act as a clearing house to implement strategies in close consultation with relevant UN agencies and other stakeholders (Brazil)

• OHCHR should respond as a matter of priority to the request for technical assistance made during the UPR process (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC);

• Secretariat elaborates guidelines on the elaboration of action-oriented questions and recommendations. A limit to the number of questions and recommendations should be considered. (Colombia)

• Systematize information on best practices and make it available to the States, NHRI and CSOs that so require. (Colombia)

J. Role of Stakeholders

1. General

• The role of the civil society, NHRI, and independent experts should be strengthened (Spain).

• NHRI should participate more actively in the review of their own State (Qatar).

2. Written Contributions

• The report including the views of other stakeholder, as stated in paragraph 15 (c) of the IB text, should include a separate section for NHRI with “A” Status (Spain);

• That in States where a national human rights institution (NHRI) exists, their third reports to be compiled by the OHCHR should contain a separate section on these NHRI’s recommendations (Thailand);
• Increase the participation of NHRI by ensuring their separate contribution to the UPR documentation (Australia)

• Encourage stakeholder reports to include information on implementation of accepted recommendations from the first round (United States of America)

• Allow A-status NHRI to submit a separate 10 page report as an additional basis for the review (Canada);

• To strengthen National Human Rights Institutions in the UPR process (Norway)

• ‘A’ status accredited NHRI shall be able to provide regular updated information on the status of implementation of UPR outcomes (Norway).

• During the second cycle, information provided by NHRI should be treated separately from that submitted from other stakeholders. (Peru)

3. Enhanced Participation (oral interventions)

• More time should be allocated to NGOs and NHRI during the adoption of the reports. NHRI should be given the floor just after the SuR. (Spain);

• Allowing [stakeholder] participation in the Working Group session (Australia);

• Level of NGOs and NHRI participation are optimal and must not change (Russian Federation).

• Increase the speaking time allotted to NGOs and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI). (France)

• Consider how regional human rights systems could provide more input into the UPR (Ireland)

• Enhance NHRI/NGO/stakeholder input into the UPR process: a) request the High Commissioner for Human Rights to present the UN compilation and stakeholder summary reports at the beginning of each country’s review; b) create dedicated speaking space during the UPR Working Group for A-status NHRI (by video-link if necessary) and NGOs; c) establish guidelines for States to ensure effective consultation with national civil society and other stakeholders (Canada);

• Allow National Human Rights Institutions with ‘A’ status to make recommendations with regard to the human rights situation in their jurisdiction (Ireland);

• “A” status NHRI should have the ability to take the floor and should be able to make recommendations (United Kingdom);

• Give National Human Rights Institutions a separate speaking slot during the review in the UPR working group and at the time of the adoption of the report (Austria)

• ‘A’ status accredited NHRI shall be allocated speaking time during the review of its country at the WG of the UPR, following the presentation by the State under review (Norway);

• Afford increased participation to NHRI and Civil Society Organizations during the second cycle. (Peru)

• Afford NHRI and CSOs the opportunity to participate in the UPR ID (Peru)

• Make possible that NGOs and NHRI intervene during the adoption of the report by the UPR WG. (Chile)
4. **Other**

- States should carry out consultation with civil society in an annual basis on the UPR process (Spain);
- Encourage States to hold an annual consultation on implementation with all relevant stakeholders (Austria); (Belgium on behalf of EU).
- State should be mandated to hold a civil society consultation following their Review (United Kingdom).
- Spreading future UPR cycles over five-year period should be considered as it could yield practical benefits including in terms of enhancing stakeholder participation (Malaysia);
- Preserve the modalities for the participation and contribution of NGOs and other stakeholders proven to be balanced (Iran);
- Take into account the views of CSOs which are recognized by the SUR (Mauritania),

**K. Trust Fund for Participation**

- Strengthen the resources of the UPR Voluntary Trust Fund to facilitate the participation of developing countries, particularly the least developed countries, in the UPR mechanism (Egypt on behalf of NAM);
- Establish adequate funds for allowing less advanced countries without permanent mission in Geneva to participate in meetings of the Working Group and to those of the Human Rights Council for the adoption of final UPR reports, particularly during the sessions before their review (Morocco);
- Establish adequate funds for ensuring the participation of the less advance countries to their review, notably through a delegation composed of more than one representative (Morocco);
- Establish adequate funds, notably for ensuring the participation of the A-Status National Human Rights Institution of the country reviewed and allowing him/her the possibility to take the floor during the adoption of the final report by the Council right after the State reviewed (Morocco);
- The resources of UPR Voluntary Trust Fund should be strengthened enabling the effective participation of developing countries particularly the least developed countries in different stages of the UPR process (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
- Strengthen the UPR Voluntary Trust Fund to facilitate the participation of developing countries, especially the least developed countries and small island states (India);
- There is a need to strengthen the resources of the UPR Voluntary Trust Fund enabling the effective participation of developing countries particularly the least developed countries in different stages of the UPR process (Iran);
- That effective use of the voluntary trust fund should be strengthened and fully operationalized in order to enhance the engagement of the SuRs especially small States, in the preparation, participation [and follow-up] phases of the UPR (Thailand);
- Make available more information on the existing funds (Thailand);
• Establish a separate fund specifically to assist small States to attend their UPR review and to meet UPR reporting obligations (Australia);
• Set up more targeted technical assistance for small States, including internships, training and skill upgrading (Australia);
• Appoint a dedicated resource person to act as a permanent point of liaison for small States regarding their UPR process (Australia).

L. Follow-up (incl. Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance)

1. General

• Financial and technical assistance should be provided to States at their request for the implementation of accepted recommendations (United Arab Emirates);
• UPR voluntary funds should be strengthened for both participation and implementation of UPR accepted recommendations, upon the request of the SuR (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Provide support to countries which asked for technical or financial assistance for the implementation of recommendations made to them (Morocco);
• Develop concrete tools to provide technical assistance, at the request of interested States, for the implementation of accepted recommendations (Cuba);
• HRC and OHCHR should solve the problems facing developing countries (capacity building) (China);
• Take advantage of the opportunity provided by the UPR exercise and utilize it as a forum for assessing and addressing technical assistance and capacity-building issues and needs of the SuR, upon its request (Malaysia);
• Strengthen the technical assistance to SURs which so require and the exchange of best practices between countries, and international organizations. (Vietnam);
• Further strengthen the UPR Voluntary Fund. (Japan);
• Provide technical assistance when needed for the implementation of recommendations (Bosnia Herzegovina);
• Convert the UPR to an instrument for technical assistance and cooperation (Guatemala);
• Better and more targeted use of the UPR voluntary fund (Australia);
• Adopt modalities for providing the necessary technical assistance to enhance the State’s capacity to fulfil its human rights obligations, through implementation of the UPR recommendations (Ghana).

2. Implementation of Recommendations - General

• Appropriate modalities for follow-up should be established. SuRs that fail to comply with Recs. must explain within a prescribed time frame the reasons for non-compliance. (Mauritius);
• For the second cycle, priority should be given to the implementation of recommendations that enjoy the Government’s support (Russian Federation);
• The Council should develop a guiding document or methodology in order to monitor the follow-up of the implementation of recommendations and required technical assistance. In this regard the role of Troika and relevant mechanisms of Council could be examined (Kazakhstan);

• That proper and clear follow-up mechanisms should be put in place in assessing the status of implementation of recommendations of the UPR (Have regional special rapporteurs, who would be, among others, tasked with the implementation and follow-up of the UPR recommendations) (South Africa);

• Provide open and clear responses about the implementation of the recommendations, including an update on issues of concern (Serbia).

3. Technical Cooperation Strategies

• Recommendations to be used as a basis to design strategies for technical assistance and capacity building (Brazil);

• Mechanisms and strategies for technical assistance and capacity building for the implementation of recommendations made during the UPR process should be created (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC);

• Strengthen the focus on implementation and sustained follow-up. States should provide an implementation plan for the accepted recommendations within one year after the adoption of their UPR outcome report and should present this plan to the HRC (Austria);

• The Council and the OHCHR to adopt follow-up strategies and mechanisms, so as to provide technical assistance and to enhance capacity building (Peru);

• Technical cooperation strategies should be strengthened in order to assist countries, upon request, in implementing recommendations (Paraguay);

• Discuss and adopt a strategy for technical cooperation and funding, including the UPR Trust Fund (Serbia).

4. Role of State under Review

• Follow-up and implementation of the recommendations rely on SuR’s responsibility and willingness (Russian Federation);

• Implementation of recommendations of the UPR is the primary responsibility of government. Thus the Council could examine which states, the possible way of engaging in regular basis, on how to implement the UPR recommendations. In order to continue a dialogue the participation of various stakeholders should be defined (Kazakhstan).

5. Role of OHCHR

• OHCHR should act as a focal point to facilitate the identification of areas of international cooperation, as well as the possible sources of cooperation, forging the links that are necessary to contribute to the national efforts in the implementation of the UPR outcome (Mexico);

• Each State prepares a report after the review, highlighting the technical assistance required for the implementation of recommendations. This report should be forwarded to the OHCHR, which in turn should respond to the requests made by SuR (Chile);
• Promote the role of the OHCHR in supporting the UPR process, especially when it comes to building of the national capabilities for the implementation of the UPR recommendations (Moldova);

• Usefulness of technical assistance and capacity-building provided by OHCHR through its [training] centres and regional offices to assist in the implementation of accepted recommendations (Qatar);

• Strengthen the assistance and cooperation role of OHCHR, together with the UN system and regional organisations, in the implementation of the accepted recommendations and commitments made (Uruguay).

6. Role of U.N. System

• The Resident Coordinator to operate as a facilitation mechanism at the request of the State concerned (Uruguay);

• SuR should have the option at the end of a review to request the UN system to appoint a dedicated resource person to act as a permanent liaison and support point for implementation. (Maldives);

• Establish a mechanism to coordinate assistance for the implementation of recommendations between States and UN agencies, including OHCHR. (Japan);

• Specific attention needs to be given to the capacity of the UN system to provide technical cooperation. (Colombia);

• UN Country Teams engaged in follow up should have a specific space in the second cycle (United Kingdom);

• Mainstream the UPR recommendations into the UN system especially the UN country team where there is no presence of the OHCHR field office (Thailand).

7. Access to Trust Fund, Terms of Reference and Board of Trustees

• Operationalize the provision of technical assistance and capacity building in consultation with and with the consent of the State under Review by deciding on its modalities during the review process (India);

• The Voluntary Fund for financial assistance should provide for a source of financial and technical assistance to help countries implement recommendations, with their consent. Modalities of the functioning of this Fund should be agreed by the Human Rights Council as a matter of priority, preferably before the beginning of the next UPR cycle, and within the context of its review process (Egypt on behalf of NAM);

• Modalities for the functioning of the Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical assistance should be adopted and its trustees appointed (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Modalities should be finalized at the earliest to operationalize the Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Further elaboration of the format, resources, allocation and other related modalities - on the need to provide more technical assistance for the preparation of the report and for the implementation of the UPR recommendations, in particular for developing countries (Indonesia);

• Finalize at the earliest the modalities to operationalize the Voluntary Fund for Financial and Technical Assistance (Iran);
• The Human Rights Council should indicate how trustees of UPR Voluntary Trust Fund set up by the resolution 6/17 are to be appointed. The HRC should also proceed to their early appointment (Algeria);

• Make full use of the voluntary fund for the implementation of UPR recommendations. Mandate the establishment of guidelines for the voluntary fund (Brazil);

• That effective use of the voluntary trust fund should be strengthened and fully operationalized in order to enhance the engagement of the SuRs especially small States, in the [preparation, participation and] follow-up phases of the UPR (Thailand);

• Support the NAM proposal for the establishment of UPR Voluntary Trust Fund as envisaged in the Council resolution 6/17 and its implementation from the very beginning of the second cycle (Nepal);

• Make available more information on the existing funds (Thailand).

M. Link with other Mechanisms

• HRC should consider the possibility of establishing regional specific special procedures to ensure that a comprehensive approach is applied to human rights in all countries and regions (Costa Rica);

• That proper and clear follow-up mechanisms should be put in place in assessing the status of implementation of recommendations of the UPR (Have regional special rapporteurs, who would be, among others, tasked with the implementation and follow-up of the UPR recommendations) (South Africa);

• As some mandate holders of the Special Procedures already engage themselves in the UPR follow-up the Council should clearly clarify the role of those in that process (Kazakhstan).

• Review should ensure full implementation of all recommendations, including those of the treaty bodies, special procedures and UPR. (Italy);

II. Special Procedures

A. Special procedures mandates

• Take a cautious view of the possible conversion of some special mandate holders into working groups, since it may lead to a decreased level of human rights protection than currently exists. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• Preserve effective and independent functioning of Special Procedures system, opposes any proposal to go beyond the existing mechanisms designed to address the professional conduct of mandate holders. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• Bring in line the duration of country mandates with those of thematic mandates as well as introduce automatic independent initiation mechanisms for the consideration of country situations. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• The Council should periodically embark on the process of Review, Rationalization and Improvement (RRI) of mandates to avoid unnecessary duplication, and to give
full implementation of Para 58 (d) of the Institutional Building Package (IBP). (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- Convert some mandates to Working Groups in view of their sensitive nature to ensure a representative opinion on sensitive issues. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- Mandate-holders to execute their duties with strict adherence to the principles of objectivity, independence, non-selectivity, impartiality and non-politicization. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- Establish country specific mandates only with the cooperation of the country concerned. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- The Human Rights Council should establish a “Legal Committee on compliance with the Code of Conduct” on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- Apply the Code of Conduct and to address allegations of non-compliance, while respecting Presidential Statement 8/PRST/2 on the persistence non-compliance by a mandate holder with the provisions of resolution 5/2. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

- Establish, on the basis of equal geographical representation, a HRC Legal Committee on Compliance with the Code of Conduct, the modalities of which to be determined inter-governmentally. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

- Not impose country mandates on any country against its will. The consent of the State concerned should form the basis of any decision to be taken by the HRC in this domain. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

- Consider the introduction of applying a two-thirds majority for the establishment of country mandates. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

- Consider introducing a two-third majority approval for the adoption of country specific resolutions. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

- All mandate-holders must act in an objective, independent, non-selective, impartial and non-politized manner. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- The HRC should ensure implementing the process of RRI on regular intervals. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- The HRC may consider converting some Special Procedures into Working Groups. This may be considered by the HRC during the renewing the mandate of a particular Special Procedure or in the context of a continuing RRI process. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Country-specific mandates must not be created against the will of those countries. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- There is need to establish a HRC “legal committee on compliance with the Code of Conduct” on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Establish a monitoring mechanism to review compliance with the Code of Conduct by Mandate Holders. (Cuba)

- Set up a monitoring mechanism over Special Procedures for their observation of the mandate and Code of Conduct to ensure that the Special Procedures work is impartial, objective, and professional. (China)
• Ensure balance between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights mandates and avoid the proliferation of Special Procedures and overlap to avoid the waste of resources and impact on efficiency and effectiveness. (China)

• Convert gradually individual mandates into Working Groups in order to avoid the contradictions amongst various parties over the procedures and to enhance the credibility and legitimacy of the Special Procedures. (China)

• Maintain the existing terms of the mandates of Special Procedures, thus the terms of thematic Special Procedures, including the mandate of Special Rapporteur on Occupied territories, should be three years and country mandates should be one year. (Russian Federation)

• Consider the introduction of criteria for creating new Special Procedures mandates, and there should be mandatory step-by-step procedure before a mandate is created. (Russian Federation)

• The HRC must provide for a procedure of responsibility of mandate holders for inappropriate performance of their duties including even an earlier termination of their mandate. Complaints by States concerning the bridge of the Code of Conduct should be considered by the HRC which should make appropriate decision. In this connection, consider creating the Committee on Ethics to resolve such disputes. (Russian Federation)

• The mandate holders should not exceed the limits of their mandates and should strictly keep to the principles of independence, objectivity, consciousness and lack of bias. In fulfilling their obligation, they must strictly comply with all the provisions of the Code of Conduct. (Russian Federation)

• Review must preserve independence and integrity of Special Procedures. (Israel)

• Allegations of violations of the Code of Conduct by a mandate holder must not be exploited as an excuse to interfere with independence or work of Special Procedures. (Israel)

• Formulate transparent criteria so as to automatically set the establishment of a mandate for country-specific Special Rapporteurs. (Israel)

• Special Procedures should respect the Code of Conduct as outlined in resolution 5/2, the same Code of Conduct also apply to States to cooperate with the Special Procedures. (Switzerland)

• Reiterates its firm opposition to the establishment of a new monitoring/control mechanism. In fact, the work and role of Coordination Committee have improved and is a sufficient guarantee of the implementation of the Code of Conduct. (Switzerland)

• It could accept that channel of regular communication between the Coordination Committee and the President be established in order to inform the latter of the activities of the Special Procedures. The mechanism established through Presidential statement 8/2 is sufficient in this respect. (Switzerland)

• Oppose the proposal of establishment of a new mandate based by vote of majority by two-thirds of the membership. (Switzerland)

• Extend the duration of thematic mandates from three to four years and the country mandates from one to two years. (Switzerland)

• Bring the duration of country mandates into line with thematic mandates. (Australia)

• Establish an ethics committee. (South Africa)
• Establish a group of five regional Special Rapporteurs to deal with all human rights situations of concern within various regions of the world. They would be appointed according to current modalities where each region would have one expert being part of the regional rapporteurs for each region. They would work in close cooperation with countries within the region, and would report to the Heads of State summit of each region. (South Africa)

• Does not subscribe to the current practice of having selective country mandates; preference for country mandates to be established for all countries if the current practice of country mandates is retained. (South Africa)

• Create new mandates, whether thematic or country-specific, only in cases where protection gaps have been clearly identified. (Thailand)

• Consider carefully the country-specific mandates in light of the specific situation in each country. A country mandate must reflect both constructive and appropriate level of engagement. (Thailand)

• Fully respect the independence of the Special Procedures system. At the same time, however, the mandate holders should carry out their work in line with their specific mandate and the Code of Conduct. In this regard the issue of persistent and well-substantiated cases of non-compliance would be best addressed by the HRC in accordance with President Statement 8/PRST/2. (Thailand)

• Set up an intergovernmental group of the HRC to complete the RRI process so as to reduce overlapping of mandates and to make recommendations to the HRC accordingly. (Algeria)

• The establishment of new mandates should be subordinated to a cost/benefit analysis to ascertain that they are no alternative and cheaper way of achieving the objective pursued as per para. 58 (d) of IB text, in view of the cost of such a decision. (Algeria)

• There should be a temporary halt to the creation of new Special Procedures beyond present numbers, all newly emerging concerns being addressed through redeployment. (Algeria)

• Establish, in the context of the review and on the basis of equitable geographical distribution of an HRC “legal committee on compliance with the Code of Conduct” to which all contentions on compliance of the Code of Conduct should be referred to. (Algeria)

• The Special Procedures should present their reports first to the HRC, and when reporting to the Third Committee, they should include the reaction of the HRC to their reports. (Algeria)

• Not extend the country mandates without evaluating the work of the mandate holder in the field, and without having considered other options as whether there is still a need for a mandate or if the State concerned has rejected the mandate. No mandate can be imposed without getting the approval by the State concerned. (Sudan)

• Promote dialogue and cooperation and reject the principle of selectivity and politicization when dealing with cases in certain countries and where there have been attempts to impose a country mandate without the consent of the country concerned. (Sudan)

• All mandates holders should respect the Code of Conduct in an effective manner. (Sudan)
• Reservations on any proposal that could possibly undermine or threaten independence of Special Procedures. (Republic of Korea)

• Extension of the duration of country-specific mandates should follow the model of thematic mandates since the shortness of their mandate can undermine the effectiveness of their work and inter-active dialogues are likely to focus on the renewal of the mandate and not on the substantive issues at hand. (Republic of Korea)

• Reject additional oversight of the Special Procedures. (United Kingdom)

• Look again at the process of rationalization of special procedures. (Morocco)

• The HRC should encourage the creation of Working Groups or the merging of individuals mandates to avoid the multiplication or duplication of mandates and strengthen the expertise of mandate-holders. (Morocco)

• Special Procedures should scrupulously respect the Code of Conduct and the mandates granted to them. (Morocco)

• Create regional rapporteurs according to modalities to be determined; these will complement the country-specific special procedures and will not be competent to deal with countries that already have specific country mandates. (France)

• Avoid duplication of mandates. (Bangladesh)

• Establish country mandates only on the basis of consent of the country concerned. (Bangladesh)

• Special Procedures must comply with the Code of Conduct. (Belarus)

• Establish a committee or other body on the compliance of the mandate holders with the Code of Conduct. (Belarus)

• Special Procedures must be independent and guided by the Code of Conduct; they should not go beyond their mandate. (Saudi Arabia)

• Flexibility should be maintained with regard to the establishment of new mandate. (Argentina and Chile)

• Oppose any proposal which might restrict the independence of mandate holders. (Peru)

• Views of concerned countries must be respected and coercive and confrontational imposition of politicized country-specific mandates against their will must be restrained under whatever circumstances. (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea)

• Promote continuity and effectiveness of engagement between mandate holders and States by standardizing the terms of all mandates to three years. (Canada)

• Enhance coverage of the Special Procedures system, and enhance the prevention, early warning, and responsiveness function of HRC by establishing new types of Special Procedures to look at all urgent, emerging, persistent or neglected human rights situations around the world, regardless of the country, and to bring these situations to the Council’s attention. In this regard, create one Working Group focused on each geographic region. (Canada)

• Refers to a number of measures in its written contribution to reduce the number of new Council resolutions, new mandate resolutions in particular in order to make Special Procedures more effective. (Japan)
• Special Procedures should work exclusively within the parameters of the mandate entrusted to them and prepare carefully their reports to ensure that they are realistic, objective and impartial. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Respect the independence of mandate holders but also the sovereignty of States that should not be jeopardized. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Special Procedures to cooperate with States in keeping the mandate granted to them. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Change some Special Procedures to Working Groups to guarantee cultural diversity and equitable geographic distribution. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Avoid the appointment of a mandate holder against the will of the country concerned thus jeopardizing the sovereignty of that country. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Establish an independent legal committee composed of international independent experts to ensure respect of the Code of Conduct by Special Procedures. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Under the RRI process, consider establishing regional Special Procedures specific for all regions of the world in the principle of non-selectivity. Possible criteria for the establishment of such procedures could be:

  • every region have its own special procedure covering every country of the region. The mandate holder would be an independent expert of the region;

  • it would not be a thematic special procedure for region, but rather a special procedure to observe the general situation of human rights in the region;

  • the special procedure should report annually on all countries of the region, identifying areas dealt with, in terms of positive practices and issues of concern as well as challenges;

  • in the report, the regional Special Procedure could refer to information submitted by the State concerned, use information from the UPR, the general system of the UN system or respective regional organizations as well as NHRI's in compliance with the Paris principles;

  • the regional special procedure could function as a mechanism of support and advice that would coordinate with regional OHCHR offices as well as other special procedures. In this respect, it could work to facilitate the cohesion of the system and support the implementation of UPR recommendations;

  • the regional special procedure could contribute to identify priority areas for technical cooperation and develop strategies for the implementation of human rights mechanisms, regional or universal;

  • in cases where a Special Procedure on a given country already exists, these countries might be excluded by the regional special procedure. (Costa Rica)

• Take necessary measures to ensure independence, neutrality, objectivity, non-selectivity and non-politicization of mandate holders and to make sure that they do not go beyond their mandate in compliance of the UN Charter provisions as well as the resolution establishing their mandates and the Code of Conduct. (Yemen)

• The Special Procedures Coordination Committee to continue its efforts to inform Special Procedures of the Code of Conduct and to continue to play its role in resolving concerns that arise with respect to the Code of Conduct. (United States of America)
• Adjust the duration of country mandates to that of thematic mandates, except when the mandate holder advises otherwise. Also every mandate should contain elements for supervision, information and identification of possible assistance and legal advice needs. (Spain)

• Oppose any proposal to limit the independence of Special Procedures. (Spain)

• Special Procedures to act in an objective, independent, non-selective, impartial and non-politicized manner. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Establish a monitoring mechanism to review the compliance of the Special Procedures with their mandate and the Code of Conduct. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Implement the process of RRI on a regular basis and review the reporting cycle of the Special Procedures mandate holders to rationalize it, and make appropriate recommendations to the GA. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Consider converting some Special Procedures into Working Groups during the renewal of their mandates or in the context of a continuing RRI process. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Define some criteria for the establishment of new Special Procedures in order to prevent their proliferation and their unnecessary duplication with existing mechanisms. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Create country specific mandates on the basis of the approval by a two-thirds majority of the Council. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Support the notion that all Special Procedures mandate holders should work to the highest standards of professionalism whilst fulfilling their mandates. Their work should be carried out in full compliance with the Code of Conduct and in an objective, independent, and non-politicized manner. (Indonesia)

• The idea of creating specific Working Groups to undertake the important duties of mandate holders could be further explored. (Indonesia)

• Draw attention of Art 4/3 of Resolution 5/2 which stipulates the necessity for national legislation to be respected and upheld at all times. (Indonesia)

• Have a more stringent quality control or screening of Special Procedures before creating new ones, and avoid duplication and explore other means of addressing issues as provided in sub-paragraphs 58 (c) and (d) of the IBP. (Philippines)

• Any attempts to limit the work of Special Procedures through unnecessary oversight mechanisms are unacceptable. (Ireland)

• Consider converting some Special Procedures, the most sensitive ones to begin with, into Working Groups in order to overcome the problem of idiosyncrasies of individual Special Procedures that have at times led to the invoking the Code of Conduct. (India)

• Use the review as an opportunity to streamline, merge or possibly discontinue mandates, in particular where duplication and overlap clearly exists. (India)

• Special procedures should act objectively, independently and impartially and in strict compliance with the Code of Conduct. (Azerbaijan)

• Continue the review, rationalization and improvement of mandates effectively. (Azerbaijan)
• Avoid duplication of mandates and new mandates should be as clear and specific as possible, so as to avoid ambiguity as reflected in paragraph 58 of the IBP. (Azerbaijan)

• Special Procedures to respect and adhere to the Code of Conduct. (Malaysia)

• Retain the present duration of the country specific and thematic mandates. (Malaysia)

• If a HRC Legal Committee in compliance with resolution 5/2 is established, envisage a role for the Consultative Group. (Malaysia)

• Encourage the Coordination Committee and adequately resource it in order to provide new mandate holders with basic training and orientation to enable them to effectively exercise their mandates from day one. (Austria)

• Encourage the Coordination Committee to take on more responsibility in ensuring that also in the future all Special Procedures mandate holders observe the highest standards of professionalism while exercising their mandates. (Austria)

• Reject proposal aimed at limiting the independence of Special Procedures, namely an oversight mechanism of State representatives. (Austria)

• Limit proposals based on political priorities or a simple objective of visibility when creating new mandates; even if the proliferation of Special Procedures should be avoided, the development of priority issues should be one of the main functions of the Council. (Turkey)

• Reiterate the importance of preserving the independence of mandate holders but underscore the need for mandate holders to operate within the defined parameters of their mandate. (Ghana)

• The challenge for this review process is to identify the manner through which further promote the independence, impartiality and objectivity of the mandate-holders, while ensuring that due procedure is followed, in accordance with the Code of Conduct and in the conduct of their respective mandates. (Sri Lanka)

• The objective of this review should be to further consolidate the understanding that one should distinguish between the independence of mandate holders, which is absolute in nature, and their prerogatives, circumscribed by their mandates, the mandate of the HRC and the provisions of the UN Charter. (Sri Lanka)

• Support proposal to establish, on the basis of equitable geographical distribution, a HRC “Legal Committee on compliance with the Code of Conduct”, the modalities of which should be elaborated inter-governmentally. (Sri Lanka)

• Respect the views of the concerned country and not to impose country resolutions or mandates against their will. In this regard, country mandates should be established by a two-thirds majority of the HRC. (Sri Lanka)

• No support to any proposal which could impact negatively on the independence of Special Procedures. (Sweden)

• Put in place a mechanism to assess the effectiveness of the existing mandates and the prospect they can offer in achieving the objectives of their mandate; to use the result of this assessment to determine steps to be taken to strengthen the mandate in question. (Timor-Leste)

• In relation to country mandate, the establishment of country mandates should be preceded by serious efforts at securing the agreement, at least the consent, of the country concerned. Further, the HRC could work with the concerned country to
identify measures which need to be taken to address the human rights situation that initially demanded the establishment of the mandate. (Timor-Leste)

• In exercising their functions mandate holders must scrupulously comply with the Code of conduct as set out by Council res. 5/2; (Rwanda)

• The mission of mandate holders should be clearly and concisely defined in order to avoid any ambiguity which could negatively affect their efficiency in the exercise of their mandate. (Rwanda)

• Mandate holders must be guided by the principles of independence, impartiality, objectivity, non-politicization and non-selectivity and avoid all external pressure and prejudice. (Rwanda)

• Cannot accept any intention to undermine independence, objectivity and responsibility of Special Procedures. (Paraguay)

• Reinforce impartiality, objectivity, non-politicization and non-selectivity of Special Procedures while distinguishing between mandate holders independence and the obligations and responsibilities set in the UN Charter and the Code of Conduct. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

• Establish a legal Committee on the Special Procedures compliance with the Code of Conduct, composed of equitable geographic distribution. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

• Dialogue with a concerned country would be the most appropriate mean to deal with human rights situation when compared to the imposition of country resolutions without the consent of the concerned country. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

• Ensure respect of the independence, neutrality, integrity and objectivity of the system. (Bahrain)

• Mandate holders must respect the terms of their mandates and missions and accord priority to reports that must be drafted not in line with their personal positions but with the Code of Conduct. (Bahrain)

• OHCHR must also verify the respect of the Code of Conduct and of mandates. (Bahrain)

• The independence of Special Procedures should be preserved. (Ukraine)

• Strengthen mechanisms that allow for independence, objectivity, impartiality, transparency, responsibility and all the principles set in fundamental UN texts, including the Code of Conduct. (Ecuador)

• Establish a mechanism to assess Special Procedures mandate holders compliance with the Code of Conduct. (Ecuador)

• The Council should continue to ensure that the Code of Conduct is a mechanism for building trust between stakeholders and strengthen the Special Procedures system. (Kazakhstan)

• Strengthen the value and credibility of mandate holders’ functions by ensuring a more effective adherence to the Code of Conduct, mandate holders should give due respect to the views of Governments and should avoid bias. (Nepal)

• Reservation on proliferation of mandates; focus on making the existing mandates more effective, to avoid unnecessary overlapping and duplication. (Nepal)

• Rationalize existing Special Procedures; avoid duplication. (Guatemala)
• Respect the Code of Conduct and ensure mandate holders compliance with its provisions. (Guatemala)

• Taking into account the independence of Special Procedures and the need for a two-way cooperation, address any problems related to the implementation of a mandate with the Coordination Committee, acting as a peer ethics mechanism. (Uruguay)

• Improve Special Procedures independence and their full compliance with the terms of their mandates, the provisions of UN Charter, the IBP, the Code of Conduct and international law. (Qatar)

B. Selection of mandate-holders

• Ensure that the most suitably qualified candidates are selected as mandate holders. Add a provision to IBP (or alternatively to Council resolution/decision) that all those participating in this process should be guided by the aims of achieving objectivity, professionalism and independence of experts. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• Respect the principle of equitable geographical representation in the appointment of mandate holders. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

• The President of the Council should follow the order of priority as suggested by the Consultative Group and embark on consultations with regional groups to determine the level of acceptability of selected candidates towards achieving consensus. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

• The Consultative Group should request short-listed candidates to provide written submissions on their views on the relevant mandate and vision for implementation, and to base selection on the criteria of competence, gender, and geographic balance. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

• The President should follow the order of priority suggested by the Consultative Group and if he/she decides otherwise, he/she should explain the reasons for his/her decision. In addition, he/she is to hold extensive consultations with all regional groups to identify candidates that enjoy consensus. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

• Selection should take into account the knowledge and experience in the field of human rights; field experience specifically in the mandate area, gender and geographical balance should be fundamental. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

• OHCHR to undertake a more in depth analysis of the candidates based on the criteria set by the HRC before including them in the public list. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

• Greater interaction during selection process between Consultative Group and candidates. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

• President to undertake open and transparent consultations in due course before selection. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

• Respect the principle of equitable geographical representation while appointing new mandate-holders. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• During the selection/appointment of mandate-holders, the shortlisted candidatures should be invited to make a written submission presenting their views on the relevant mandates and their vision on their implementation. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)
• The President should follow the order of priority as suggested by the CG and should conduct extensive consultations with the regional groups in order to ascertain the acceptability of selected candidates with the aim to achieve consensus. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• Respect the principle of geographical balance in the selection and appointment of mandate holders. (China)

• Conduct interviews with candidates in the process of selection through video or teleconference and request them to make a declaration of commitment, once appointed. (China)

• More attention to be paid to the selection and appointment of Special Procedures to secure they have the highest human rights qualifications which necessarily implies broad experience in the field of human rights. States and all relevant actors should more actively seek for suitable candidates for each mandate, including experts with richer more diverse profiles. (Mexico)

• Before including candidates in the public list, OHCHR should more carefully analyze the candidatures based on the criteria adopted by the HRC. The Presidency could undertake to draw up such a list. (Mexico)

• The Coordination Committee should play a more active role in the selection process, transmitting their views of the current and outgoing mandate holders suggesting the appropriate qualifications and profiles. (Mexico)

• The Consultative Group could interview candidates to assess their capacity, availability and interest in assuming the mandate. (Mexico)

• States should also examine more carefully the objective assessment of the candidates in order to avoid that political or regional considerations prevail in the decisions adopted. (Mexico)

• Strengthen the role of the HRC in the system of candidates selection for the posts of Special Procedures. It should be based first of all on qualifications and experience as well as their abilities to discharge their duties as provided for in para 31 of IBP. The Consultative Group, in agreeing on short list with regional groups, should conduct personal interview with candidates who are also requested to provide in writing motivation for applying for that mandate. The selection procedure should take into account the principle of a just geographical distribution. (Russian Federation)

• Nomination of Special Procedure mandate holders must be based on clear, uniform and professional criteria as developed by the HC. Safeguards must be in place to ensure candidates successfully meet those requirements before an empowered party includes such names on any relevant list for consideration. (Israel)

• Avoid appointing individuals who do not meet the threshold of impartiality and objectivity required to properly carry out the relevant mandate: candidates who have published or promoted debated positions or campaigned on the topic of the country specific mandate must not be included on any list for consideration. (Israel)

• HC should have significant role in the selection of country specific Special Rapporteurs. (Israel)

• Require short-listed candidates for Special Procedures to provide a motivation letter or to reply to a questionnaire in support of their candidacy. (Australia)

• All candidates should clearly specify the vacancy they apply for and explain in details their experiences relevant to the mandate. In addition, eligible candidates should write a motivation letter specifying reasons for their interest in the mandate at
had, in the name of transparency, those motivation letters could be published on OHCHR website. (Finland)

• The Consultative Group should interview short-listed candidates. Interviews could be conducted by using the most cost-effective working methods, including teleconferencing. (Finland)

• The Consultative Group could be enlarged by the inclusion of additional members in order to increase its expertise, experience and effectiveness. (Finland)

• The Consultative Group to substantiate its choices. (Algeria)

• The President to do the following:
  
  (a) Follow the order of priority put forward by the Consultative Group in ascertaining accessibility of selected candidates by regional groups, any change resulting from substantiated requests from the latter;
  
  (b) to ascertain that the country of origin of a mandate holder and the regional group of the country concerned, in case of country specific mandates, do not object to the suggested candidate;
  
  (c) to substantiate his/her choices when transmitting to the HRC the list of candidates identified for each vacancy if different from the selection and order of priority proposed by the CG. (Algeria)

• Re-activate the application of procedures in the IBP aiming at the nomination of competent mandate-holders with proper expertise and experience in the relevant fields of human rights that have not been fully applied, focusing on the upholding of guiding principles such as objectivity, professionalism and independence, by all participants in the process of selection and nomination of mandate-holders. (Republic of Korea)

• Support proposals to develop criteria for inclusion in the roster of Special Procedures mandates holders. (United Kingdom)

• The selection procedure should be improved. The Consultative Group could be supported by an expertise from OHCHR or the Coordination Committee. The candidates should submit a “motivation letter” for their candidature. The Consultative Group should have the possibility to interview all short-listed candidates. Proposals made by the Consultative Group should be motivated. (Morocco)

• Strengthen the selection process to guarantee the independence and effectiveness of Special Procedures; independent experts such as the Chair of the International Coordinating Committee of NHRIs, the Chair of the Coordination Committee of Special Procedures or the HC should participate in the work of the Consultative Group. (France)

• Implement adequately para 40 of the IBP on the principle of equal geographic representation among mandate holders. (Bangladesh)

• Candidates short-listed must submit their views on how their prospective mandates can be improved or a programme of action on implementation of their prospective mandates to gain a fuller idea of the candidates. (Belarus)

• There should be an increased transparency in the selection and appointment of Special Procedures in respecting the equitable geographical distribution of the appointment. (Saudi Arabia)
• Improve the selection process ensuring that the most appropriate mandate holder is selected. (Colombia)

• Candidates should be interviewed by the Consultative Group and each candidate should provide something in writing on how they visualize the exercise and why they think they are the best candidates. (Colombia)

• Select and appoint mandate holders on the basis of practical not theoretical criteria e.g. their experience; guarantee equitable geographic, cultural and religious diversity in the appointment process. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Ensure transparency in the selection and appointment of mandate holders in terms of equitable geographical distribution in conformity with art. 101 of the UN Charter. (Yemen)

• Introduce improvements into the procedure for selection and appointment of Special Procedure mandate holders, and also ask the secretariat to justify or give reasons for the selection of candidates on a public list, or to ensure that a Special Procedure mandate holder participates in the deliberations of the Consultative Group in that respect. The President should also give reasons for selection made if it does not follow the proposal of the Consultative Group. (Spain)

• Decide the appointment of a country specific mandate holder based on the consent of concerned countries. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• President to follow the order of priority as suggested by the Consultative Group and conduct extensive consultations with the regional groups to ascertain the acceptability of selected candidates to achieve consensus. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• The Consultative Group should request the short listed candidates to submit in writing their views on the relevant mandate and vision for implementation. The President should follow the order of priority suggested by the Consultative Group and ascertain the suitability of selected candidates by regional groups. (Indonesia)

• Improve the selection process for mandate-holders by requiring short-listed candidates to make written submissions on the work of the mandates they are being considered for. (Philippines)

• HRC secretariat to provide rationale for selecting candidates from the public list. (Ireland)

• The President of the HRC should justify fully any decision by to depart from the order of selection indicated by the Consultative Group without seeking to undermine this right (of the President). (Ireland)

• Strengthen the selection process of Special Procedures, also taking into account the views of the outgoing Special Procedures or Chair of the Coordination Committee, as long as the primacy of the inter-governmental process in the Consultative Group is maintained. (India)

• The HRC President should conduct wide consultations for developing a consensus before proposing appointments based on recommendations by the Consultative Group. The President should also follow the order of priority recommended by the Consultative Group and, in case of a departure, provide reasons for the same; but it would not be desirable to give any country or regional group a veto over the selection of a particular nominee. (India)

• Ensure equitable representation concerning the appointment of mandate holders and select most suitable candidates. (Azerbaijan)
• Selection process positive gains to be preserved through refining the process of consultation as well as the technical and objective requirements for prospective candidates. (Malaysia)

• The Consultative Group could make active use of the contributions of Special Procedures, in its work to enhance the selection process and ensure that nominees meet the requirements of the mandate in terms of independence, expertise and experience. (Austria)

• Respect and enhance the principle of equal geographical representation among mandate holders when they are appointed. (Sri Lanka)

• Strengthen the selection and nomination process of the mandate holders. (Sweden)

• Improve the Special Procedures selection process, in observance of the principle of equitable geographic distribution. The Consultative Group should take into account gender, competence and geographic balance in making selection. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

• The President should follow the order of priority on the recommended list by the Consultative Group as well as on the basis of consultations with regional groups. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)

• Improve the criteria for the appointment of Special Procedures mandate holders. (Ukraine)

• Improve the selection and appointment process of Special Procedures to avoid any discrimination and manipulation. (Ecuador)

• Effectively introduce equitable geographical balance while selecting and appointing the mandate holders. (Nepal)

• Strengthen the role of OHCHR and the Coordination Committee in the selection process of mandate holders to ensure a better analysis of their experience. (Uruguay)

• Improve transparency in the mandate holders selection process, having due regard to the principle of equitable geographic distribution. (Qatar)

C. Methods of work and reporting modalities

• mandates studies/reports presented to the Council to always take precedence over un-mandated ones (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

• Add an annex to Special Procedures country visits reports, including information presented to them by State concerned and its comments on the preliminary reports presented by the Special Procedures. (Egypt on behalf of the NAM)

• Publish, if required by States, response to the Special Procedures report on the country visit at the same time as the report, possibly as annex. (Costa Rica/GRULAC)

• OHCHR to provide enhanced capacity building to mandate holders. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

• An annex should be added to country visits reports of Special Procedures including information presented to them by the States concerned, and other comments on the preliminary reports prepared by Special Procedures. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• Revise the cycle of presentation of Special Procedures’ reports in order to rationalize them. (Cuba)
• At the request of the State concerned, to ensure that the response of the State concerned to the report of the Special Rapporteur’s visit be published simultaneously with the report of the Special Rapporteur. (Cuba)

• Diversify ways and means of interaction between Special Procedures and country visited in addition to country visits including that Special Procedures should proactively engage in bilateral dialogues. (China)

• Once appointed, there should be better induction for Special Rapporteurs on the functioning of the system while fully respecting their independence to avoid controversy often due to the lack of familiarity with the system. (Mexico)

• Develop “best practices” guidelines to guide work of the Special Procedures mandate holders, fact finding missions and other related mechanisms. (Israel)

• De-cluster the current clustered interactive dialogue to allow more time for discussion and Special Rapporteur to respond after 8 to 10 statements. (Switzerland)

• Include an Annex to Special Procedures’ country visits reports of State comments on the initial draft report. (Australia)

• Increase the regularity and focus on interactive dialogue with mandate holders, including through a separate, un-clustered dialogue for each mandate. (Australia)

• Further utilize the expertise of the Special Procedures in panel discussions, working groups, briefing sessions and stand-alone dialogue. (Australia)

• Enhance technical cooperation and assistance in order to help States to be able to meet the demands of Special Procedures, such as preparation of reports or field visits. (Thailand)

• Requests of visits should also be combined in order to reduce the burden of the States concerned. (Thailand)

• Following country visits, member states should have the opportunity on a voluntary basis to submit a document containing responses to the Special Rapporteur’s visit; this document should be published as annex to the report of the Special Rapporteur. (Bolivia on behalf of Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia)

• Special Procedures should also reply more promptly to the invitations of States. (Algeria)

• Provide technical assistance and consolidation of capacities through country mandates without resorting to pressure between the mandate holder and States concerned. (Sudan)

• Submit written questions in advance by Council members wishing to participate in the interactive dialogues. (Republic of Korea)

• Enhance the level of dialogue with individual Special Procedures and rearrange the current clustered ID system. (United Kingdom)

• The Coordination Committee to open itself to Member States to establish a dialogue with them. (Morocco)

• Mandate holders must encourage the dialogue and consultation with the member states of the HRC by organizing regular discussions with States and allocating more time for ID during the HRC sessions. (Morocco)

• The OHCHR, in consultation with the Coordination Committee, should ensure appropriate training for the new mandate holders to allow them to be familiarized with their mandate and the work within the UN. Regarding country mandates,
OHCHR should provide them with reports submitted by the country concerned in addition to OHCHR documents in order to have an objective view of the situation on the ground. (Morocco)

- Establish a system of periodic consultations between the Special Procedures and States in view to enhance the mutual dialogues and exchange, in addition to traditional dialogues following the presentation of reports. (Senegal)

- Avoid clustering during the ID. (Bangladesh)

- Optimize the gathering of views in the process of preparation of reports and other publications by mandate holders, especially that questionnaires for the preparation of thematic reports and other studies should be translated into all UN languages. (Belarus)

- Establish reasonable deadlines for States to respond to questionnaires, two months proposed. (Belarus)

- Special procedures should send to States texts of their presentation and statements for Council meetings on time; this will also make it possible for more intensive and focused inter-active dialogues with Special Procedures. (Belarus)

- Special Procedures, in presenting their country visit reports, must include the comments and conclusions of Governments of countries visited. (Saudi Arabia)

- Publish the comments and observations of the State concerned on the country mission reports as Annex to the report of the Special Rapporteur or the Working Group, guarantying a balanced view of the situation. (Colombia)

- De-cluster interactive dialogues with Special Procedures, to foresee at least 2 hours of dialogue with each of them including more time for the special procedures to react to statements by delegations. (Germany)

- Adequate institutional support to the Special Procedures; HRC to make more efforts to this effect. (Germany)

- Have a better coordination between Special Procedures, through
  (a) short, medium and long term planning of country visits;
  (b) information from Special Procedures of criteria used for the selection of countries to be visited;
  (c) the strengthening of the work of the Coordination Committee to programme their work using criteria that will provide greater efficiency. (Argentina and Chile)

- Establish new working methods and additional mechanisms such as the holding of briefings and debates that will allow to hear various voices, for example among others testimonies of victims of human rights violations, national experts, representatives of other UN agencies and of regional organizations. (Argentina and Chile)

- Strengthening follow-up recommendations by integrating information analysis and recommendation of Special Procedures into the thematic and country specific discussions with the participation of civil society in these debates, through videoconference, if necessary; by providing regular information by States on compliance of recommendations of Special Procedures in national reports to UPR, by sending reminders to States which do not comply with the recommendations of Special Procedures. (Argentina and Chile)
• Include replies of the country concerned in the Special Procedures’ country mission reports. (Peru)

• Allow the National Human Rights Institution of the State visited to take the floor following the State intervention. (Peru)

• Increase the time for the interactive dialogues e.g by reducing the time for or eliminating the general debates segment which follows the presentation of the reports of Special Procedures. (Peru)

• Special Procedures should coordinate more with regional human rights bodies. (Peru)

• Enhance quality of HRC interaction with Special Procedures:
  
  (a) Ensure stand-alone interactive dialogue with each Special Procedure by:

  • Allowing sufficient time for interventions by all interested States and NGOs
  • Allowing time for mandate holders to respond after each 10 interventions
  • Encouraging questions to be submitted in advance
  • Reducing speaking times for interventions

  (b) Engage Special Procedures more frequently via periodic joint briefings/panels on cross-cutting issues (either at the request of the HRC or of the mandate holders) (Canada).

• Existing mandate holders should be encouraged to interact more frequently and deeply to enable the Council to be better apprised of their activities. (Japan)

• Council should be flexible with the format of the reports from and dialogue with mandate holders in order to avoid overloading the programme of work. (Japan)

• Incorporate answers of the States to the mandate holders in the reports. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Avoid duplication between the Complaint Procedure and other procedures adopted by the Council and take all measures to reject politicized complaints and verify the credibility of the source of the complaint in order to avoid finger pointing for unfounded and false reasons. (Yemen)

• Give more time to interactive dialogues with special procedures giving up the current system of clustering mandate holders. (Spain)

• Add an annex to country visit reports of Special Procedures including information presented to them by the State concerned and the State’s comments to the preliminary report. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Outline specific agreed terms and conditions pertaining to the methods, procedure and technical aspects of the visit, between the Special Procedures and countries concerned prior to an official Special Procedures visit; this measure should not in any manner undermine the independence of Special Procedures and should be implemented on a case by case basis with accordance of the specific country and mandate holder concerned. (Indonesia)

• Encourage all special procedures that they submit their reports on time and that Secretariat translate them in a timely manner into all UN languages to ensure a genuine and informed dialogue on relevant issues in the Council; (Philippines)
• Encourage special procedures to coordinate before making requests for country visits, and consider consulting with delegations in Geneva informally before issuing formal request letters for visits; (Philippines)

• Mandate holders to be encouraged to make special reports to the Council either on a thematic or country situation if circumstances justify this. (Ireland)

• Welcome more coordination among Special Procedures, e.g. on visits. (Ireland)

• Enhance the quality of IDs with Special Procedures, preferably through individual dialogue, as distinct from a clustered dialogue with Special Procedures. (India)

• Allocate more time for interactive dialogues and rationalize time management to ensure the proper interactive character of the discussion with special procedures mandate holders, to allow them to respond to the questions addressed to them. (Azerbaijan)

• All reports prepared by mandate holders should be submitted at least two weeks before the session of the Council. (Azerbaijan)

• An annex reflecting views of the concerned countries should be added to the country reports. (Azerbaijan)

• Explore the issue of disconnect of Special Procedures bypassing the Council through their direct reporting to the GA (Malaysia)

• Include a clear reference for Special Procedures to prioritize the delivery of reports mandated or requested by the Council (Malaysia)

• Special Procedures to respond when extended invitations to undertake country visits in a similar way States are expected to respond to requests for visits by Special Procedures. (Malaysia)

• Allocate more time for IDs with the Special Procedures, discontinue the clustered ID. (Austria)

• Make a more effective use of the opportunity to engage with Special Procedures mandate holders throughout the year. Short briefing-sessions could be used by the Council to hear briefing by Special Procedures or other UN agencies on specific or emerging human rights situations in a thematic, regional or country-specific context. (Austria)

• The Coordination Committee could present the report of the annual meeting of Special Procedures at a HRC session. (Austria)

• Encourage the Coordination Committee and adequately resource it in order to provide new mandate holders with basic training and orientation to enable them to effectively exercise their mandates from day one. (Austria)

• Develop ways of cooperating and for constructive dialogue between country rapporteurs and the countries concerned. (Turkey)

• Develop the interactive dialogue with the special procedures and possibilities for coordinating among the Special Procedures. (Turkey)

• Take all necessary steps to ensure the Special Procedures are able to meet NGOs’ officials when visiting their countries. (Turkey)

• Improve IDs by allocating more time to the dialogue and avoiding the clustering of mandate holders. (Sweden)
• Allocate more time for the IDs between the Council and the Special Procedures. (Timor-Leste)

• Allocate enough time and logistical resources to mandate holders in the exercise of their mandate to allow them to carry out personal and independent evaluation of the situation on the ground and avoid having to use other sources of information that might have preconceived and prejudiced positions. (Rwanda)

• Mandate holders should submit their reports within the time set by the Council in order to allow delegations to better prepare for the interactive dialogues. (Rwanda)

• Mandate holders should formulate their recommendations in more realistic way and more concise and unambiguous manner to ensure that they can be better used. (Rwanda)

• Permanent dialogue with mandate holders is a constructive exchange leading to results and should not be limited to written communications and complaints. (Paraguay)

• Mandate holders would help if they could formulate more concrete proposals of cooperation and solutions that can generate consensus at the local level. (Paraguay)

• Improve transparency and strengthen the interaction of Special Procedures with the Member States of the Council. (Ukraine)

• Ensure better coordination among existing Special Procedures as well as increase the coordination with treaty bodies and other UN bodies and agencies. (Ukraine)

• Special Procedures should seek for as much as possible comprehensive information from Governments prior to their country visits. (Kazakhstan)

• Mandate holders and states should try to exhaust all channels to reach objective, reliable and comprehensive assessment. (Kazakhstan)

• Add final remarks and comments from Governments as annexes to the reports. (Kazakhstan)

• Engage in a separate interactive dialogue with each mandate holder to ensure a positive dialogue and comprehensive assessment of the work of the mandate holders. (Kazakhstan)

• The Coordinating Committee of the Special Procedures should continue to improve its Manual of Operations. (Kazakhstan)

• Improve clarity in the management of Special Procedures funding and to ensure equal support to all Special Procedures; a joint fund should be set up on un-earmarked contribution which can be distributed to all Special Procedures. (Guatemala)

• Invite Special Procedures to verify the credibility of their sources of information; (Qatar)

• Include in Special Procedures reports the comments, replies and views of the concerned country to the Council and the General Assembly. (Qatar)

D. Cooperation with Special Procedures and follow-up

• In line with 60/251, States have an obligation to cooperate with different mechanisms of the Council.
• Council Members must lead by example by cooperating fully with all Council mechanisms throughout their time in the Council (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• Use the level of State’s cooperation as an indicator in relation to applications for HRC membership. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• Preserve Special Procedures as one of the most, if not the most accessible human rights mechanisms to human rights defenders and actual or potential victims; to address acts of intimidation or reprisals against those cooperating or seeking to cooperate with Special Procedures (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• On follow-up to work of Special Procedures, ensure that Council is in a position to fulfil its mandate under UNGA resolution 60/251: this requires much greater-follow up to the activities, recommendations and communications of Special Procedures mandate holders; this also implies that Council should devote enough time for interactive dialogues with SP mandate holders and have adequate tools at its disposal to respond to situations of violations of human rights (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

• States should cooperate with Special Procedures in the performing of their mandates by providing required information and responding to their communication in timely manner. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

• Cooperation of all stakeholders, in particular States, with the system is needed to make it effective and able to improve the situation on the ground. (Mexico)

• Cooperation of States implies the organization of country visits, the proper attention to urgent appeals, timely responses to thematic consultations and openness for objective and respectful dialogue with Special Procedures. (Mexico)

• Special Procedures should facilitate cooperation and technical assistance in support of national efforts. (Mexico)

• Standing invitation is exclusively a matter of voluntary consideration of States and should not be either an obligation for them, or criteria of assessment on their work in human rights. (Russian Federation)

• Any sitting Member State of the Council should allow Special Procedures mandate holders to visit the country during its membership in the event such a request arises. (Israel)

• Create a database, similar to the one on UPR, to include information on country visit requests, responses or lack of response from States as well as other communications from the Special Procedures to States. (Switzerland)

• Increase the number of invitations issued to Special Procedures and to facilitate those visits to take place. (Australia)

• Establish a public record of how States cooperate with the independent experts, including state responses to visit requests and the number of visits received by each country. (Australia)

• Human Rights Council Member States to allow mandate holders to visit during their membership term if requested. (Australia)

• Dialogue between Special Procedures and Member States should be undertaken as a two-way street cooperation to achieve concrete results for better implementation of all human rights. (Bolivia on behalf of Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia)
• HC should prepare a compilation on visits for each Special Procedure to include states visited, requests for visits made by states and by Special Procedures and any responses provided. (Bolivia on behalf of Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia)

• Explore possible means and modalities of addressing the issue of lack of cooperation with special procedures in a more systematic way, especially for cases such as persistent denials of mandate holders’ field-visit requests. The Council should discuss those cases under relevant agenda items at its regular session. (Republic of Korea)

• Greater emphasis should be put on States’ record of cooperation with the Special Procedures during the meeting of the HRC and this should be taken into account when States are standing for the HRC membership. (United Kingdom)

• It should be obligatory for States to cooperate fully with all Council mechanisms throughout their time on the HRC by agreeing to requests for country visit and responding to their communications. (United Kingdom)

• The HRC should enhance its level of attention to the problem of reprisals against those individuals who cooperate with the mechanisms of the UN system including the Special Procedures. (United Kingdom)

• Have dedicated discussion of follow up to previous reports and country visits carried out by Special Procedures. (United Kingdom)

• Must remedy lack of cooperation as credibility and effectiveness of the Council are at stake. (France)

• Consider degree of cooperation with Special Procedures as one of the criteria for membership in Council, which should be evaluated by OHCHR. Failure to honour standing invitations, not responding to urgent appeals or not systematically following up on request for visits should prevent countries from standing for election. The GA should study this in its forthcoming discussion on the status of Council. (France)

• Create a code of conduct for States with regards to Special Procedures which will establish obligation of States in the area of cooperation. (France)

• To publish the information on visits accomplished and visits requested by States in an organized manner to provide greater transparency. (Colombia)

• Strengthen follow-up to recommendations through:
  
  (a) Inclusion of information and analysis of the reports of Special Procedures in the debates on thematic and country issues. (Argentina and Chile)

  (b) Participation of civil society during these dialogues, through videoconferencing which will enable NGOs that do not have the possibility to attend these debates to participate in the dialogues with States and Special Procedures. (Argentina and Chile)

  (c) Provide periodic information by States about the status of implementation of recommendations made by Special Procedures. (Argentina and Chile)

  (d) Inclusion in the national report presented under the UPR of information related to the implementation of recommendations made by Special Procedures. (Argentina and Chile)

  (e) Sending reminders to States that have not replied on progress made in the implementation of recommendations made by Special Procedures (Argentina and Chile)
• Promote mutual cooperation between States and Special Procedures, through
  
  (a) Strengthening the resource and support for the implementation of technical cooperation proposals made by Special Procedures in their recommendations.

  (b) Considering cooperation of States as a criteria for the election of the Council membership and in this context suggest the following actions:
  
  asking the OHCHR to compile and make available objective information on the cooperation programme between States and UN Human Rights mechanisms, giving effect to para 9 of res. 60/251, including the issue of cooperation under item 5 of the agenda of the HRC, creating a standby group of experts to undertake ad-hoc missions and tasks mandated by the HRC. (Argentina and Chile)

• Special Procedures to implement a policy of contact and of constant information with civil society in each country, for example, through the establishment a database of national or local NGOs organized by countries. (Argentina and Chile)

• Special procedures should submit after a certain period of time a report on follow up or implementation of recommendations made during country visits as well as proposals to improve the implementation of a particular right. (Peru)

• Enhance the cooperation between States and Special Procedures. (Brazil)

• Make available a compilation of all information regarding the country visits requests from Special Procedures, invitations received and the status of responses. (Brazil)

• Provide the international community as whole with access to the response from Governments on the content of country visits reports. (Brazil)

• Country visits reports prepared by Special Procedures and responses from Governments should be available as documents of the Council in order to increase the level of information available to all stakeholders. (Brazil)

• Special Procedures should promote technical assistance and capacity building to interested countries. Special Procedures should work as facilitators for the provisions of technical assistance and cooperation. (Brazil)

• Enhance States’ cooperation with the system of Special Procedures by elaborating guidelines for effective State engagement with Special Procedures to which all HRC members would by definition be committed to adhere. (Canada)

• The Council to give further thought to countermeasures when faced with persistent non-cooperation. (Japan)

• HC should compile a report on typical benchmarks which indicate the eagerness or reluctance of states to cooperate with Special Procedures, such as the acceptance or refusal of requests for country visits by Special Procedures, and of the corresponding facts pertaining to non-cooperation by specific States. (Japan)

• Need to improve the cooperation between States and Special Procedures. (Costa Rica)

• Non-cooperation should be looked at seriously during review. (Czech Republic)

• Full cooperation should be an obligation for Members of the Council and those who are applying to become a Member: bona fide cooperation should be made an important indicator in applications; persistent lack of cooperation should mean State is not qualified for membership. (Czech Republic)
• Look for ways to put more pressure on those who already sit in the Council but refuse to cooperate with the mandates. (Czech Republic)

• Ensure that there is appropriate follow-up to the work of the Special Procedures, including follow-up by States on implementation of recommendations as appropriate, and to follow-up by the Council itself. Specifically, to build time for follow-up into the Programme of Work of the HRC, and OHCHR and States should provide reporting on implementation to facilitate the follow-up. (United States of America)

• Expand support for Special Procedures with respect to the dissemination of their findings, their ability to travel to concerned countries to distribute and discuss their reports, and their ability to participate in public debates on issues covered in their work. (United States of America)

• Produce a public record of how States cooperate with the Special Procedures, including a database on all communications on an ongoing basis and to submit it to the HRC. Information may be included in the HC annual report to the HRC on States responses to all correspondence and recommendations of Special Procedures, responses to visit requests, number of visits to each country, and promptness of visits, such as date of request, date of State response and date of visit. (United States of America)

• Establish benchmarks for gauging basic cooperation of States with Special Procedures on country visits, including: States should respond within four months of a country visit request with a suggested time frame for the visit; a State should accommodate a visit request within two years, except where there is a long queue of requests and the State has consistently hosted three visits a year; States should cooperate in assisting the modalities of the country visit. (United States of America)

• Require any State that is a candidate country for the HRC to provide an update/response to Special Procedures inquiries, recommendations, and request for country visits. States should consider a candidate’s record of cooperation with the Special Procedures when electing members to the HRC. (United States of America)

• Establish a check for “standing invitations” to Special Procedures: if Governments are non-responsive to visit requests or are not cooperating in good faith to allow access to Special Procedures using the benchmark of four months and two years (cited above) that states will no longer be able to claim a standing invitation. (United States of America)

• Require States to respond to issues raised by Special Procedures as an annex to their UPR reports. (United States of America)

• Trigger a meeting and appropriate consideration of the HRC when five different Special Procedures cite the same country as a country of serious concern in their regular reports. (United States of America)

• Cooperation with Special Procedures should be taken as a major indicator on candidacies for countries applying to be members of the Council. (Spain)

• Support proposal to discuss under Item 5 objective information collected and provided by OHCHR on the degree of cooperation between States and Special Procedures. (Ireland)

• States to be encouraged to take the degree of cooperation documented into account in guiding the choices for elections to HRC. (Ireland)
• Secretariat should be tasked with monitoring that countries having issued standing invitations operate this policy in practice. The Council to note the updated list of countries with standing invitations under Item 5 and remove from the list those countries who no longer in practice operate this policy. (Ireland)

• States should also cooperate with Special Procedures to enable them to work in a constructive manner. (Azerbaijan)

• Encourage candidate countries for HRC membership to include in their pledges a commitment to fully cooperate with Special Procedures, including by issuing a standing invitation, and there could be a regular review and follow-up with States on such pledges in the HRC. (Austria)

• Develop effective mechanisms to prevent, and take action on reprisals against those who cooperate with the UN, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights, in particular Special Procedures. (Austria)

• Establish a public record on invitations to Special Procedures, pending request for visits and visits accomplished. (Austria)

• Task OHCHR with setting up a publicly accessible data-base containing all recommendations made to each specific State by Special Procedures, treaty bodies and accepted UPR recommendations, along with indication on the status of implementation of each recommendation. (Austria)

• Create conducive environment for dialogue and mutual cooperation between States and Special Procedures. (Ghana)

• Work towards elimination of bottlenecks hindering cooperation between States and Special Procedures and devise creative means of ensuring that few cases of non-cooperation do not derail Council objective. (Ghana)

• All States should demonstrate unconditional and constructive cooperation with Special Procedures. (Sweden)

• Promote cooperation by keeping a record of responses from States on requests of country visits or of specific information. (Sweden)

• Include the issue of follow-up in the reports by the Special Procedure mandate holder to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations. (Sweden)

• Special Procedures to be obliged, following a country visit, to dedicate one page to follow-up to that mission in all subsequent reports to the Council. This dedicated page would inform the international community about key developments, progress with implementation of recommendations and steps taken by the UN and the wider community to provide capacity-support to the State concerned. (Maldives)

• Member States of the HRC should demonstrate maximum cooperation with its mechanisms. It would be useful if candidates for HRC membership issue standing invitation to Special Procedures as an essential condition for membership. (Paraguay)

• Strengthen the role of cooperation to support the implementation of recommendations, with the help of the Secretariat and the UN system, at the request of States. (Uruguay)

• States who have not yet issued standing invitation can at least be expected to invite thematic mandate holders to assist in facing major challenges in specific areas, such as the areas identified by the UPR. (Uruguay)
E. Funding/resources

- Attaches the greater importance to the transparency of funding for Special Procedures. (Belgium on behalf of the EU)

- Allocate funds for Special Procedures mandates in a transparent and even manner, irrespective of whether they are in the sphere of civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights. (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group)

- Place all Special Procedures on equal footing. In this regard OHCHR should provide information on the financial resources used by mandate holders in the form of “expenditure report” annexed to their reports. There has to be an exclusive reliance on UN regular budget funding and a ban on any fund-raising, or voluntarily contribution, to individual mandate holders. Any otherwise voluntary contributions should be made to OHCHR in the form of non-earmarked resources, subject to public disclosure, and OHCHR is to allocate them evenly on all mandate holders. The same principle of equal allocation is to be applied to human resources. Furthermore only members of the OHCHR Secretariat should accompany mandate-holders during their official country visits. (Egypt/NAM)

- Increased transparency in the resources provided to special procedures, and Council should be informed on availability of and sources of the funding of each Special Procedure. Where external funding is available, a common fund should be established. (Costa Rica on behalf of GRULAC)

- Transparency in resource allocation and expenditure within the system of Special Procedures should be guaranteed. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- All mandate-holders, whether in the domain of ESCR or CPR, should be treated on equal footing as far resource allocation is concerned. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Information on the financial resources used by mandate-holders in executing their mandates in the form of an “expenditure report” should annexed to their reports. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Voluntary resources should be made to OHCHR in the form of non-earmarked resources, and OHCHR should allocate them equally to all mandate-holders. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Equal human resources should be provided to all mandate-holders and only members of the Secretariat should accompany the mandate-holders in the course of their official country visits. (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC)

- Establish a general fund from voluntary contributions to support the activities of Special Procedures, these contributions should be provided without any conditions or specific earmarking for any particular procedures. This allocation of contributions should be subject to a decision by a task force composed of representatives of five Member States of the Council, one from each regional group; all Special Procedures should be treated on an equal footing with regard to resources to undertake their activities unless they have been mandated to undertake specific additional tasks. (Cuba)

- OHCHR should consider disclosing the human and financial resources support to Special Procedures including the sources and the use of earmarked fund. (China)

- Need more transparency for the use of extra budgetary resources. When extra budgetary contribution is required, this contribution can be consolidated into one fund in order to ensure the equal distribution of funds. (Mexico)
• Need for equal treatment of all Special Procedures which also applies to the support given to them by OHCHR. The provision should be strengthened so that any financing of Special Procedures, including voluntary financing, must be transparent and should be conducted exclusively through OHCHR on equal and non-selective basis. (Russian Federation)

• Mandate holders should be funded from the regular UN budget or in the case where a separate fund is established, monitoring mechanisms be put in place to ensure that the allocation of funds is on an equal and transparent basis. (South Africa)

• Ensure that adequate resources, both in terms of finance and personnel, are available to support the work of all mandate holders on an equal footing. (Thailand)

• Promote transparency of the resources used by mandate holders. (Thailand)

• Encourage OHCHR to provide information on the financial resources used by mandate holders. (Thailand)

• Voluntary contributions should be made as non-earmarked resources to OHCHR, which shall be allocated among all mandate holders in an equitable manner. (Thailand)

• Any resolution to create a new mandate should be matched by contributions from States. (Thailand)

• HC should submit a report to the Council on the amount of resources used by each special procedure during their country visits. (Bolivia on behalf of Brazil, Ecuador and Colombia)

• Emphasis should be put on the exclusive reliance on UN regular budget to the funding of Special Procedures activities. Any earmarked voluntary contribution should be put in a common fund and distributed to mandate holders equitably. (Algeria)

• Create a special fund to ensure the necessary financing of the functioning of the Special Procedures which should not depend on voluntary contributions to ensure equal treatment of all Special Procedures and guarantee their independence. (Morocco)

• Address the need for sufficient financial and human resources for Special Procedures. (Bangladesh)

• Maintain the universality and objectivity in providing sufficient and adequate financial and human resources for all Special Procedures. (Bangladesh)

• Channel all funding through the OHCHR and their provisions should be transparent. (Bangladesh)

• Enhance resource allocation to Special Procedures. Regarding the extra budgetary, consider the establishment of a mechanism, which comprise 10% to total value of annual contribution to allow less inequality in allocation of resource distribution among Special Procedures without discouraging financing specific mandates. (Argentina and Chile)

• Financing of Special Procedures should be as transparent as possible and undertaken in a way that guarantees the independence of their work. In this regard, the HRC may contemplate creating a common fund to finance the activities of the Special Procedures, mainly their visits, fund to which States and other institutions should contribute without earmarking to a specific mandate. (Peru)

• Financial allocation should be equal to all mandates. (Brazil)
• Provide equal treatment to all mandate holders without any discrimination in the allocation of funds and human resources. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Incorporate information on mandate holders’ expenses in their reports in order to ensure transparency. (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

• Increase resources for Special Procedures, including for staff and country visits, and direct funding to support implementation of the Special Procedures’ recommendations. (United States of America)

• Support all activities of the Special procedures from the UN regular budget and guarantee transparency in resource allocation and expenditure within the system. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• All voluntary contributions to support the activities of the Special Procedures should be provided without conditionality and establish an intergovernmental task force to decide upon these allocations. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Treat all mandate holders on an equal footing in terms of resource allocations unless they are specifically mandated with additional tasks by the Council. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Annex to the mandate holders’ reports an “expenditure report” on the financial resources utilized by mandate holders in implementing their mandates. (Islamic Republic of Iran)

• Underline the need for Special Procedures to stick only to UN regular budget for their operational funding. (Indonesia)

• Mandate holders require adequate budgetary funding. (Ireland)

• Address the issue of equitable funding of Special Procedures. (India)

• Have a statement on all funding and expenditure provided for Special Procedures in order to encourage transparency and instil greater confidence in the system. (India)

• Recommend that such a statement be appended to the report submitted by every Special Procedures in each case. On the issues of extra-budgetary funding of Special Procedures, it would consider a study by the OHCHR in order to first have empirical data and diagnosis of the issues before discussing a suitable remedy. (India)

• Treat all mandate holders equally with regards to resource allocation. (Azerbaijan)

• Take concrete steps to address effectively the nagging problem of inadequate resources for Special Procedures. (Ghana)

• Support all mandate holders on equal footing in terms of resources put at their disposal. (Sri Lanka)

• Assess ways of making funding more transparent in the interest of strengthening the integrity and independence of Special Procedures. (Sweden)

• Establish a fund to cover the operational costs for all mandate holders in order to preserve the independence and objectivity of mandate holders in the exercise of their functions. (Rwanda)

• Retain the principle of equality and if regular resources are insufficient, extra-budgetary resources should be equitably distributed. Focus OHCHR’s functions on this criterion. (Paraguay)

• Ensure equal support, including from financial point of view, to all mandate holders. (Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela)
• Ensure an adequate and equitable distribution of financial and human resources for Special Procedures to carry out their functions efficiently. (Ukraine)

• Ensure more transparency in the financial administration of the Special Procedures. In this regard, all reports of country visits should also contain a financial report of the visit. (Ecuador)

• Ensure that the system of Special Procedures has sufficient technical, financial and equal human resources. (Kazakhstan)

• Improve clarity in the management of Special Procedures funding and to ensure equal support to all Special Procedures; a joint fund should be set up on un-earmarked contribution which can be distribute to all Special Procedures. (Guatemala)

• With regard to resources for Special Procedures, the best option would be to increase regular budget but consider unearmarked voluntary contributions if regular budget is not sufficient, or reserve portion of contributions for specific purposes not for traditional overheads but establish a Joint Reserve Fund for urgent or unplanned activities. (Uruguay)

• Ensure adequate, necessary funding to all Special Procedures on an equal basis. (Qatar)

F. Other issues

• Strengthen the independence of Special Procedures as early warning mechanisms through the establishment of a mechanism of at least five Special Rapporteurs to alert the Council on imminent crisis. (Argentina and Chile)

• Strengthen the early warning systems of the Special Procedures. (Australia).

• The Special Procedures has a potential role to play more effectively the early warning mechanism of conflict prevention. In this regard, there is a need to be much more consideration of the conclusion and recommendations of the Special Procedures. (United Kingdom)

• Allow Special Procedures to draw to the attention of the Council, the HC, or of a State, in a preventive manner, to any specific situation which may result in a serious violation of human rights and to recommend courses of action which, as far as possible, promote dialogue and cooperation to overcome the threat. (Peru)

• Special procedures should have the capacity to draw the Council’s attention to a particular country situation including the possibility of convening a special session of the Council on this basis to deal with a particular country situation. (Spain)

• Make better use of Special Procedures capacity to serve as an early warning mechanism. A specified number of Special Procedures of the Coordination Committee should be able to call for Special Sessions or Urgent Debates – either to address gross and systematic human rights violations or to initiate preventive action by the Council. (Austria)

• Council should be able to benefit from the work of treaty bodies to an increasing extent, the presentations by the Chair of treaty bodies should deal with areas where there is a need for standardisation or that these have been identified, which will be valuable for illustrating best practices in this process and there should be no questioning of the treaty bodies themselves. (Turkey)
• Strengthen the role of Special Procedures mandate holders as an early warning and prevention mechanism. (Ukraine)

III. Advisory Committee and Complaint Procedure

A. Advisory Committee

1. General

• Replace the Advisory Committee by a roster of individual experts available to produce studies mandated the Council (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

• Advisory Committee to continue to serve as a think-tank in accordance with the mandates and directions given by Council as stipulated in paragraphs 65 and 75 of Council resolution 5/1 (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Only minimum adjustments are needed to enhance the work of the Advisory Committee (Cuba);

• Abolish the Advisory Committee, which is an expensive and duplicative effort, (United States of America);

• Keep the Advisory Committee as is (Bangladesh);

• Keep the system of appointment of members and the working methods of the Advisory Committee as it stands in the current IB package (Russian Federation);

• Maintain the work and functioning of the Advisory Committee as presently constituted in the IB package (Malaysia);

• Maintain mandate and functions of the Advisory Committee (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Replace the Advisory Committee by a roster of individual experts available to produce studies mandated by the Council (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);

• Preserve composition and working methods of the Advisory Committee (China);

• Advisory Committee to continue to serve as a think-tank in accordance with the mandate and direction given by the Council, as per paragraphs 65 and 75 of the IB package (India);

• Maintain the Advisory Committee as is (Saudi Arabia);

• Preserve the Advisory Committee as the Council necessitates a mechanism for the provision of technical thematic advice (Argentina);

• Advisory Committee to continue to serve as a think tank on matters addressed to it by the Council (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of);

2. Functions

• Ensure that the Advisory Committee provides its expertise only at the request of the Human Rights Council (Pakistan);

• Advisory Committee not to adopt resolutions and decisions (Pakistan);

• Consider empowering the Advisory Committee with a limited right to initiative (Russian Federation);
• Advisory Committee to provide its expertise only on the request of the Council (Islamic Republic of Iran);
• Advisory Committee to present to the Council possible topics for research (China);
• Advisory Committee to continue to work at the discretion of the Council and not to be given any powers to initiate any study *suo motu* (India);
• Expand the Committee’s role on longer-term, cross-cutting, systemic issues (Canada);
• Advisory Committee to identify, for further consideration of the Council, problems and protection gaps in relation to certain thematic issues (Thailand);
• Advisory Committee to work under the direction of the Council; it should not have the mandate to initiate studies; it should be encouraged to recommend thematic issues requiring more study or research for the approval of the Council (Thailand);

3. **Composition and selection of members of the Advisory Committee**

• Develop a transparent process for the selection of qualified members with a system similar to the one used to select special procedures mandate-holders (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Establish a roster of experts and apply the same eligibility criteria for the selection of candidates (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Only experts assigned for a particular task to be considered as active members of the Committee for the purpose of travel to Geneva (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Nominees to the Advisory Committee to be proposed and endorsed by the States from their own region (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Increase the membership to allow for burden-sharing among its members (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Envisage different system of nomination of experts, which is similar to the selection process of Special Procedures mandate-holders (Greece);
• In order to maintain a system of expert advice as mandated by Council resolution 5/1, consider an ad hoc expert advice based on specific requirements, applying qualification criteria similar to that used in the appointment of Special Procedures (United States of America);
• Appoint experts with recognized competence and experience in the field of human rights, high moral standing, independence and impartiality (Islamic Republic of Iran);
• Consider suggestions aimed at improving the utility of the Advisory Committee through a better selection process of its members (India);
• Appointment system of experts to be the same as the one applied for the appointment of Special Procedures mandate-holders (Mexico);
• Link term of membership of Advisory Committee experts to the duration of the research project assigned to the expert with a view to reducing costs and ensuring adequate expertise in relation to identified theme (Mexico);
• Revise the appointment system to mirror that of Special Procedures in order to ensure a diverse and dynamic expert membership (Canada);
• Ensure that the Advisory Committee be composed of experts of highest possible expertise in different human rights fields; ensuring age diversity and a variety of academic backgrounds (Argentina);
• Develop an appointment system similar to that used for the appointment of Special Procedures mandate-holders (Argentina);
• Develop a new appointment system similar to that applied for the appointment of Special Procedures mandate-holders (Chile);
• Maintain the current composition of the Advisory Committee, which respects the principle of equitable geographical representation (South Africa).

4. Methods of work

• Increase time allocation to Advisory Committee meetings for more in-depth and analytical discussions within the Committee (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);
• Provide adequate secretariat support to the Advisory Committee (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);
• Modalities and annual meeting calendar to provide enough flexibility for providing expert input in a timely manner (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Apply more flexible and cost-effective working methods, including the use of technologies, such as teleconferencing, so as to render the Committee’s regular plenary sessions unnecessary and redundant (Belgium on behalf of the EU).
• Increase the time allocated to the Advisory Committee (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Provide the Advisory Committee with adequate secretariat staff (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Hold more regular meetings in view of the increasing number of studies being mandated by the Human Rights Council (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Provide adequate Secretariat support (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Apply more cost-efficient solution within existing resources and meeting time, by resorting to new technology (Greece);
• Encourage small group meetings within the Advisory Committee according to thematic focus (Greece);
• Encourage increased cooperation with other mechanisms (Greece);
• Fully implement paragraphs 81 and 82 of the IB package, whereby members of the Advisory Committee are encouraged to communicate inter-sessionally among themselves (Philippines);
• Allocate more time to the Advisory Committee and adjust its calendar of meetings so as to enable the Advisory Committee to fully accomplish the tasks it has been mandated to do (Philippines);
• Extend the duration of the Advisory Committee’s meetings (Malaysia);
• Provide the Advisory Committee with additional secretariat support (Malaysia);
• Provide the Advisory Committee with sufficient time to conduct its regular sessions (Russian Federation);
• Plan the meetings of the Advisory Committee in such way to allow more time for private meetings and consultations; envisage 5-day public sessions from Wednesday through the following Tuesday to give the experts, in particular the members of drafting groups, to meet in private two days before each session (on Monday and Tuesday) and during the weekend (Morocco);

• Encourage Committee members to consult with each other, to work in drafting groups during the inter-sessional period, and to consult with the relevant co-sponsor of mandates assigned to them, either in private meetings in Geneva or by videoconference (Morocco);

• Avoid duplication of work with other United Nations bodies (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Elaborate more flexible and cost-effective working methods, including through recourse to remote team work, use of E-mails and teleconference facilities, thus making regular sessions unnecessary (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland);

• Increase meeting time by replacing current one-week sessions with two-week sessions (China);

• Provide the Advisory Committee with adequate secretariat support (China);

• Reduce the annual meeting schedule to one 5-day session (Canada);

• Revise working methods to give more time for closed working meetings of the Committee (Canada);

• Adopt IT solutions to enhance inter-sessional communication between members (Canada);

• Extend the Advisory Committee’s meeting time, in order to allow member States and observes to interact in the best possible way with the Advisory Committee (Saudi Arabia);

• Increase meeting time and consider holding one longer session per year instead of two (Chile);

• Increase Secretariat support provided to the Committee (Chile);

• Provide the Advisory Committee with adequate support (South Africa);

• Increase the meeting time for the Advisory Committee (South Africa);

• Maintain methods of work of the Advisory Committee, including two sessions for a maximum of 10 working days per year so as not to place a heavier burden on the programme of work of the Council (Thailand);

• Encourage members of the Advisory Committee to communicate between sessions, and submit proposals for additional ad hoc sessions for the Council’s consideration, as and when needed, in accordance with the IB package (Thailand);

• Increase meeting time, as well as resources and Secretariat support (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of);

• The Secretariat to provide technical support for the smooth running of the sessions of the Committee, the timely issuance of all relevant documentation and the regular updating of the website (Bolivia, Plurinational State of);

• Issue a compilation of all thematic work undertaken by the Committee (Bolivia, Plurinational State of).
• Increase meeting time from 5 to 7 days for each session of the Committee, while developing technology for inter-sessional teleconferencing (Bolivia, Plurinational State of).

5. Relationship with the Human Rights Council

• Clearer mandate to be provided by the Council, specifying needs for research and advice (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

• Bureau of the Council to propose the agenda for experts based on the requests stemming from resolutions and decisions of the Council (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

• Involve members of the Committee in various panels organized by the Council (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Establish interaction with States, among others, in accordance with the modalities of the Council, for example in the form of informal meetings between interested states and the members of the Advisory Committee (Philippines);

• Advisory Committee to have the possibility to report to the Human Rights Council after each of its session so as to keep the Council updated of the status of the tasks and themes assigned to it (Morocco);

• Enhance interaction between Member States and the Advisory Committee (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Strengthen the interaction between the Advisory Committee and the Human Rights Council; invite Committee members to attend panels organized by the Council (China);

• Human Rights Council to provide the Committee with clearer and more focused mandates (Chile);

• Hold regular debates between the Council and the Committee by inviting experts to seminars, panels and dialogues held by the Council (Chile);

• Enhance Advisory Committee role and functions by encouraging States to make full use of its expertise (Thailand);

• Invite at least one member of the Committee to attend, on a rotation basis, all sessions of the Council (Bolivia, Plurinational State of).

B. Complaint Procedure

1. General

• Abolish the Complaint procedure so as to favour other mechanisms, which deal with victims with transparency, impartiality, equality and efficiency (Mexico);

• Reallocate the budget of the Complaint procedure so as to strengthen the capacity of Special Procedures to deal with individual complaints (Mexico);

• Address the complaints currently under consideration by the Complaint procedure to the pertinent mechanisms (Mexico);
2. Scope and architecture of the Complaint procedure

- Preserve current composition of the two Working Groups, which ensures proper and comprehensive consideration at both the expert and intergovernmental levels (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);

- Expand the scope of the procedure to also include “gross and reliably attested violations of all human rights and all fundamental freedoms”, further to the proposal by Switzerland on “emerging patters of violations” (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

- Present to the Council an exhaustive report on all the cases considered under the complaint procedure, including the ones rejected as inadmissible, discontinued or kept under review by the Working Group on Communications (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

- Strengthen the Working Group on Communications and abolish the Working Group on Situations (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

- Nominate members of the Working Group on Communications by the President of Council, on the basis of the advice of the Consultative Group, from a roster of experts (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

- Retain the system of two working groups (one composed of experts and the second - of representatives of the regional groups, members of the HRC); the Working Group on Communications to continue examining admissibility of communications and report to the Working Groups on Situations; the Working Group on Situations to continue proposing measures to be taken by the HRC (Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC);

- Retain the mechanism and its structure of two working groups (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

- Maintain the procedure as established in Council resolution 5/1 (Cuba);

- Ensure that the working groups compile a complete report of all the cases considered under the complaint procedure, cases forwarded to States for response, and dismissed/discontinued cases, or cases kept under review by the Working Group on Communications, for submission to the Council. The Report to equally include an Appendix listing all complaints deemed inadmissible prior to engaging a State, including the State involved and the unmet criteria (e.g. failure to exhaust domestic remedies, facts do not amount to a violation, not reliably attested) (United States of America);

- Keep the Complaint procedure as is and retain the two Working groups’ system (Bangladesh);

- Extend the scope of the procedure to also include the emerging trends of human rights violations, in addition to what is already stated in the institutional package under paragraph 85 (Switzerland);

- Merge the two working groups into one new Working Group, to fill the mandate of the Working Group on Situations and the Working Group on Communications (Switzerland);

- Consider having the new Working Group composed of independent experts, such as former treaty body members, former Special procedures’ mandate holders, members of National Human Rights Institutions, and other categories of experts (Switzerland);
• Recognize that the IB package envisages a multi-stage and multi-track process in providing victims with avenue to address grievances or allegations of human rights violations which includes but is not limited to the complaint procedure (Malaysia);

• Keep the Complaint procedure in its present format, in particular its two working groups (Russian Federation);

• Bear in mind that the Complaint procedure’s aim must be not at punishing particular States but at revealing tendencies on human rights violations and at repairing the situation in cooperation with the concerned States (Russian Federation);

• Consider that, if it communications are to be able to be examined under item 4 of the agenda, this should not be interpreted as a departure from IBP (Russian Federation);

• Maintain the Complaint procedure (Morocco);

• Maintain the Complaint procedure as it is (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Strengthen the Working Group on Communications and abolish the Working Group on Situations (UK);

• Give the Human Rights Council’s President a role in nominating the members of the Working Group on Communications from a roster of experts, in order to create a more transparent and streamlined process to ensure that legitimate complaints are heard (UK);

• All cases considered, including those inadmissible, discontinued, or kept under review, to be reported to the Human Rights Council and the grounds for such decisions to be published (UK);

• Preserve the Working Group on Communications and the Working Group on Situations (China);

• Retain the Complaint procedure whilst exploring the possibility of streamlining its functioning (India);

• Eliminate the Working Group on Situations and merge its functions into those of the Working Group on communications (Canada);

• Provide for the adoption of conclusions and recommendations to the State concerned, including a general (public) section and a case specific (confidential) section (Canada);

• Provide regular and timely (public) reporting to the Council on all cases received, including the rationale for the actions taken (or for dismissal) (Canada);

• Prepare an annual (public) summary report containing aggregated data on the outcome of the cases received and considered (Canada);

• Extend the competence of the Complaint procedure so as to enable it to consider “emerging patterns of grave human rights violations” (Argentina);

• Replace the two existing working groups with a single group, to be composed of five experts (Argentina);

• Issue a complete study of all cases considered, including those considered as inadmissible, those rejected and those kept under review (Argentina);

• Maintain the Complaint procedure in order to be able for the Council to address such gross and systematic human rights violations (Thailand);

• Maintain two separate working groups, given their specific separate responsibilities (Thailand);
• Promote strongly the principles of transparency and impartiality in the work and functioning of the Complaint procedure (Thailand);
• Maintain the Complaint procedure (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of);

3. Composition, mandate and powers of working groups

• Respect the principle of equitable geographical representation to the composition of the two Working Groups (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Nominees to the Working Group on Communications to be appointed by each regional group from the members of the Advisory Committee, while nominees to the Working group on Situations should be appointed by each regional group from the HRC membership (Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC);

4. Modalities

• Retain the confidential nature of the Complaint procedure (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);
• Uphold non-duplication between the functioning of the Complaint procedure and other human rights mechanisms, and avoid simultaneous consideration of cases under the confidential and public procedures (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);
• Seek measures to ensure and reinforce adherence to the admissibility criteria, set up in paragraph 87 of the IB package (Egypt on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement);
• Consider further whether the confidentiality clause of paragraph 86 best serves the needs of victims with a view to limiting it to the work of the Working Group on communications (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Enable the Complaint procedure to deal with a specific case even if a country is being dealt with by a special procedure, a treaty body or other United Nations or similar regional complaints procedure as long as the latter does not specifically address the case (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
• Retain the confidentiality of the Complaint procedure (Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC);
• Uphold strictly non-duplication with other human rights mechanisms (Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC);
• Follow strictly the admissibility criteria, as defined by paragraph 87 of HRC resolution 5/1 while undertaking initial screening of communications (Pakistan, on behalf of the OIC);
• Maintain the confidentiality of the mechanism with a view to enhancing cooperation with the State concerned (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Ensure that communications before the Complaint procedure are not already being examined by other Council mechanisms (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Maintain the confidentiality of the Complaint procedure (Cuba);
• Respect the principle on non-duplication, including through a better internal coordination within OHCHR, so as to prevent the same case from being dealt by at the same time by other public mechanisms (Cuba);
• Clarify what is meant in operative paragraph 87(f) of Human Rights Council resolution 5/1, which provides that, in order for a complaint to be admissible, it must
not “refer to a case … already being dealt with by a special procedure, a treaty body or another United Nations or similar regional complaints procedure in the field of human rights”. This rule of non-duplication applies to other specific complaint mechanisms of international organizations and not to public consideration of human rights situations by the Human Rights Council (United States of America);

- Ensure that the Working Group on Communications filters more effectively complaints by applying stricter scrutiny of admissibility criteria, so that the Working Group forwards only serious and well-supported complaints to States (United States of America);

- Increase transparency, by making the Complaint procedure public at an earlier stage; do it automatically, if States fail to respond after a certain delay or if the reply is considered by the Working Group on Communications to be a formalistic and non-responsive one; alternatively, render it possible for the Working group on Communications to make the complaint public once it has considered that a case is admissible and has advanced the complaint to the Working Group on Situations (United States of America);

- Envisage making a case public after the Working Group on Situations has transmitted a complaint to the Human Rights Council (United States of America);

- Keep the Complaint procedure’s confidential nature (Bangladesh);

- Ensure that admissibility is based on sufficient grounds to satisfy that (a) complaints are not politically motivated and (b) existing mechanisms of the country concerned have been exhausted (Bangladesh);

- Maintain the admissibility criteria for complaints as they stand now, but have the communications examined by a new single Working group, thus eliminating one non-useful filter (Switzerland);

- Maintain the confidential nature of the procedure, provide that the Human Rights Council receives an exhaustive report on all cases considered under the Complaint procedure, including those rejected as inadmissible, those discontinued, and those kept under review by the new Working Group (Switzerland);

- Improve the technical capacity of the Secretariat in order to provide information on the documentation in a smooth and adequate manner, in particular the replies from States, along with their translation (Colombia);

- Envisage that both the Working Group on Communications and the Working Group on Situations have a dialogue with the concerned State before deciding on cases (Colombia);

- Ensure, in order to avoid duplications, that the Secretariat provides information as to whether the case is already being dealt with by other United Nations or regional procedures (Colombia);

- Revisit, and where appropriate change, the current administrative arrangements, which appear discriminatory to State representatives before the Council under the Complaint Procedure (Malaysia);

- Make sure that the Secretariat does respect strictly the confidentiality of the Complaint procedure and does not transmit excerpts of the communications to other UN entities (Russian Federation);

- Ensure better coordination between the Complaint procedure and other procedures of the Council, in order to avoid duplication (Morocco);
• Keep the confidentiality as the fundamental principle of the Complaint procedure (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Uphold strictly the principle of non-duplication with other human rights mechanisms by mandating OHCHR to ensure a better internal coordination (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Follow strictly the admissibility criteria for communications, as defined in paragraph 87, for initial screening of communications (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Limit the confidentiality clause to the initial stages of the Working Group on Communications and subject to genuine engagement of the States concerned (UK);

• Allow the Complaint procedure to deal with specific cases even if issues involving the State concerned are being dealt with in more general terms by a special procedure, a treaty body, or other UN or regional complaints procedure (UK);

• Make it possible to have reopened every communication, if evidence is brought to the attention of the Working Group on Communications showing that the original communication has not been resolved (UK);

• Maintain the confidential nature of the Complaint procedure, which is very important to its functioning (China);

• Retain the confidential form of the Complaint procedure, but consider exploring suggestions on the streamlining of its functioning so long as the elements of States’ involvement in the process is retained (India);

• Revise the appointment system to mirror that of the Special procedures (Canada);

• Avoid duplication between the work of the Complaint procedure and other HRC procedures (Saudi Arabia);

• Avoid politicisation (Saudi Arabia);

• Base admissibility to serious systematic human rights violations (Saudi Arabia);

• Retain the confidentiality of the procedure (Saudi Arabia);

• Preserve the current admissibility criteria (Argentina);

• Keep the confidential nature of the Complaint procedure (Argentina);

• Keep the confidential nature of the Complaint procedure in accordance with the victim-based approach, and in order to enhance cooperation with the procedure, especially from States (Thailand);

• Consider ways to reduce duplication of work between the procedure and other mechanisms (Thailand);

• Keep informed at all stages of the procedure both the author of the communication and the State concerned (Thailand);

• Convey in a clear and a timely manner to all parties concerned the reasons for either admitting or dismissing a case by the Working Group on Communications in order to enhance the transparency of the process (Thailand);

• Preserve the procedure’s confidential nature. (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of);

• Avoid duplication with other mechanisms. (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of);

• Maintain fluid dialogue with the country concerned. (Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of).
C. Other subsidiary bodies

- Allocate significantly less meeting time to the Social Forum given the limited attendance of and lack of dialogue during its sessions (Belgium on behalf of the EU);
- Ensure that the Expert Mechanism on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples avoid, to the extent possible duplication with the work of the Special Rapporteur and the Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; and encourage its members to communicate more inter-sessionally in order to optimize their meeting time (Philippines);
- Assess the functioning and effectiveness of other HRC expert forums in the context of the review, in particular the Social Forum (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland).

IV. Agenda and Framework for a Programme of Work

A. Agenda

- Maintain the agenda as is (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
- Preserve the agenda in its current form (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
- Maintain the 10-item agenda structure, which provides opportunity for all human rights issues to be discussed in the Council’s framework (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
- Reject any attempt to change the current format of the agenda (Islamic Republic of Iran);
- Preserve the agenda of the HRC (Egypt);
- Preserve the delicate balance of the agenda as enumerated in the IB package (Bangladesh);
- Preserve the agenda (Sri Lanka);
- Do not reopen or change the agenda or the PoW (Morocco);
- Maintain the current agenda (India);
- Not in a position to accommodate any attempt to reopen the current agenda (Algeria);
- Retain the current agenda (Malaysia);
- No merging of agenda items (Malaysia);
- Retain the current agenda (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);
- Preserve the agenda (Viet Nam);
- Reject amendment of agenda or any of its items, particularly item 7 which is a thematic issue (Syrian Arab Republic);
- Undesirable to reopen the segment of the Agenda and Programme of Work of the institution building package (South Africa);
- Do not support proposal to merge agenda items, particularly agenda items 7 and 9. If agreement cannot be reached, President to address letters to various Heads of State and Government inviting them to agree to the purging of these agenda items from
the PoW of the Council. Such request to be accompanied by a specific timeline within which the Heads of State and Government should respond to the President’s recommendation (South Africa);

• Maintain the present agenda and framework of the PoW (China);

• Keep the institution building package and the agenda as they stand (Bahrain);

• Confirm the agenda and the framework for the annual PoW as mentioned in resolution 5/1 (Lebanon);

• Preserve the agenda and framework for the programme of work (Azerbaijan);

• Preserve the established agenda (Venezuela);

• Maintain current agenda (Saudi Arabia);

• Maintain existing agenda (Thailand);

• No changes to agenda and PoW (Russian Federation);

• Maintain agenda in its current shape without any change (Yemen);

• Simplify the agenda of the HRC (United Kingdom);

• Consider the US proposal of grouping items 4, 7, 10 as well as items 3 and 9. (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Merge agenda items 4, 8 and 10 and items 3, 8 and 9 (Australia);

• Merge agenda items 3, 8, 9 and items 4, 7, 10 (Canada);

• Rationalize the treatment of country situations by combining items 4, 7 and 10. Grant 10 minutes for each intervention under this new item (United States of America);

• Include element of mainstreaming in item 2 by having an annual panel with heads of UN organizations (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Include mainstreaming of human rights throughout the UN system under agenda item 2, as well as the regular dialogue with the HC (United Kingdom);

• Add sub-item in item 3 entitled “Mainstreaming of human rights within the UN system, interrelation of human rights and rights thematic issues” (Norway);

• Include, under agenda item 3, a new sub-item related to “the right to self-determination” (Algeria);

• Under item 4, have an expert group established by the President to carry out fact-finding missions established at short notice (Spain);

• Increase time allotted to item 4 (Israel);

• Support the proposal that discussion under agenda item 4 should be divided into five regional segments (Africa, Asia, Western Europe and Others, Latin America and Caribbean Countries, and Eastern Europe) (Ghana);

• Create new agenda item on “best practice in human rights”, to showcasing positive human rights stories and best practices that might act as incentives for States to follow-suit (Maldives);

• Retain the general debate on item 6 in all regular sessions (Norway);

• Consider redistribution of agenda items; consider each agenda item at least once a year. Item 6 could be considered only once at the September session (Thailand);
• Remove item 7 from the agenda (Israel);
• Keep Palestine on the agenda until the conflict is resolved (Maldives);
• Include follow-up more explicitly in item 8 (Belgium on behalf of EU);
• Expand agenda item 8 to better incorporate the need to consider follow up and implementation of HRC initiatives and international human rights law (United Kingdom);
• Include, under agenda item 9, a new sub-item related to the follow-up to the outcome of the Durban Review Conference (Algeria);
• Broaden item 9 to the consideration of issues related to non-discrimination (France);

B. Programme of work

• Rationalize the PoW and render it more manageable ((Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
• Rationalize the annual PoW to avoid duplication and repetition of items (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Rationalize the PoW to lessen overload of work for delegations and to avoid duplication and repetition throughout the annual cycle (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Announce the HRC PoW as far as possible in advance (Australia);
• Rationalize the PoW (Islamic Republic of Iran);
• Cluster and/or spread the ten agenda items among the regular sessions (Japan);
• Agenda items and thematic debates to be discussed once a year and there should be appropriate programming within PoW (Guatemala);
• Regroup thematically related matters by session in the annual PoW (Morocco);
• Streamline the organization of the Council’s work including regular discussions on the annual PoW (Malaysia);
• Better use of the organizational meetings to plan and prepare HRC sessions and possible rationalization of the PoW to avoid duplication and repetition (Malaysia);
• Support idea of more effective distribution of workload between sessions, one session devoted to UPR (Russian Federation);
• All parties to comply with agenda and PoW, and when discussion individual items questions not to be raised which have nothing to do with agenda item (Russian Federation);
• Closer control and distribution of time within the sessions, allotting time to NGOs shall not occur at the expense of reducing time available for State interventions (Russian Federation);
• Reduce workload of the Council (Ghana);
• Need for a more predictable annual PoW, i.e. the Council should annually decide on its PoW and not immediately prior to its sessions (South Africa);
• Merit in timely decisions on the annual PoW, and to designate a session for a specific set of rights for deliberation at that session (civil and political rights or economic, social and cultural rights session) (South Africa);
• Reorganize the PoW (Cuba);
• Rationalize the POW and agenda and ensure more reasonable and rational management of time and ease the workload, by for example spreading agenda items across sessions (Spain);
• Make the POW balanced and predictable, by leaving necessary margins to deal with urgent situations (Spain);
• Review and streamline the Annual Agenda to avoid repetition over the course of the year (Maldives);
• Rationalize the PoW (Azerbaijan);
• Rationalize the calendar and PoW to make them more predictable (United States of America);
• Rationalize the annual PoW by avoiding duplications and overlaps and reducing heavy burden on delegations (Saudi Arabia);
• Make available on OHCHR website the annual PoW with approximate dates of consideration of items and issues (Norway);
• Make available on OHCHR website the PoW for a session at least six weeks before a session (Norway);

C. Calendar of sessions

• Three sessions of 10 weeks; 1st session of 5 weeks in February/March to discuss all agenda items except item 6; 2nd session of 3 weeks in June to discuss all agenda items except item 6; 3rd session in September/October dedicated to the adoption of report of the UPR working group and the general debate under agenda item 6 (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
• Continue to meet for ten weeks - two main sessions to be convened, each of a 4 weeks duration, the first being in February/March and the second in September/October (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Continue to meet in 3 sessions for 10 weeks per year; dedicate 2 sessions in March and September to all agenda items but item 6; dedicate the third session to the adoption of UPR report and the general debate under item 6 in June (Islamic Republic of Iran);
• Maintain 3 annual regular sessions, including a main session, for no less that 10 weeks (Norway);
• Short of the Council being a permanent body, maintain at least 3 regular sessions per year (Maldives);
• Maintain 3 annual sessions with 10 weeks a year (Venezuela);
• Maintain 3 sessions a year for no less than a total of 10 weeks (Thailand);
• Maintain the current number of sessions (Azerbaijan);
• Consider reducing the duration of some sessions, thus optimizing the length of time and reducing costs (Paraguay);
• Streamline the sessions of the Council (Lebanon);
• Reduce the number of sessions taking into account the proposals made (Peru on behalf of Chile, Paraguay and Colombia);
• Reduce Council sessions to two sessions per year (Guatemala);
• Better distribute activities throughout the year and one regular session for each half year (March/September) (Brazil);
• Eliminate one of the sessions (Turkey);
• Consider rationalizing the periodicity and duration of sessions (Bangladesh);
• Reduce the number and/or length of regular sessions (Japan);
• Arrange the annual calendar of sessions in a manner which allows sufficient time between two meetings (Morocco);
• Re-arrange meeting schedules, particularly HRC sessions, to provide sufficient time for the thorough reading of documents (Indonesia);
• Support the proposal of two annual sessions in March and June (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);
• Hold 2 sessions in February/March and June to discuss all agenda items except agenda item 6 and a third session dedicated to the adoption of UPR reports and the General Debate under item 6 in September/October (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
• Hold 2 sessions to discuss all agenda items, with the exception of item 6 on the UPR process, which would be the focus of a third dedicated session (Indonesia);
• Hold 2 sessions of 4 weeks in February/March with a HLS and in September (Morocco);
• Hold 2 instead of 3 sessions a year, of 4 weeks each. Adoption of UPR reports to be separated from regular sessions (Philippines);
• Hold 2 substantive sessions a year for 8 weeks in total and use remaining time for UPR adoptions, either in September to adopt UPR outcomes, or hold formal sessions for 3 days after each UPR WG to adopt the outcome of previous working groups (UK);
• Hold 2 sessions each of 4 weeks and a third session for the general debate under item 6 and the adoption of UPR outcomes (Syrian Arab Republic);
• Consider Mauritius proposal of having two sessions of four weeks and link the consideration of UPR outcome to WG sessions (Belgium on behalf of EU);
• Hold 2 main 4 weeks sessions per year in February/March and September/October; three sessions of a 2.5 days for adoption of UPR WG reports immediately after the end of UPR WG; a mini session of 2.5 days in June for consideration of the annual HRC report to the GA or one or two specific issues and follow up actions or decide on a yearly human rights theme (Mauritius);
• Convene 2 main sessions in spring and summer (UK);
• Two 2 weeks sessions in June and September and a third session dedicated to the adoption of the UPR outcome reports, as well as for mid-term reporting or voluntary presentations of states on the implementation of their UPR recommendations, and use the remaining time for the mini- or briefing sessions, distributed in accordance with the POW throughout the year, to enable the Council to deal with global human rights developments in a timely manner and strengthen its credibility and visibility (Austria);
• Hold 2 regular sessions a year and a session in September devoted to UPR (France);
Establish one, higher profile main session of 4 to 6 weeks in March for general debates under each agenda item and the negotiation and adoption of all recurring resolutions (Canada);

Two sessions of 4 weeks relating to all agenda items but item 6; redistribute the remaining time of 2 weeks to the adoption of UPR report (of the previous working group session) after the working group sessions and enhance the duration of the UPR for each SuR (Brazil);

Hold a mini-session of two and half days in June to focus on the consideration of either the annual HRC report to the General Assembly, or one or two specific issues and follow-up actions as may be necessary, or decide on a yearly human rights theme (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

Combine UPR and the general debate under item 6 in one session. Except item 6, all other items can be dealt with in 2 sessions (China);

Hold two main sessions of 4 weeks, with the remaining third session of 2 weeks dedicated to the adoption of UPR WG reports (India);

Hold “UPR adoption sessions” at the end of each UPR WG for the adoption of UPR reports from the past WG session (Canada);

Envisage convening 2 UPR working group session per year reviewing 24 States on the basis of the ongoing modalities (Brazil);

Hold two sessions of 5 and 3 weeks in February/March and June. A further two weeks sessions would not examine item agenda 6 nor proceed to the adoption of UPR reports (Algeria);

Dedicate the third session of the HRC in September/October to the adoption of UPR WG reports and the general debate under item 6 (Sri Lanka);

Hold 3 sessions of a period of 2,5 days immediately after the end of UPR WG sessions exclusively for the adoption of the reports of countries reviewed in the previous WG (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

Convene at the end of each UPR WG, a formal session to adopt the UPR reports considered at the previous UPR Working Group (Maldives);

Hold 3 UPR sessions of 9 days after each WG session to adopt the final reports of the countries reviewed in the previous WG (Morocco);

Hold one session to adopt reports of UPR WG (Cuba);

Consider holding short sessions immediately after the WG on UPR (Algeria);

Schedule 3 plenary sessions per year for the consideration of UPR outcome. These sessions should last 3 days and take place after the UPR WG (Norway);

Consider NAM proposal of devoting a third session exclusively to item 6 (Belgium on behalf of EU);

Organize several shorter HRC sessions (3-5 days each) attached to UPR adoption session focussed on emerging/ongoing human rights situations, follow-up to issues from the main session and various cross-cutting thematic issues (e.g. panels and joint interactive dialogues), with only one general debate to address all agenda items (Canada);

Hold 2 mini-sessions of one day of procedural nature, one on 18 June marking the end of the HRC cycle to formally adopt the annual report to the GA and one on 19
June to mark the beginning of the new cycle, to elect the new President and members of the Bureau and to adopt the annual PoW (Morocco);

- Hold monthly mini-sessions, including on follow-up, and yearly thematic issues. The mini or briefing sessions should contain updates by the HC on any emerging human rights issues in a non-selective way, panel debates on thematic issues, briefings by special procedures, other UN agencies or organizations, and also focus on follow-up to special procedure reports, including on country visits (Austria);

- Organize mini-sessions (France);
- Cannot support monthly sessions (Cuba);
- Hold one Council session annually in each region on a rotational basis (Indonesia);
- Increase the visibility of the Council by holding the main March session, on special occasions, in NY or in other UN headquarters or in a developing country (Algeria);
- Geneva to remain the meeting place for all regular and special sessions (Cuba);

V. Methods of Work and Rules of Procedure

A. Debates, dialogues and panels

- Strictly prevent referring to the names of countries and human rights country situations under agenda items other than item 4 (Islamic Republic of Iran);
- Organize various thematic debates in order to allow more time for interactive debates (Morocco);
- Avoid clustered interactive dialogues by providing 1h30 to 2h to individual debates with each special procedure (Morocco);
- Discontinue the current clustering arrangement of interactive dialogues with Special Procedures (Algeria);
- Give more time to IDs with Special Procedures (Cuba);
- Avoid clustering of ID (Cuba);
- Allow more time for dialogue with special procedures and end clustering of interactive dialogues; spend less time in general debates (United Kingdom);
- Extend the time for dialogues with special procedures and deal with the dialogues individually and not grouped them in a cluster (Spain);
- Expand time and de-cluster IDs with SP (Belgium on behalf of EU);
- End the clustering of dialogues with the special procedures (Lebanon);
- Expand time of IDs with SP, through for example, the establishment of monthly mini-sessions and require more advance notice of these dialogues (United States of America);
- Strengthen Council interaction with SP, extend duration of IDs with SP (Norway);
- Increase time for dialogues and debates on topical international issues which have a direct impact on the enjoyment of human rights, including the right to development (Viet Nam);
• Shorten general debates, organize panels, reorganize meetings more efficiently (Argentina);

• Reorder Special Rapporteurs to ensure that subjects are related (Argentina);

• Avoid holding parallel meetings (Viet Nam);

• Consider devoting a half day panel at least once a year to interact with Heads of UN agencies on specific human rights themes; OHCHR to prepare required documentation; the outcome to be a negotiated Presidential Statement; encourage synergy with the Third Committee of the GA to avoid overlapping (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Enhance efforts to mainstream human rights across the UN system; hold a half day yearly panel to interact with UN Heads of agencies and fund on specific human rights themes (Australia);

• Hold a half day panel, under agenda items 1 or 3, at least once a year, to interact with heads of UN agencies and funds on specific human rights themes with the objectives of addressing related issues requiring further coordination or mainstreaming human rights system-wide; OHCHR to prepare required documentation; the outcome to be in the form of a negotiated consensus Presidential Statement (Algeria);

• Panels have shown usefulness but the number of Panels has increased and should be streamlined (Guatemala);

• Rationalize the POW so that fewer items are addressed and more time is given to the quality of interactive dialogues, debates and panels (Paraguay);

• Convene more information sessions or panels, such as the panel on Somalia in September 2010 (Spain);

• Not to conduct General Debates on every item of the agenda at each session and thus make space and time in the PoW to hold interactive dialogues or panel discussions on issues of substance and importance to the Council and its stakeholders (Philippines);

• Avoid non-stop meetings which decrease the effectiveness of discussions (Azerbaijan);

• Avoid full-day meetings (Norway);

• Expand time for the consideration of UPR outcomes (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Expand time of panel discussions to ensure the participation of all or ensure that statements not delivered due to time constraints are publicly recorded (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Organize forum with heads of UN agencies within a HRC session (Serbia);

B. Work formats and arrangements

• Make full use of entire toolbox of mechanisms available to address human rights situations of concern, including better use of open-ended briefings and Presidential Statements; use these tools as early warning mechanisms (Australia);

• Use of flexible open-ended meeting formats, including panel discussions, working groups, briefing sessions and stand-alone dialogues; utilize the expertise of OHCHR, SP, NHRIIs and civil society experts; also provide the opportunity to hear from
national experts and representatives of other UN agencies or regional agencies (Australia);

• Hold periodic interregional meetings and seminars with the participation of experts on thematic issues (Turkey);

• Give priority to subjects where interregional cooperation is possible, rather than dealing with the same subjects at every session (Turkey);

• Increase the number of side events organized by NGOs as well as those organized by the HC and States (Turkey);

• Expand the range of possible formats, including special briefing/information/discussion sessions (including expert panels); special high level sessions (e.g. to engage with visiting senior government representatives from a particular State); special thematic sessions (e.g. with multiple SP mandate-holders); special urgent debate sessions to address grave human rights situations of immediate concern (Canada);

• Increase more informal opportunities for discussions, such as briefings by the HC and other international organizations, to be held proactively either during regular sessions and/or the in between sessions (Japan);

• Encourage the holding of informal briefings by OHCH, the country concerned and other affected countries; reach a common understanding on such methods of work and their procedures (Japan);

• Invite the chairs of treaty bodies to give regular oral reports (Japan);

• Make full use of the existing format for its discussions and not introduce any other format that is not approved by the Council (China);

• Maintain the balance between civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural rights in the interactive dialogues with the special mechanisms (China);

• Improve the HRC’s methods of work by using more effectively and systematically the many tools already existing to address urgent situations and identifying a set of independent initiation mechanisms to better address all situations of concern when the need arises (UK);

• Establish WG on Prevention or Early Warning with the authority to request immediate meetings of the Council (United States of America)

• Allow holding of a special sitting during a regular session with the support of a third of the Council membership, the President or the High Commissioner (France)

• Hold panels or briefings, with the participation of HC or/and Special Rapporteurs, to respond to problematic situations, adopt presidential declarations, resort to an ad-hoc team of experts to undertake FFM under very short notice in case of HR violations (France);

• Use fully the available tools such as informal briefings, panel debates, seminars and roundtables to promote discussions on issues requiring the urgent attention of the Council. Enhance the role of the President in addressing these situations: he could, in consultation with the State concerned and other States, carry out briefings, informal consultations, field visits and issue statements (Thailand);

• Bring the relevant agenda item forward on the PoW if an urgent human rights situation occurs during a regular session (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
• Adjust the programme of work in case an urgent human rights situation emerges in the course of a regular session (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Methods of work of the Council must reflect a balanced approach, criticize all human rights situations and place itself at the centre of country-specific situations to ensure that credibility of the Council is restored (South Africa);

• HRC to be able to deal with urgent human rights situation (Romania);

• Adjust the relevant agenda item in the POW in case an urgent human rights situation occurs during a regular session (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Develop a set of criteria for addressing HR situations (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Identify more clearly the toolkit for dealing with urgent and chronic situations (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Find forms to address serious human rights violations outside ordinary or special sessions (Spain);

• Play a more active role as a preventive and early warning mechanism by elaborating criteria that would establish that the human rights situation requires the Council’s attention (Spain);

• Find ways to address country human rights situations in a constructive, incremental manner, designed to engage and build trust with the country concerned. Make more use of well-organized Country Briefing sessions outside the Council chamber, organized by OHCHR in cooperation with the country concerned (Maldives);

• OHCHR could also report to the Council on serious situations (Spain);

• Make more systematic use of the Council toolbox of mechanisms to address urgent and chronic HR situations (Belgium on behalf of EU);

• Better use the tools from the institution building package to address situations of violations of human rights (United States of America);

• Create a special procedure for each of the five regions with mandate to examine the situations in their specified region, report their findings to the Council, send communications and urgent appeals to Governments, concerning allegations of violations, carry out country visits and provide recommendations on how to improve the human rights situations under their consideration (Ghana);

C. Special sessions

• Preserve the current mandate of the HRC outlined in GA resolution 60/251 with regard to special sessions (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Maintain modalities for convening special sessions (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Hold special sessions of the HRC “when needed” to address important, urgent or emerging human rights situations of concern (Canada);

• Establish a clear process for holding special sessions, urgent debates, special sittings and special briefings during HRC sessions at the request of 1/3 of the membership of the HRC, and convened as soon as possible (minimum 24 h) after the submission of the request (Canada);

• Empower the President to convene a meeting of the HRC (as soon as possible of the call or request; min. 24 hours) at any time he deems necessary; at the request of the GA or the Security Council; at the request or on the advice of the Secretary-General.
or the HC; at the request of a member of the Bureau; in follow-up to an urgent or emergency response by relevant UN bodies or organizations to situations of concern (e.g. as a result of a non-periodic meeting of the SC under article 35 or under article 11 (3) of the UN Charter, or of the GA, or urgent/emergency responses by OCHA or UNHRC) (Canada);

- Maintain the modalities for convening special sessions (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
- Address the absence of a definition of the purpose of special sessions (Algeria);
- Preserve the current mechanism to hold special sessions (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);
- Maintain the modalities for convening special sessions (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
- Keep the relevant rules for special sessions (China);
- Ensure universality of a special session by requiring support from all geographic regions. Maintain the 1/3 threshold for convening a special session and include two States from each group (Israel);
- Develop a system of automatic independent initiation mechanisms for the holding of special sessions which could also determine the need to address an urgent situation in regular session (Belgium on behalf of EU);
- Have a system of automatic triggers for convening special sessions in addition to the existing 16 member States system to deal with urgent situations, clearly identify mechanisms of toolkit to deal with such situations (Spain);
- Define independent triggers (e.g. SG, HC, Security Council, the majority of the GA or at least three Special Rapporteurs) in case of HR violations or non cooperation with the SP (France);
- Convene a special or an ordinary session of the Council if requested by the SG, OHCHR, the GA or the Security Council, as well as on the basis of 3 or more special procedures which identify serious violations and lack of cooperation with mandate holders (Spain);
- Enable the HC to convene a special session (Israel);
- Allow five different thematic SP, the SG on advice from Under Secretaries, HC, or Special Representatives as well as ‘A Status’ NHRIs to trigger dialogue on a specific country situation with no predetermined outcome (United States of America);
- Hold special sessions to deal with urgent situations outside of regular sessions, and regular informal briefings on issues already provided by OHCHR (United Kingdom);

D. Resolutions and other outcomes

- Avoid proliferation of resolutions and duplication with GA resolutions; allow more time for negotiations on resolutions before action; early notification of meetings and avoid parallel consultations (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
- Avoid proliferation of resolutions and duplication with GA resolutions as far as possible (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);
- Avoid the proliferation of resolutions and duplications with GA resolutions to allow more time for negotiations before action, early notification of meetings and avoid
the holding of parallel consultations, increase the informal contacts and discussions (Sri Lanka);

• Avoid a proliferation of resolutions and overlapping with the GA, avoid excessive number of informal consultations during Council sessions and promote a method to solve this problem, for example by applying a procedure for information on resolutions or establishing formulae which make it possible to reduce overlapping of meetings (Paraguay).

• Promote restraint in resorting to resolutions to avoid their proliferation and duplication. Supplement paragraph 117 (c) of the IBP by having an annual calendar of draft resolutions and having biannual instead of annual resolutions (Philippines);

• Biennialize resolutions, whenever possible (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Biennialize thematic and country specific resolutions (Australia);

• Bi- or triennialize resolutions (Japan);

• Bi- or triennialize thematic resolutions to the extend possible (India);

• Thematic resolutions to be bi-annualized or tri-annualized to reduce parallel negotiations which create problems for small delegations (Guatemala);

• Resolutions should not be presented more than once per year or should even be bi- or triennialized and should not overload the OHCHR with requests for reports which can not be duly elaborated by experts or be considered by States (Argentina);

• Bi-annualize resolutions on commonly established criteria to facilitate the full participation of all UN members (Belgium on behalf of EU).

• Bi-annualize resolutions to avoid their proliferation. Resolutions should be short, concise and action oriented. (Azerbaijan)

• Bi-annualize thematic resolutions (Thailand);

• Bi-annualize or tri-annualize resolutions without prejudice to urgent issues (Peru on behalf of Chile, Paraguay and Colombia);

• Consider an annual, bi- or triennial submission of proposals/draft resolutions, as well as shortening the length of resolutions and not being repetitive (Indonesia);

• Present the resolutions biannually (Spain);

• Consider introducing a two-third majority for the adoption of country-specific resolutions (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Adopt country specific resolutions and those establishing new special procedures by a qualified 2/3 majority (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• New mandates special procedures adopted by qualified majority namely 2/3 members present and voting (Russian Federation);

• 2/3 majority for country resolutions (Cuba);

• Formulate criteria to be agreed upon by consensus that would be used as basis for bringing a country under the special procedures mandate (Ghana);

• Need for a careful examination of the need for resolutions, in particular new mandate resolutions (Japan);

• Dialogue and cooperation should prevail over confrontation, issue of “numeric majority” is not useful during negotiations (Guatemala);
• Extend country-mandate terms to two years (Japan);
• Renew country mandate resolutions every 2 years (United States of America);
• Establish stricter procedures for new mandate resolutions (Japan);
• Make resolutions more action-oriented and consider ways of facilitating their implementation and follow-up (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Resolutions to be action oriented (Australia);
• Resolutions to be short, concise and action-oriented (Sri Lanka);
• Reduce the number of resolutions and shorten them (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
• Reduce the length of resolutions by reiterating previous ones and concentrating only on new operational elements such as holding of a panel or a workshop (India);
• Avoid duplication of resolutions of the Council and of the GA (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);
• Focus on new progressive elements when tabling various initiatives which could be presented for negotiations, which should as a matter for necessity contribute to the practical enjoyment of human rights and the strengthening of international human rights law, norms and standards (South Africa);
• Streamline and limit the length of draft initiatives to save costs (South Africa);
• Condense resolutions avoiding repetition and duplication of resolutions with the same content; result of the informal consultations to be known ways before action is taken (Viet Nam);
• Reduce the number of resolutions, thematic resolutions should be submitted triennially, sponsors should distribute the draft at least 2 weeks before the beginning of the Council session (China);
• Consider better streamlining of initiatives, including running resolutions on a biannual rather than an annual basis (UK).
• Focus the debate on the implementation of resolutions of the HRC (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);
• Establish and maintain a draft calendar of resolutions and decisions (Morocco);
• Establish a calendar of resolutions to be presented annually or on a bi-annual basis (Mauritius);
• Establish a yearly calendar of resolutions to be reviewed at the organizational session while allowing the flexibility for resolutions which might be needed owing to sudden developments along the cycle (India);
• Compile a yearly calendar of scheduled proposals (Indonesia);
• Elaborate tentative yearly calendar of planned resolutions on the basis of information provided at organizational session in June. Update information on planned resolutions to be tabled at the organizational meeting before each session (Norway);
• Presidential statements to be made only after extensive consultations with States and on the basis of consensus (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
• Presidential and HRC statements to be made only after extensive consultations and on the basis of consensus (Islamic Republic of Iran);
• Presidential Statements only after extensive consultations and on the basis of consensus (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Presidential statements to be made on the basis of consensus and consultations (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);

• Presidential and Council Statements only after extensive consultations and on the basis of consensus (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Expand the range of possible outcomes including resolutions, decisions, presidential statements, summary reports, joint statements (e.g. HRC and State concerned) (Canada);

• Devise a method to ensure that Member States are well apprised with the outcome of the negotiations conducted in informal meetings, before resolutions or decisions are brought to the HRC for action (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Implement the President’s open-ended information meetings on resolutions, decisions and other related business as stipulated in paragraph 112 of the IB text (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Sponsor(s) to circulate the initial draft of a resolution no later than the first day of a regular session; submit as early as possible and no later than at the end of the penultimate week of the session (firm deadline), the amended draft resolution, incorporating the results of informal consultations (Japan);

• Sponsor(s) of draft resolutions to provide in consultation with OHCHR PBIs information by the end of the first week of the session; no decision to be taken on a resolution in the event that this deadline is not met (Japan);

• Interested States to start informal discussions with the President and the Secretariat on a formal office as well as on the staff and budgetary requirements thereof, with a view to clarify the appropriate modalities of this office as requested in General Assembly resolution 64/144 (Japan);

• States to respect the thematic focus of a session when submitting resolutions (Morocco);

• Encourage delegations to disseminate draft resolutions and decisions in advance of a sessions and to hold informal consultations during the inter-sessional period (Morocco);

• Foresee a week before each session for informal consultations on draft resolutions and decisions (Morocco);

• Foresee the suspension of a session, for one or two days, further to the thematic discussions, to hold informal consultations on draft resolutions and decisions (Morocco);

• Establish procedures to ensure that formal introduction of resolutions takes place well ahead of adoption; this should not preclude tabling of emergency resolutions, if justified (Mauritius);

• Table resolutions at the beginning of a session while allowing tabling of resolutions for urgent situations (Peru on behalf of Chile, Paraguay and Colombia);

• Resolutions should be presented at least two weeks prior to the beginning of the session, if possible, taking into account the annual programme of work of the HRC (Argentina);

• Allow more time for negotiations on resolutions before action (Philippines);
• Require delegations to submit a list of resolutions to be tabled prior to the session and table first draft one week before the tabling deadline (exceptions to be made for crisis situation) (United States of America);

• Have early notification of meetings and draft resolutions, avoid the holding of parallel consultations, increase informal contacts and discussions, thereby promoting more consensual outcomes (Philippines);

• Ensure better planning and information sharing on resolutions sufficiently in advance. Information on the budgetary implications of resolutions should be made available during informal consultations (Thailand);

• Implement more extensively paragraph 112 of the IBP on the convening of the President’s open-ended information meetings on resolutions, decisions and other related business as a means to ensure information-sharing on the status of negotiations on draft resolutions during Council sessions (Philippines);

• Better organize informal consultations in order to allow participation of all (Peru on behalf of Chile, Paraguay and Colombia);

• Ensure effective monitoring and follow-up of resolutions adopted under agenda item 7 since the inception of the HRC (Lebanon);

• Increase focus on follow-up and on results of the implementation of Council resolutions. The Secretariat could be requested to prepare papers on the status of implementation of certain Council resolutions (Thailand);

• Encourage cross-regional initiatives (Azerbaijan);

• Ensure that timely information on the financial consequences of HRC initiatives is made available in the course of negotiations. Main sponsors of initiatives should consult with the secretariat at an early stage to identify the likely costs associated with any initiative and present the information to delegations at least a week before action on any proposal (UK);

• Ensure that information on budgetary implications of an initiative is available at least a week before the adoption of a resolution (Belgium on behalf of EU);

E. Reports and documentation

• Allocate necessary funds to the translation of documents in due time into the six UN languages (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Allocate necessary funding to enable timely translation of documents (Australia);

• Distribute all reports, particularly SP reports, to delegations at least 15 days in advance of their consideration by the HRC in all official UN languages (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Ensure translation into all official languages of all documents and resolutions (Viet Nam);

• Develop a system for a daily electronic distributions of all HRC (and other human rights) related documentation, as an alternative to paper copies circulated to all missions (Canada);

• Reduce the number of mandatory written reports and dialogue sessions (Japan);
• Ensure early preparation and circulation in all official languages of the United Nations of all reports, particularly those of special procedures at least 15 days before their consideration by the HRC (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Ensure availability of working documents in time and in all UN languages (India);

• Replace by half within 5 years paper copies of documentation by electronic copies (Algeria);

• Introduce electronic access facilities for participation in official HRC meetings through cooperation between the Secretariat and ITU (Algeria);

• Reduce by 10% the present number of pages as from next year and subject to review afterwards (Algeria);

• Reports and documents of the Council to be issued in time and in all UN languages (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);

• Develop more user-friendly information on the reports which are expected to be or will be effectively examined in each session; the reports of Special Procedures and the topics which have been tabled for debate (Mauritius);

• Find appropriate solutions to do away with shortcomings of circulation of all reports in due time in all official languages, at least 15 days before official consideration (Yemen);

• Set criteria to avoid overlap and duplication of reports (Yemen);

• Working documents need to be ready on time and translated to all official languages, which requires further support to the Secretariat (Guatemala);

• Transmit to delegations all reports, particularly those of special procedures, in a timely fashion, at least 15 days in advance of their consideration by the Council, and in all official UN languages (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Make documentation available at the earliest opportunity and in all UN official languages; Distribute statements or presentations (mandate holders, panelists, or Secretariat) well in advance through emails/internet or if possible, in hard copy (Indonesia);

• Reduce the circulation of paper documentation by ensuring that all reports are available online in a timely fashion (United Kingdom);

• Bi-annualize the consideration of certain reports (Peru on behalf of Chile, Paraguay and Colombia);

• Submit all reports two weeks before their consideration (Azerbaijan);

• Ensure all reports submitted to the Council are properly considered (Azerbaijan);

• Circulate reports at the same time and in all languages (Saudi Arabia);

F. Presidency and Bureau

• President and Bureau to maintain a strictly procedural and organizational role, as stipulated in rule 10 of the Rules of Procedures (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• President and Bureau to maintain a strictly procedural and organizational role in line with rule 10 of the rules of procedure (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Bureau to maintain a strictly procedural and organizational role line with the rule 10 of the Rules of Procedure (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);
Preserve the strictly procedural and organizational role for the President and the Bureau (India);

President and assistants shall fulfill function arising from the Rules of Procedure (Russian Federation);

Observe the strict procedural nature of the president and the Bureau rule 10 (Cuba);

The Bureau should be more active in facilitating the work of the HRC (Argentina);

Establish a Secretariat Branch under the auspices of UNOG rather than OHCHR to support the HRC and its presidency (Canada);

Urgently take measures towards the establishment of an office of the president (Switzerland; Mexico; Nigeria; Thailand and Ukraine);

Need to address the relationship between the HRC and OHCHR insofar as it serves as HRC Secretariat. The review will address these systemic issues and will come up with practical and feasible recommendations to resolve them (India);

Strengthen the office of the President, by at least provide a communications and a legal experts (Romania);

The President and the Bureau shall maintain a strictly procedural and organizational role in line with the rule 10 of the ROP (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

Maintain the organizational and procedural role of the bureau (Philippines);

The bureau should only be responsible procedural and organizational matters (China);

Further discuss the reinforcement of office of President, taking into account the geographic distribution (Lebanon);

Maintain strict procedural and organizational role of Bureau (Azerbaijan)

Provide the President with his own permanent team constituted at least of a legal advisor and a communication advisor (France);

Explore ways to strengthen the Office of the President (Thailand)

G. Accessibility and Stakeholder participation

Create a task force on the accessibility of persons with disabilities (Turkey);

Create an organ alike the Venice Commission to support legislative work at the national level (Turkey);

Undertake an “accessibility audit” of the HRC including by exploring the feasibility of captioning, sing language for meetings, webcasting of WGs and subsidiary bodies (Canada);

Institute an “Accessibility Task Force” consisting of high-level representatives of States, UNOG, OHCHR and civil society organizations (in particular those of persons with disabilities) (Canada);

Adopt IT solutions to enhance access of non-resident States and NHRIs, such as videoconferencing or video messaging (Canada);

Adopt necessary measures to ensure accessibility of persons with disabilities (Morocco);
UNOG and OHCHR to develop, in collaboration with States, civil society organizations and persons with disabilities, a specific and comprehensive accessibility plan for the Council and all of its work and the whole Palais des Nations, also addressing the needs of the broader UN system (New Zealand and Mexico);

Raise awareness on accessibility for persons working in and around the Council (New Zealand and Mexico).

Create an accessibility plan to be implemented in close consultation with UNOG and persons with disabilities (Austria).

Ensure the participation of all in the Council, particularly of persons with disabilities, by elaborating an accessibility plan (Belgium on behalf of EU)

Allocate additional resources to OHCHR to facilitate the participation in the work of the HRC and its subsidiary bodies of countries without permanent mission in Geneva and of A-status NHRIs in accordance with the Paris Principles in developing countries (Morocco);

Recommend the establishment of a special funding mechanism aimed at empowering small delegations, in particular those from Small and Vulnerable Economies and Least Developed Countries, to participate more effectively in the proceedings of the Human Rights Council (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

Establish a proper technical assistance programme for the HRC to assist small delegations from developing countries to fulfill their responsibility and rights as HRC members; enhance the capacity of small delegations from developing countries and to enable them to better act on the Council’s agenda and its various consultative processes (Mauritius);

Establish a fund for the above-mentioned purpose as elaborated in the written contribution (Mauritius);

Preserve the participation of NGOs and other stakeholders in the HRC deliberations (Islamic Republic of Iran);

Allow NHRIs in conformity with the Paris Principles to submit video statements as oral interventions at Council sessions (Austria),

Invite NHRI representatives regularly to speak on Council panels and to contribute to other experts meetings and events organized by the HRC and OHCHR (Austria);

Give the NHRI from a state concerned in the country-specific or thematic report of a special procedures mandate holder the opportunity to speak immediately after the concerned country in order to directly contribute to the interactive dialogue (Austria);

Allow NHRIs to provide the Council with regular information on the implementation of special procedures’ recommendations (Austria);

Guarantee the representativeness of the participation of NGOs, which should also reflect geographic balance (China);

At the request of member states, OHCHR should provide technical and financial support to NGOs from developing countries and help them to participate in the Council’s work (China);
H. Visibility

- Invite newspapers and magazines to prepare articles on the objectives and the functioning of the HRC (Turkey);
- Utilize all communication methodologies (Turkey);
- Increase the visibility of the President in relation to the media, by e.g. conducting information visits to certain countries in certain cases (Turkey);
- Establish a public relations and communications position within the office of the President (Turkey);
- Organize a presentation for information at one of the sessions of IPU (Turkey);

I. Rules of Procedure

- Continued codification of rules of procedure and practices (Russian Federation)
- Not alter the Council’s ROP as contained in the IB text (Philippines).

J. Relation with the General Assembly

- President to consult with the PGA on options for fast-track approval by the GA of HRC resolutions with financial implications (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
- Request the Fifth Committee to consider the feasibility of a meeting within a month after each session of the HRC to consider and approve budget allocations resulting from the adoption of HRC resolutions (Canada);
- President to consult with the PGA on option for a swift approval by the GA of the HRC resolutions with financial implications. There might be a need for the HRC to review the relationship between the HRC and the 5th Committee of the GA (India);
- Recommend the GA the provision of financial contingency calculated on the basis of additional funding required to implement HRC resolutions during the last planning period (Algeria);
- President to consult with PGA on how to fast-track approval by GA of HRC resolutions with financial implications (Algeria);
- Strengthen and properly align reporting procedures of the Council and the General Assembly (South Africa)
- Align the Council and General Assembly so that they are complementary and not duplicate their work and approach to human rights issues. To this end, the Council remains the pre-eminent body of first instance, i.e. principal United Nations Human Rights Body to deal with human rights issues and present its report to the General Assembly for adoption (South Africa)
- Revise the reporting line to the GA, e.g submit resolutions requiring urgent endorsement by GA shortly after a particular Council session or present to the GA only part of its report listing recommendations with financial implications requiring GA action (Thailand)
- HRC to make appropriate recommendations on its own budget lines and on those of its subsidiary bodies (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);
• Make every possible effort to meet unbudgeted financial requirements from existing resources and to this effect, seek further efficiency and rationalization within the UN Secretariat (Japan);

K. Relationship between the HRC and OHCHR

• Need to ensure better synergy and coordination between the HRC and OHCHR and to build a constructive working relation and dialogue between both bodies (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• HC to report to the HRC only once per year at the main session; reports to other sessions to be restricted to new developments and challenges since the previous session (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• SF and SMP to be consistent with the agreed international human rights law instruments as well as HRC resolutions (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Include an item on the OHCHR draft SF in the HRC PoW every two years under agenda item 2; the HC to present the draft SF to the HRC prior to its submission to the General Assembly; the President of the HRC should send a report reflecting the discussions in the HRC to the GA and the CPC as an input to their consideration of the draft SF by the HC (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Include and item on “The OHCHR Strategic Management Plan” in the HRC PoW every two years under agenda item 2; the HC would present the draft SMP to the HRC and an interactive dialogue shall take place between Member/Observer States and the HC; The HRC will ensure its consistency with the SF adopted by the GA and with HRC resolutions (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• HC should report to the HRC only once a year at the main session of the Council (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• HC to report to the HRC only once per year at the main session (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• HC to present the draft SF to be followed by an interactive dialogues under agenda item 2 biannually (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Ensure better synergy between the HRC and OHCHR and build on the constructive working relationship and dialogue between both sides (Sri Lanka);

• Include, under agenda item 2, every two years, a new sub-item dedicated to the presentation of and discussion on the HC’s Strategic Framework (Algeria);

• HC to report to the HRC only once a year during the main session and to provide updates at the remaining sessions (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• In accordance of PRST 15/2, request the HC to present the Strategic Framework for Programme 19 to the HRC prior to its submission to the CPC, for the purpose the HC to compile and submit the views of States and relevant stakeholders for the transmission to CPC (India);

• HC to present her annual report to the main session in March and to present follow-up reports to others sessions (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);

• HC to present annual report at the main sessions, following reports to concentrate on activities of the Office and should not refer to issues appearing under other items; the presentation of updates to be followed by an interactive dialogue; such reports to be available enough in advance (Cuba);
• Avoid including under agenda item 2 the OHCHR strategic framework and management plan (Spain);

• HC’s two years’ strategic framework should be submitted and approved by the Council (China);

• During the main session, listen to HC annual report under item 2, and listen to reports on new developments during other sessions (China);

• The OHCHR should strictly carry out the functions of the secretariat and should not be involved in substantive discussions (China);

• HRC should not take action on either the Strategic Framework or Strategic Management Plan of OHCHR (United Kingdom);

• Discuss draft Strategic Framework in a formal setting (Azerbaijan)

• Improve coordination between OHCHR and HRC and ensure that the SF and SMP are in line with HRs international standards and with Council resolutions (Venezuela);

• Strengthen the independence and legal separation of OHCHR from the HRC (Israel);

• Enable HC to make structural changes to her Office to enhance her staff’s expertise (Israel);

• Maintain independence of OHCHR and not allow the Strategic Framework to be introduced under item 2 (France);

• High Commissioner should continue reporting on new developments under item 2 at each session (Thailand);

• Relationship between the Council and OHCHR is beyond the scope of the review. Distinguish OHCHR as a whole and Council’s Secretariat. Only this latter should be subjected to review (Thailand);

L. Cross-cutting issues

• Ensure that not only first generation human rights are being dealt with (Turkey);

• Make recommendations on the further development of international law in the field of human rights to the GA in line with paragraph 5(c) of resolution 60/251 (Turkey);

• Give special attention to the issue of improving human rights coordination and mainstreaming system wide (Egypt on behalf of the NAM);

• Coordinate and mainstream human rights in the UN system (Yemen)

• Critical that the developmental agenda be integrated into the human rights agenda (South Africa);

• Better coordination between the Council and human rights agencies (Guatemala);

• Strengthen the voice of human rights victims and defenders in the Council in an objective, non-politicized and balanced manner (Maldives);

• Ensure that victims have a voice in the proceedings of the Council under agenda item 7, for example by video conferencing (Lebanon).

• Mainstream human rights within the UN system (Thailand)

• Request higher level of policy and programmatic streamlining among HLCP, UNDG and CEB (Serbia)
- Streamline human rights within the UN system and coordinate initiatives between the HRC and other UN bodies (Serbia)
- Ensure adequate exchange of information between UN-related Permanent Missions (Serbia)
- Strengthen interaction with other UN Agencies (Austria);
Part II: No Title

- The review is an unique opportunity to discover ways and means by which the HRC can better discharge its mandate (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

- Instead of seeking to tinker with or obliterate the institution building package, it could be useful to enquire how well member States, observers and other stakeholders have effectively utilized these mechanisms at their disposal (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

- Review, not reform the Council; the IBP should not be reopened. Emphasis to be put on building achievements and enhance them. Avoid politicisation, double standards. The review should be guided by objectivity, transparency, and practicality (Oman on behalf of the Arab Group);

- The review exercise should be confined to fine-tuning the work and the functioning of the Council; any reform and any call to link the performance of the Council with its mandate are premature (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

- Improve, not reform the Council; keep the institution building package (balanced) as is (Chile);

- Improve and reinforce the HRC; evaluate what has been done and identify and adequately and efficiently address shortcoming and deficiencies. Need to have a constructive dialogue, so as to ameliorate the work and functioning of the Council. Focus on points of convergence (Guatemala);

- The review gives an opportunity to streamline the work and to make it contribute further to human rights situation on the ground (Japan);

- The review is an examination, not a reform, aiming at consolidating achievements (Algeria);

- The review aims at improving the Council, not at reforming it and at affecting the balance between objectivity, non politicisation and efficiency of the promotion and protection of human rights (Ecuador);

- The review is not a reform, but an opportunity to improve existing shortcomings within the framework of the IB package (China);

- The review, which should not be considered as the last one, should aim at preserving the achievements made thus far, in particular with regard to the IB package and its outcome should be adopted by consensus (Saudi Arabia);

- The assessment of the work and functioning of the Council should be measured against the mandate outlined in GA resolution 60/251 (United States).

- The IB package, a balanced result of a long process of difficult negotiations, should be supplemented, rather than re-opened (Viet Nam);

- The review should preserve and strengthen existing mechanisms and tools (Argentina);

- The review is not to reinvent the wheel; the spirit of the institution building package should be our guideline; Negotiations should focus on how inclusive participation can be enhanced and the HRC be made more efficient and effective (Nepal);

- The review shall be based on the IBP in the context of the mandate of General Assembly resolution 69/251 (Azerbaijan);
• Not reopen the institution building package, but refine the work and functioning of the HRC (Azerbaijan);

• The review exercise must preserve the ability to give effect to the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity, non-selectivity, dialogue, cooperation and capacity-building (India);

• The review, while giving due regard to all stakeholders, must preserve the primacy of the inter-governmental nature of HRC mechanism and recognize the primacy of national efforts in the realization of human rights (India);

• The review exercise must not derogate from the delicate balance in the institution building package of the HRC (India);

• Reinforce the strengths of the HRC and not reconstruct, reframe or unravel existing arrangements (Malaysia);

• The purpose of the review is not to introduce reforms to the mechanism that have been established after arduous negotiations in 2007; the purpose is to evaluate the work and functioning of the HRC (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);

• The review should serve to strengthen the work of the HRC (Mexico);

• Undertake the review in a manner that maintains and builds on the achievements of the HRC (Yemen);

• Too early to start a reform, this is a review; not re-open the institution building package (Yemen);

• The review should be conducive to an even more efficient and stronger HRC; It is an opportunity to make the necessary adjustments in the work and functioning of the HRC; the balance reached five years ago should not be unravelled (Brazil);

• The review should address pragmatic issues by strengthening tools currently available in the HRC toolbox (Thailand);

• Reflect on achievements and shortcomings of the HRC with open-minded approach and constructive spirit so as to identify possible adjustments for the UPR, the HRC programme of work and the Special Procedures (Timor-Leste);

• Not renegotiate the institution building package, instead, ensure that this intergovernmental negotiating process aims at making further improvement where necessary (Sri Lanka);

• Identify the substantive and non-substantive elements of the review and focus on those that are doable (Sri Lanka);

• Base the review on the institution building package and maintain its intergovernmental nature (Qatar);

• Review, not to reform the work and functioning of the HRC in accordance with the mandate of the GA Res. 60/251 (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Identify the limited areas which requires adjustments based on consensus with a view to facilitate more smooth work and functioning of the HRC without re-opening the IB text, whose delicate balance should be strictly maintained (Islamic Republic of Iran);

• Make the HRC to become more able to effectively fulfil its mandate to address situations of violations of human rights, including gross and systematic violations, and to respond promptly to human rights emergencies (Canada);
• Strengthen the Council’s role in the prevention of human rights violations. To ensure that the Council better adhere to its funding principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity (Canada);

• Assess whether the HRC has lived up to the high expectations of the time of its establishment and implement modifications that would address identified shortcomings (Poland);

• Do not institute deadlines for additional submissions on the review of the Council, i.e. after the end of the present IGWG (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

• Ensure that national human rights institutions and NGOs will be able to participate fully in the deliberations of the Council’s review (Poland);

• Importance of participation by other stakeholders, while stressing the intergovernmental nature of the review process (Bahrain);

• The process of review is an intergovernmental process and the participation of stakeholders should take place in accordance with the institution building process (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya);

• Inclusiveness of the review, but the intergovernmental nature should be preserved (Azerbaijan);

• The outcome of the review should be in the form of an annex to Council resolution 5/1 (China);

• Adopt, by consensus, one outcome document as a result of the review (Belarus);

• The review is an opportunity to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the HRC. It is not a reform nor should it reopen the institution building package (Colombia);

• Expresses the appreciation of the transparency of the process and agreed to not reopen the negotiation op16 of 60/251 (The Sudan);

• The review should be conducted in an atmosphere of non polarization to reach the consensus (The Sudan);

• Improvement is needed in attitudes and the political culture of all stakeholders in the HRC (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• The current structure is conceived and sufficiently robust enough (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• The work of the HRC should be more action-oriented (Spain);

• Victims must also occupy a greater place and that the HRC further integrates their views (Switzerland);

• The HRC should give voice to victims (Netherlands);

• Treat all human rights within the framework of international human rights instruments, not only the instruments of the 1st generation (Turkey);

• Address the long-neglected inter-linkage between development and human rights and to enable the Council to have a well-coordinated inter-governmental structure to deal with this matter and feed into the NY processes (South Africa);

• Give priority to themes where interregional cooperation is possible (Turkey);

• Make the Council more accessible to small States and Islands (Maldives);
• Focus on positive and best practices of human rights in order to create peer pressure and a race to the top (Maldives);

• Prevent the evolving trends in the HRC from going down the same path which led to the failure of the former Commission (Islamic Republic Iran);

• Need of systematized analysis, to be included in a consolidated document, focusing on the six pillars of the IBP (UPR, Special procedures, Advisory Committee; Complaint procedure; PoW (Agenda); Methods of Work). The document should also include information on the dialogue and previous negotiations (Ecuador);

• Elevate the HRC to a principal organ of the United Nations (Argentina);

• Strengthen international efforts to foster a global dialogue for the promotion of a culture of tolerance and peace at all levels, based on respect for human rights and for diversity (Pakistan on behalf of the OIC);

• Reinforce international efforts to uphold a global dialogue for the promotion of a culture of tolerance and peace at all levels, based on respect for human rights while taking into account the cultural diversity (Islamic Republic Iran);

• Need to look at cross-cutting issues for cooperation. Dialogue and cooperation of States should not comprise the primary obligation of States to protect victims of human rights violations and prevent it for future (Peru);

• Reinforce the culture of dialogue, so as to permit the HRC to remain a forum in which respect, persuasion, and mutual understanding prevail (Algeria);

• The Council should also be a forum for dialogue on all issues (Spain);

• Guarantee better participation of all actors concerned and establish a real dialogue based on mutual understanding and with a view to improving the human rights conditions for every one (Morocco);

• The HRC can perform better to promote and effectively coordinate and mainstream of human rights within the UN system. The General Assembly decided that the HRC should ensure participation and consultation with observers, specialized agencies, and other intergovernmental organizations. Strengthen such dialogue as a result of the review (Belgium on behalf of the EU);

• Reinstate human rights as one of the three pillars upon which the entire United Nations system rests (Nigeria on behalf of the African Group);

• Mainstream human rights into the United Nations system; strengthen the role of the HRC by incorporating human rights in a cross-cutting manner in the United Nations as one of the three fundamental pillars of the Organization (Mexico);

• Consider, inter alia, the establishment of mechanisms and/or strategies for the implementation of recommendations of HRC mechanisms, such as the UPR and special procedures (Brazil);

• Improve follow-up and implementation to ensure real and measurable impact (Maldives);

• Take benefit from the outcome and the discussion of treaty bodies by increasing the presentation of treaty bodies to the Council when common areas of interest have been identified (Turkey);

• The HRC with OHCHR should have an institutionalized and systematic dialogue with relevant United Nations bodies in order to ensure that priority is accorded to human rights in its work and in particular on the ground (Mexico);
• Need to beef up coordination among human rights mechanisms and need to avoid duplication and overlap (Bahrain);
Part : No Title

- Select HRC members taking into account of their contributions to human rights and their own record thereon; the General Assembly to reflect on remedial ways to clean slates and to reinforce selection criteria for HRC members (France);

- Consider the non cooperation of States with Special Procedures as an element of consideration of membership in servicing the HRC (Austria);

- Find ways, during the review, to better fulfil the requirements of 60/251 on the issue of membership (Sweden);

- Do not change the current limited membership (Argentina);

- Make membership universal (Canada);

- Pending the inception of a universal HRC, establish clear criteria as to what constitutes “upholding the highest standards in the promotion and protection of human rights, and full cooperation with the HRC” (Canada);

- Ensure member States take into account criteria established in 60/251 when selecting Council members; require candidates to present voluntary pledges and commitments in an interactive dialogue before the GA; OHCHR to provide a report for this interactive dialogue including, information on the implementation of ratified human rights treaties, possible human rights sanctions, nature of human rights complaints against a country, status of implementation of UPR recommendations, level of cooperation with SP, contribution to HR initiatives (United States of America);

- Avoid clean slates (United States of America)
Annex

Written submissions

- Argentina
- Argentina & Chile (E, S)
- Armenia
- China
- Colombia
- Costa Rica
- Cuba
- European Union
- GRULAC
- India
- Indonesia
- Islamic Republic of Iran
- Israel
- Japan
- Maldives
- Mauritius
- Mexico
- Moldova
- Non Aligned Movement
- Norway
- Oman (A)
- Pakistan
- Reflection Group
- Russian Federation
- South Africa
- Switzerland
- Turkey
- United States of America

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1 in alphabetical order