

Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of Uzbekistan, (3rd cycle – 30th session)

I. INTRODUCTION

1. This is a joint submission by Anti-Slavery International, Cotton Campaign, International Labor Rights Forum, Responsible Sourcing Network and Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights.
2. This submission focuses on forced labour in Uzbekistan. Specifically, 1) State-sponsored forced labour in the cotton sector; 2) Harassment and imprisonment of journalists and Human Rights Defenders who monitor and report on forced labour in the cotton sector; and 3) Continued child labour.
3. This information is structured in line with the Matrice of recommendations provided by the OHCHR in the ‘Matrice of recommendations, UPR of Uzbekistan’ⁱ, with evidence on **1) state sponsored forced labour in the cotton sector** submitted under Theme D27 Prohibition of Slavery, Trafficking. The information submitted herein on **2) harassment and imprisonment of journalists and human rights defenders who monitor and report on forced labour in the cotton sector** is relevant to Theme D27 Prohibition of Slavery, Trafficking, as well as Theme D33 Arbitrary arrest and detention, Theme D43 Freedom of opinion and expression, and Theme H1 Human rights defenders; and **3) Continued child labour** is relevant to Theme F33 Children: protection against exploitation.

II. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

4. Since the second cycle UPR of Uzbekistan in 2013, the government of Uzbekistan continued to force Uzbek citizens to harvest cotton as part of its state-controlled system of cotton production. Despite the Uzbek government’s increased engagement with the International Labour Organization (via the Decent Work Country Programme), the number of Uzbek adults forced to harvest cotton *increased* in 2015 and 2016 because of the burden from children to public sector employees. The government has actively intimidated and detained independent civil society monitors and journalists who attempt to observe and report on forced labour during the annual cotton harvest.
5. According to reports from independent monitoring conducted by the Uzbek-German Forum (UGF), the Uzbek government again used coercion to mobilize its citizens to plant and weed the cotton fields prior to the 2017 fall harvest.ⁱⁱ
6. The state-run mobilization campaign largely targets public sector employees, people receiving welfare and child benefits, and students who are forced into the fields under the threat of losing jobs, social benefits, or university placements.

7. In 2017 many citizens reported being forced by their supervisors or local officials to sign declarations that they agree to pick cotton “voluntarily” and agree to dismissal or expulsion if they fail to participate in the harvest or meet their picking quota.
8. International pressure was critical in the Uzbek government ending the systematic mass mobilization of children to harvest cotton, and it will be critical to ending the systematic mobilization of adults that continued in 2017, despite some reductions.
9. On 21 September 2017, the prime minister of Uzbekistan ordered local officials to recall students, medical and education workers from the fields, following President Mirziyoyev’s statement on the eradication of forced labour in his address to the UN General Assembly. University students and some education and health care workers were returned from the fields on 22 September 2017, a significant development. However, education and medical workers in some districts continued to pick cotton. In other districts, officials ordered pupils’ parents to work in the place of teachers or required teachers and medical workers to pay hire workers to pick cotton in their place. On 28 September 2017, in Angren city of Uzbekistan, teachers and doctors, alongside with coal miners and factories’ workers were once again brought into the fields. Local administration and law enforcement mobilized citizens to pick cotton under threats of penaltiesⁱⁱⁱ.
10. Despite an important commitment from the President and prime minister, the government of Uzbekistan has not yet taken steps to dismantle the production quota system of centralized control, which creates pressure on local officials to resort to forced labour to meet otherwise hard-to-reach objectives. Continued scrutiny is needed to ensure that the promises made by the authorities are translated into practice and to prevent a shift of coercion to other groups or other forms of coercion such as increased extortion to pay for replacement workers.
11. Extortion is rapidly becoming a distinct feature of the 2017 cotton harvest. Officials extract money from the citizens to pay for replacement workers to line their pockets and essentially subsidize cotton sector at people’s expense. According to UGF, teachers who were returned from the fields at the prime minister’s order on September 22, 2017, were told to pay about US\$40, half of their monthly wage, to hire a replacement worker.^{iv} In Uzbekistan’s “pick or pay” state-run forced labour system, officials prefer the “pay” piece, which allows them to skim corrupt profits and avoid the need to force people into the fields.
12. Employees of numerous other organizations are still forced to harvest cotton or pay for their freedom. On September 26, 2017, the Central Bank of Uzbekistan released an “internal use” document ordering the chairmen of commercial banks boards and the heads of the regional branches of the Central Bank to request every member of staff in regional branches to hire five people each to pick cotton^v.
13. According to UGF, private businesses in various retail markets of Uzbekistan are required to pay so-called “cotton money” to a representative of the tax office or the market administration. Taxi drivers are being forced to transport workers to and from the cotton fields. They have been told that this is their contribution to the collection of cotton and that there would be no payment for the service.^{vi}

14. In an attempt to disguise coercion, many citizens report being forced to sign (e.g. in early September, the Union of Youth of Uzbekistan forced students to sign) declarations that they are “voluntary” cotton pickers.
15. The Government of Uzbekistan is urged to bring an end to the cotton quotas that force farmers to produce cotton and the labour quotas that force local administrators to coercively mobilize Uzbek citizens into cotton fields. Support global efforts to improve working conditions and increase pay for harvesting cotton, which would attract more voluntary labour and provide much-needed employment to rural communities in Uzbekistan. The current system of quotas, coercion and price fixing to maximize profits into the *Selkhozfond*, however, must be addressed before such efforts can be successful.

III. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECOND CYCLE RECOMMENDATIONS ON FORCED LABOUR IN THE COTTON SECTOR:

16. In the second cycle of UPR, the government of Uzbekistan developed cooperation with the International Labour Organization (ILO). In 2014 Uzbekistan signed a Decent Work Country Programme, in which it committed to work with the ILO to advance international labour standards throughout the country, including the cotton sector^{vii}.
17. In 2014 the World Bank contracted with the ILO to monitor for the use of child and forced labour related to the cotton sector in certain World Bank project areas. In response to concerns of forced and child labour being linked to World Bank projects in Uzbekistan, the Bank committed to third-party monitoring of project areas, with the possibility to suspend its loans if it received credible evidence of forced or child labour in project areas. Instead of hiring an independent, third party monitor, the Bank contracted with the ILO of which the government is a constituent member and therefore is not an independent, third party.
18. In 2014, the Uzbek government adopted a policy of no longer using forced child labour in the annual cotton harvest. Unfortunately, the 2015 and 2016 cotton harvest monitoring in Uzbekistan shows that child labour is resurgent, while the ILO third-party monitoring process is undermined by the government of Uzbekistan’s interference. Instead of implementing meaningful reforms, the Uzbek government is deceiving international monitors while maintaining its state-run system of forced labour in cotton production, substituting children with adults.
19. Despite commitments by the Uzbek government to prohibit forced labour and its increased engagement with the ILO via the Decent Work Country Programme, preliminary interviews gathered by UGF in 2017 indicate that a number of steps have been taken to mobilize public sector workers and private sector workers to harvest cotton under threat of penalty. Documents collected to date indicate that directors of schools and colleges and heads of markets continue to be required to send people to harvest cotton.
20. Problems with child labour incidents persist. In 2016 UGF documented more cases of child labour, including state-led child labour of schoolchildren, than the previous

year. Despite the end of the systematic mobilization of children to the fields in 2013 and 2014, the government has not dismantled the quota system that creates pressure on local officials to resort to forced and child labour to meet production and picking targets or face penalties.

21. In 2015^{viii} and 2016^{ix}, the Uzbek government regularly arbitrarily detained, physically assaulted and in other ways interfered with the work of independent civil society monitors and journalists attempting to report on forced and child labour and working conditions.
22. On 4 October 2017, human rights activist Elena Urlaeva, photo correspondent Timur Karpov, accompanied by journalists from Germany, were detained by Buka district law enforcement officers for speaking to cotton pickers – mobilized teachers, doctors and other public sector employees from the city of Angren. Timur Karpov reported that he was beaten by the local police officer during detention^x.
23. **State-sponsored forced labour continued on a massive scale in 2015 and 2016.**
The Uzbek government continued to force millions of its citizens to pick cotton or to pay for replacement workers. The government exerts direct control over the cotton sector from the top down, with officials at every level involved in forcing its citizens to participate in every phase of cotton production (including planting, weeding, and harvesting) under threat of penalty. A 2014 presidential decree illustrates the close involvement of high-level central government officials in cotton production and harvesting.^{xi} The decree gives personal responsibility for the harvest to key central officials and regional and district governors, who face punishment if they fail to meet assigned harvest quotas.
24. In 2016, the government once again imposed quotas for the amount of cotton to be picked by institutions (including schools, universities, and hospitals), which passed them on to their students or employees and enforced them through various forms of coercion. Official government ledgers track the number of employees each institution must send to the harvest and the names of those responsible, confirming the systemic nature of the problem. According to independent civil society monitors, the pattern and scale of mobilization in recent years remains roughly the same, affecting over a million people.^{xii}
25. Withholding child benefits and other welfare payments is just one of the penalties the government has used to force people to work. The government has threatened to fire people, especially public sector employees who are among the lowest paid in the country. Students who refused to work faced the threat of expulsion, academic penalties, and other consequences. People living in poverty are particularly susceptible to forced labour, as they are unable to risk losing their jobs or welfare benefits by refusing to work and cannot afford to pay people to work in their place.
26. Expert bodies on labour rights and human trafficking continue to express concern about the widespread use of forced labour in the Uzbek cotton sector. Since 2005, the International Labour Organization's (ILO) Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations has expressed concerns about reports of forced and child labour in the cotton industry and the government's failure to eliminate it in

observations under Conventions 29, 105, and 182.^{xiii} In 2016, the Committee once again urged the government to eliminate the use of compulsory labour of public and private sector workers, as well as students, in cotton farming.^{xiv}

27. The U.S. Department of State's 2017 Trafficking in Persons Report found that "the central government continued to demand farmers and local officials fulfill state-assigned cotton production quotas, and set insufficiently low prices for cotton and labor to attract a sufficient number of voluntary workers, which led to the wide-scale mobilizations of adult laborers."^{xv} The State Department once again rated Uzbekistan as a "Tier 3" country, the lowest rating possible that is reserved for countries who have severe problems with human trafficking and are not making significant efforts to remedy the problem.

28. Since 2005, the U.S. Department of Labor, International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) continues to include cotton from Uzbekistan on their list of goods made with forced and child labor^{xvi}.

29. Given the lack of tangible progress, major multinational corporations continue to boycott Uzbek cotton: 274 companies have now signed a pledge not to knowingly source cotton from Uzbekistan because of forced and child labour in the sector.^{xvii}

30. **Cooperation with the ILO.**

The ILO monitoring team's report on the 2015 harvest reaffirmed the existence of forced labour, stating that "the risk of forced labour under conditions of organized recruitment is real, and not merely theoretical."^{xviii} Its findings included: (1) the practices of officials responsible for meeting cotton quotas did not change; (2) there were indicators of forced labour related to widespread organized recruitment of adults to pick cotton; and (3) public-sector workers in the education and health-care sectors were compelled to contribute labour or payments. In 2016 the ILO did not monitor for forced and child labour according to the ILO's indicators. It monitored measures taken by the government to reduce the risks of forced and child labour, finding that many had not yet been implemented and specific categories of workers remained at a high risk of forced labour, including staff of educational and medical facilities, staff of various public and private entities, and students at colleges and secondary schools.^{xix}

31. The independence and effectiveness of the ILO monitoring team missions has been undermined by the presence of government and government-aligned organizations (including the government-controlled Federation of Trade Unions of Uzbekistan (FTUU)).

32. The Uzbek government also made a concerted effort to conceal the coercive nature of cotton harvesting by coaching workers on how to respond to the ILO monitoring team. The 2016 monitoring report noted that "Many interviewees appeared to have been briefed in advance."^{xx} Numerous people told Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek-German Forum that government officials or their supervisors told people to say they were local and unemployed, picking cotton voluntarily, or that they worked as cleaners or guards in their schools and hospitals instead of teachers and medical

staff.^{xxi} If the monitors already knew that they were teachers, then they were to say that they voluntarily picked cotton after they had finished teaching classes.

33. **Threats and Reprisals Against Human Rights Defenders.**

Independent human rights defenders faced constant risk of harassment and persecution in 2015^{xxii} and 2016^{xxiii}. In several regions, local authorities, including police, prosecutors, and local committees, called in monitors for questioning, accused them of being involved in illegal or “bad” activities, threatened them with charges, loss of jobs, or other penalties, and in some cases confiscated their research materials.^{xxiv} Local police and central government officials have also arbitrarily prevented monitors from traveling in connection with their human rights work.^{xxv}

34. In 2015 this harassment reached unprecedented levels as the government used arbitrary arrest, threats, degrading ill-treatment, and other repressive means to undermine the ability of monitors to conduct research and provide information to the ILO and other international institutions. One monitor, Dmitry Tikhonov, had to flee the country and another, Uktam Pardaev, was imprisoned for two months and released on a suspended sentence. Police told Pardaev that he remains subject to travel restrictions and a curfew, although these are not stipulated in the sentence, and have surveilled and intimidated his relatives and friends. He risks going to prison if found to violate conditions of release, which he believes could be used to retaliate against him for speaking out about human rights abuses.

35. In 2016 only one monitor, Elena Urlaeva, continued to work openly, and she was subjected to surveillance, harassment, arbitrary detentions and other abuses. On March 1, 2017, police again detained Urlaeva. After reportedly insulting and assaulting her, police sent Urlaeva to a psychiatric hospital for forced treatment. The hospital released her on March 23. Urlaeva said she believes authorities detained her to prevent her from meeting with representatives of the World Bank and the ILO.^{xxvi}

36. In Karakalpakstan, where the World Bank irrigation project is being implemented, authorities questioned and intimidated another Uzbek-German Forum monitor, who did not work openly, and a member of his family, suspecting him of monitoring.^{xxvii} Security forces also arrested an independent monitor in this area and briefly detained him.

37. **Reduction but not complete elimination of child labour.**

In 2014, the Uzbek government adopted a policy of no longer using forced child labour in the annual cotton harvest. Since then, more than a million children have been removed from forced labour. Unfortunately this decline was accompanied by an offsetting increase in adult forced labour.^{xxviii}

38. Despite the overall progress, cases of forced child labour, including state-led child labour persist. According to the Uzbek-German Forum and Human Rights Watch, local officials in Kashkadarya required schools to mobilize children as young as 10 or 11 years old to pick cotton and suspended classes during this period.^{xxix} They noted that in several districts this was worse than 2015, when children receiving some classes prior to being sent to pick cotton.^{xxx}

39. Changes in Uzbekistan’s country leadership.

On September 2, 2016, the state news media reported the death of Islam Karimov, the authoritarian President whose 26 year reign left a legacy of repression, human rights abuses, and corruption. The new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, has promised increased accountability and acknowledged the need for reforms in key aspects of Uzbek society, including the economy and the criminal justice system.

40. With its rampant corruption and abusive labour practices, reform of the state-run cotton sector may be an early test case of the new president’s commitment to economic reform. Yet there is reason for scepticism, since as prime minister from 2003 to 2016 Mirziyoyev oversaw the cotton production system. During the 2016 harvest, when Mirziyoyev was acting president, cotton production continued to be defined by mass involuntary mobilization of workers.^{xxxix}
41. In 2016 farmers told the Uzbek-German Forum that they would again face consequences for failure to meet their daily harvest and annual cotton production quotas. One farmer, who only fulfilled 70 percent of his cotton quota in 2016, said, “They will use Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s ‘Clever’ regime against me. It was like that last year. I had to sell all my livestock and turn in [the money] instead of cotton.”^{xxxix} A plan known as “Clever” (*Oibolta* in Uzbek), under which local officials repossessed the land and possessions of farmers who had failed to meet production quotas for cotton or wheat or incurred debts.^{xxxix}
42. The government also appeared to assign new penalties to farmers who fail to meet cotton production quotas in effect for contracts signed as of July 20, 2016. The Uzbek-German Forum obtained a copy of a “Warning Letter” sent to cotton farmers which states that they will be subject to a court proceeding for failure to fulfil the production requirements as well as incur personal financial liability for credit advanced.^{xxxix}
43. **Forced labour in cotton planting and weeding in Uzbekistan in spring 2017.** The Uzbek-German Forum found that the government required public sector employees, including education and medical workers, people receiving public benefits, and some university students in at least one region to work in the cotton fields in spring 2017. It also required some private sector businesses, including commercial banks, to send employees or hire labourers to perform spring fieldwork.
44. The Uzbek-German Forum also documented several instances of child labour in spring 2017, including children working alongside or instead of adults required to work, and children working for pay as replacement workers hired by businesses or organizations required to send their employees.
45. The spring cotton weeding season begins in late April or early May, depending on the region, and lasts between one and two months. The amount of time people worked in the fields varied from several days over the season to long shifts of up to 25 days in addition to weekend shifts. Some workers travelled to the fields every day, while others said they were sent to live in temporary housing for several weeks to work far from their homes. Public employees reported that they worked in rotating shifts of a few days to a month. Some public sector employees said that 30% of the staff or more

worked in the fields at a time and 100% worked on weekends. In Jizzakh, officials from at least two higher educational institutes ordered students of all years to work in cotton fields in the Dustlik and Pakhtakor districts for shifts of nine days to two weeks.

46. Lower-skilled employees, such as hospital orderlies, kindergarten caregivers, technical staff, cleaners, and guards usually worked more days in the field than other employees, due to pressure on institutions to remain functioning and because the lower salaries for these positions meant they could not afford to pay replacement workers.
47. Everyone interviewed told the Uzbek-German Forum that spring fieldwork was arduous, and that they worked with no shade in temperatures that reached up to 40 degrees C (104 F). The length of the workday varied. Some people worked just a few hours a day and others worked up to 12 hours with a midday break. Nearly all workers had to provide their own food and water. Some also paid for transportation.
48. At a meeting with school and kindergarten directors in July, Nafisa Nishonova, the head of the department of education of Fergana region, ordered the institutions to send teachers to the fields to prune cotton plants and told them that agricultural work had priority over their professional responsibilities. She said that refusing to work in the cotton fields meant opposing the regional *hokim* and teachers who refuse can “explain [to him] that you are not going to work in the fields.”^{xxxv} After a recording of the meeting was published, Nishonova told a journalist that teachers were working in the cotton fields but said they were doing so of their own will even though they are not paid for this work. Khairullo Bozorov, *hokim* of the Namangan region acknowledged that officials sent health and education workers to work in the fields, including in the cotton sector, and that this had a negative impact on the quality of services. He said, “It’s a fact, we can’t hide it.... We have sent [education and health workers] to do public work, even in agriculture. We haven’t let teachers do their jobs; we’ve attached them to farmers. We haven’t let doctors do their jobs, they’ve been busy working in the fields.”^{xxxvi} Several media sources published in Uzbekistan also acknowledged that public sector employees are used by the government as a free labour force for spring cotton cultivation work and other unpaid “public” work.
49. The Uzbek-German Forum documented several instances of child labour in Karakalpakstan in spring 2017, all in Turtkul. In these cases, the use of adult forced labour appeared to contribute to the use of child labour as children were working as replacement workers for or alongside adults required to work. The Uzbek-German Forum interviewed two schoolboys, ages 14 and 16, hired to work as replacement workers for a grocery store in Turtkul. The boys were not in school on the date of the interview, a Monday, even though they said they had end of year exams in a few days. In June, when school had finished, the Uzbek-German Forum also observed approximately 10 children, each holding a *ketmen*, a traditional Uzbek weeding tool similar to a hoe, at a place where people required to work by their *mahalla* and replacement workers were gathered to wait for transportation to cotton fields in Qumbosgan. A man hired as a replacement worker said that the children were working for the *mahalla*.

50. In two other instances, the Uzbek-German Forum observed children who appeared to be as young as 10 working in the cotton fields. In one case, the Uzbek-German Forum asked an employee of a mahalla council supervising people required to work by the mahalla why the children were there. The employee said, “I can’t do anything, I am just following orders.” In a separate case, the Uzbek-German Forum asked a farmer why there were young children working in his fields. The farmer said that he had not wanted to let them on the bus that transported public sector employees to his fields, but he did not prevent them from coming and working.

51. **Forced labour in the beginning of 2017 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan.**

The cotton harvest began on September 6 in several regions of Uzbekistan. According to preliminary data, the forced mobilization of public sector employees to the cotton fields occurred all over the country. UGF monitors conducted interviews with workers in schools and hospitals. According to them, the management of state institutions required workers to sign statements “of voluntary participation in the collection of cotton.” In some cases, “decisions to help the motherland to harvest cotton” were adopted at collective meetings of public organizations. UGF received information that public sector employees were required to declare their “voluntary participation” in the harvest from Syrdarya, Jizzak, and Andijan regions and the Republic of Karakalpakstan.^{xxxvii}

52. In the Republic of Karakalpakstan, doctors from central hospitals in the Turtkul and Ellikala districts told UGF that the hospital management told employees to hire pickers to work for them so they could stay at their jobs.

53. Lists of traveling “volunteers” are prepared by the management of institutions and handed over to the *hokimiats* (local administrations), which bear responsibility for fulfilling centrally imposed production and harvesting quotas and control the cotton harvest process.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF UZBEKISTAN

54. Despite years of civil society engagement and inter-governmental pressure, the Government of Uzbekistan continues to practice systematic state-sponsored forced labour during the annual cotton harvest, affecting public sector employees, people receiving welfare and child benefits, employees of state and private enterprises, and some students. High-level policy commitments to respect fundamental labour rights are not fully implemented in practice, with over a million of citizens forced to pick cotton every year or hire a replacement worker, under threat of penalty. Given the Government of Uzbekistan’s central role in perpetuating these abuses, Uzbekistan is not taking “sufficient steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights”.

55. Despite recent developments, state-sponsored forced labour in the cotton harvest remains a serious, systematic and ongoing problem in Uzbekistan. There is a vast disparity between legal commitments made to eradicate forced labour and their practical implementation. Forced labour during the cotton harvest and spring planting and weeding season violate Uzbekistan’s obligations under international law and requires immediate action.

56. Recommendations the Government of Uzbekistan should be urged to implement:

- Enforce national laws that prohibit the use of forced and child labour in alignment with ratified ILO conventions.
- Make public, high-level policy statements condemning forced labour, specifically including forced labour in the cotton sector, and making clear that all work should be voluntary and fairly compensated.
- Instruct government officials at all levels and citizens that act on behalf of the government not to use coercion to mobilize anyone to work or make payments in the cotton sector and hold to account officials to account for violations.
- Allow independent journalists, human rights defenders, and other individuals and organizations to document and report concerns about the use of forced or child labour without fear of reprisals.
- Take immediate steps to provide, in practice, effective protection of independent journalists, human rights defenders, and other activists against harassment, persecution, or interference in the exercise of their professional activities or of their right to freedom of opinion, expression, and association. Ensure that such acts are promptly, thoroughly and independently investigated, prosecuted and sanctioned, and that victims are provided with effective remedies.
- Fully implement ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, which the government ratified in October 2016.
- Initiate a time-bound plan to reform root causes of forced labour in the agriculture sector, including:
 - Cease punitive measures against farmers for debts and not meeting state-mandated production quotas for cotton and other agricultural products;
 - Ensure the state-established procurement prices for cotton and other agricultural products reflect the costs of production, including the cost of voluntary labour at market rates, and, over time abolish the state monopsony on cotton purchasing; and
 - Increase financial transparency in the agriculture sector, including by ensuring national budgets reviewed by the Oliy Majlis include expenditures and income in the agriculture sector and ensuring taxes paid in the sector go to the national budget.

ⁱ OHCHR Matrice of recommendations, UPR of Uzbekistan (2nd cycle – 16th session), Thematic list of recommendations. Access: https://www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/uzbekistan/session_30_-_may_2018/upr_ngo_submission_matrix_uzbekistan_3rdcycle_en.docx

ⁱⁱ The Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “Chronicle of Forced Labor 2017”, Issue 2, June 2017. Access: http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Chronicle-2017_Isse-2_FINAL.pdf

ⁱⁱⁱ Center-1, “Uzbekistan. Elena Urlaeva: “Ban on taking out people for picking cotton was a prank””, 29 September 2017. Access: <https://centre1.com/uzbekistan/elena-urlaeva-zapret-na-vyvoz-na-hlopok-byl-rozygryshem/>

^{iv} Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “The European Parliament hosts an exchange of views with experts to review the developments in Uzbekistan”, September 28, 2017. Access: <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/the-european-parliament-hosts-an-exchange-of-views-with-experts-to-review-the-developments-in-uzbekistan/>

^v Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “Uzbekistan: Central Bank Orders Bank Employees to Recruit Workers to Collect Cotton”, September 30, 2017. Access: <http://harvestreport.uzbekgermanforum.org/uzbekistan-central-bank-orders-bank-employees-to-recruit-workers-to-collect-cotton/>

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- ^{vi} Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “The European Parliament hosts an exchange of views with experts to review the developments in Uzbekistan”, September 28, 2017. Access: <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/the-european-parliament-hosts-an-exchange-of-views-with-experts-to-review-the-developments-in-uzbekistan/>
- ^{vii} Supported recommendations 135.10 (Switzerland), 135.11 (Hungary), 135.12 (Germany), 133.43 (Canada), 133.42 (France),
- ^{viii} Cotton Campaign, “Uzbekistan: End Prolonged Detention of Human Rights Defender”, 18 December 2015. Access: <http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uzbekistan-end-prolonged-detention-of-human-rights-defender.html>
- ^{ix} Cotton Campaign, “Uzbekistan Government Detains Human Rights Defender Elena Urlaeva in a Psychiatric Hospital”, 19 May 2016. Access: <http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uzbekistan-government-detains-human-rights-defender-elena-urlaeva-in-a-psychiatric-hospital.html>
- ^x Center-1, “Stern correspondent detained on Uzbekistan’s cotton fields”, 4 October 2017. Access: <https://centre1.com/uzbekistan/na-hlopkovyh-polyah-uzbekistana-zaderzhana-korrespondent-zhurnala-shtern/>
- ^{xi} Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan, “On organizational measures to ensure the timely and quality harvesting of raw cotton in 2014,” No. PP2380, September 4, 2014. Access: http://harvestreport2015.uzbekgermanforum.org/pdf/President/2014.09.04_Resolution-of-the-President.pdf
- ^{xii} Cotton Campaign, “Uzbekistan: ILO Report Confirms Forced Labor But Government Role Undermined Research”, February 16, 2017. Access: <http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uzbekistan-ilo-report-confirms-forced-labor.html>
- ^{xiii} See, for example, ILO, “CEACR Observation: Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105)–Uzbekistan,” adopted 2016, published 2017. Access: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:330074
- ^{xiv} ILO, “Observation (CEACR) 106th ILC session (2017) “Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105) - Uzbekistan (Ratification: 1997). Adopted 2016, published 2017. Access: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:13100:0::NO:13100:P13100_COMMENT_ID:3300743
- ^{xv} The Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report of 2017. Access: <https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/countries/2017/271311.htm>
- ^{xvi} The U.S. Department of Labor, International Labor Affairs Bureau (ILAB) List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor. September 30, 2016. Access: <https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/list-of-goods/>
- ^{xvii} Responsible Sourcing Network, “Company Pledge Against Forced Labor in the Uzbek Cotton Sector”, August 14, 2017. Access: <https://www.sourcingnetwork.org/the-cotton-pledge>
- ^{xviii} ILO, “Third-party monitoring of measures against child labour and forced labour during the 2016 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan–A report submitted to the World Bank by the International Labour Office,” January 2017. Access: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_543130.pdf
- ^{xix} ILO, “Third-party monitoring of measures against child labour and forced labour during the 2016 cotton harvest in Uzbekistan–A report submitted to the World Bank by the International Labour Office,” January 2017. Access: http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipecc/documents/publication/wcms_543130.pdf
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^{xxv} Human Rights Watch and the Uzbek-German Forum have withheld identifying information in some cases due to concerns that publishing detailed accounts of this harassment would further expose monitors to risk of reprisals.

^{xxvi} “Uzbek Human Rights Activist Elena Urlaeva Released,” Tula Connell, Solidarity Center, March 24, 2017. Access: <https://www.solidaritycenter.org/uzbek-human-rights-activist-elena-urlaeva-released/>

^{xxvii} Human Rights Watch and Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “We Can’t Refuse to Pick Cotton. Forced and Child Labor Linked to World Bank Group Investments in Uzbekistan”, June 27, 2017. Access: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/27/we-cant-refuse-pick-cotton/forced-and-child-labor-linked-world-bank-group>

^{xxviii} Cotton Campaign, “Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain in the lowest possible ranking in the annual Trafficking in Persons Report”, June 27, 2017. Access: <http://www.cottoncampaign.org/2017-tip-report.html>

^{xxix} Human Rights Watch and Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “We Can’t Refuse to Pick Cotton. Forced and Child Labor Linked to World Bank Group Investments in Uzbekistan”, June 27, 2017. Access: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/27/we-cant-refuse-pick-cotton/forced-and-child-labor-linked-world-bank-group>

^{xxx} Uzbek-German Forum interviews with grandmother of a first-year college student forced to pick cotton, Ellikkala district, Karakalpakstan, October 2015; second-year college student, Beruni district, Karakalpakstan, fall, 2016; second-year college student, Ellikkala district, Karakalpakstan, fall, 2016; first-year college student, Ellikkala district, Karakalpakstan, fall, 2016; two second-year college students, Turtkul district, Karakalpakstan, September, 2016; and two college teachers and the mother of a 17-year-old student, Turtkul district, Karakalpakstan, fall, 2016.

^{xxxi} Human Rights Watch and Uzbek-German Forum for Human Rights, “We Can’t Refuse to Pick Cotton. Forced and Child Labor Linked to World Bank Group Investments in Uzbekistan”, June 27, 2017. Access: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/06/27/we-cant-refuse-pick-cotton/forced-and-child-labor-linked-world-bank-group>

^{xxxii} “Премьер-министр Узбекистана начал ‘убийственную’ кампанию против фермеров [The Prime Minister of Uzbekistan has Begun a ‘Murderous’ Campaign Against Farmers],” Radio Ozodlik, October 14, 2015. Access: <http://rus.ozodlik.org/content/article/27305585.html>

^{xxxiii} Uzbek-German Forum interviews with farmer, Jizzakh district, Jizzakh, November 30, 2016; farmer, Buvaidin district, Fergana, November 9, 2016; farmer, Uchuprik district, Fergana, November 15, 2016; farmer, Bayavut district, Syrdarya, November 13, 2016; and farmer, Buz district, Andijan, November 18, 2016. See also “Как наказывают узбекских фермеров: ‘Сначала их заперли в автобусе, а затем избili’ [How Uzbek Farmers Are Punished: ‘First they were locked in a bus, then they were beaten’],” Radio Ozodlik, June 11, 2016, access: <http://rus.ozodlik.org/a/27790816.html>; “Новый хоким начал работу с рукоприкладства [New Hokim Began Work with Beatings],” Radio Ozodlik, June 24, 2016, access: <http://rus.ozodlik.org/a/27816922.html>; “В Кашкадарьинской области дехкан временно удерживают взаперти, чтобы отобрать у них пшеницу [In Kashkadarya] farmers temporarily locked up to seize their wheat,” Radio Ozodlik, July 14, 2016, access: <http://rus.ozodlik.mobi/a/27856842.html>; “В Кашкадарье хоким избил учителя по духовно-просветительской работе [Hokim in the Qashqadaryo [Kashkadarya] Region Beat Teacher of Spiritual and Educational Studies],” Radio Ozodlik, October 20, 2016. Access: <http://rus.ozodlik.mobi/a/28063729.html>

^{xxxiv} The letter, a form to be filled in for each farmer, states that it stems from Presidential Order of February 1, 2016 on “2016 cotton varieties arrangements and forecast of production volumes,” ПК-2484-сон. It contains signature lines for seven district officials, including the *hokim*, prosecutor, and head of the police.

^{xxxv} Audio recording of head of department of education of Fergana region Nafisa Nishonova meeting with directors of schools and kindergartens, July 21, 2017. Access: <http://sof.uz/news/show/10227-dalaga-yugur-pul-yig-kartoshka-ek-ujitu/>. For a summary of the recording in English, see “Teachers, Not Framers Need the Cotton,” Uzbek-German Forum, July 28, 2017. Access: <http://uzbekgermanforum.org/head-of-district-educational-department-teachers-not-the-farmers-need-the-cotton/>.

^{xxxvi} “Хоким Намангана пообещал не привлекать учителей и врачей к принудительному труду [The Hokim of Namangan region promised not to send teachers and doctors for forced labor],” Radio Ozodlik, August 12, 2017. Access: <https://rus.ozodlik.org/a/28673188.html>.

^{xxxvii} Uzbek-German Forum, “Chronicle of forced labor 2017. Issue 3: June – September”, September 12, 2017. Access: http://uzbekgermanforum.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Chronicle-2017_Issue-3_Cotton-Harvest-and-Weeding.pdf