



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
4 November 2010

Original: English

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**Human Rights Council**  
**Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review**  
**Tenth session**  
Geneva, 24 January–4 February 2011

## **Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in accordance with paragraph 15 (c) of the annex to Human Rights Council resolution 5/1**

### **Rwanda\***

The present report is a summary of eight stakeholders' submissions<sup>1</sup> to the universal periodic review. It follows the structure of the general guidelines adopted by the Human Rights Council. It does not contain any opinions, views or suggestions on the part of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), nor any judgement or determination in relation to specific claims. The information included herein has been systematically referenced in endnotes and, to the extent possible, the original texts have not been altered. Lack of information or focus on specific issues may be due to the absence of submissions by stakeholders regarding these particular issues. The full texts of all submissions received are available on the OHCHR website. The report has been prepared taking into consideration the four-year periodicity of the first cycle of the review.

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\* The present document was not edited before being sent to United Nations translation services.

## **I. Background and framework**

### **A. Scope of international obligations**

1. Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation (UNPO) expressed concern by the fact that Rwanda has not ratified ILO Convention 169, in relation to indigenous and tribal communities.<sup>2</sup> It recommended that Rwanda ratify this Convention and take measures to promote its efficacy in supporting indigenous rights.<sup>3</sup>

### **B. Constitutional and legislative framework**

2. Article 19 submitted that the Genocide Ideology Law was contrary to international human rights law. According to Article 19, the law's central concept of "genocide ideology" violated the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 in multiple ways. Furthermore, numerous provisions of the Genocide Ideology Law that related to penalties were also in violation of international human rights law, notably the Convention on the Rights of the Child.<sup>4</sup> Joint submission 3 (JS3) called on Rwanda to carry out an independent review of the implementation of all the genocide-related laws, and ensure their implementation in a way that is consistent with the rights recognised by the 1981 United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders and with Rwanda's international obligations.<sup>5</sup>

## **II. Promotion and protection of human rights on the ground**

### **Implementation of international human rights obligations, taking into account applicable international humanitarian law**

#### **1. Equality and non-discrimination**

3. UNPO stated that a recent survey amongst Batwa women in Rwanda has revealed that they suffered more violence compared to women from other ethnic groups. According to UNPO, sexual abuse against Batwa women has risen over the years. UNPO indicated that the causes for these forms of abuse and violence varied. However, a majority of Batwa women felt that extreme poverty was the main factor for such abuse and violence. UNPO recommended that Rwanda employ disaggregated data by gender and ethnicity to allow policies to be developed to address violence against women. A pre-requisite for this was that the government recognise the diversity of the population and acknowledge the existence of minorities and indigenous people by name.<sup>6</sup>

4. According to UNPO, the Constitution placed emphasis on the rights of "marginalised and excluded groups" however, the government refused to recognize the Batwa as a minority group that was marginalised and discriminated against, and this led them being ignored in government programmes on social welfare and development services. UNPO noted that Batwa remained poorly integrated in the society, and having no legal status or recognition, and being numerically small, they were prevented from actively engaging in political activities at the national level.<sup>7</sup> Joint Submission 1 (JS1) made similar observations.<sup>8</sup>

## 2. Right to life, liberty and security of the person

5. Human Rights Watch (HRW) stated that Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007. At the same time, regrettably, it introduced a new sentence of “life imprisonment with special provisions” which included detention in isolation. HRW informed that this provision had not been applied to date, as Rwanda’s prisons did not have the facilities for isolating large number of prisoners. In 2010, the Rwandan Parliament was debating a draft law implementing “life imprisonment with special provisions”, which specified that prisoners serving this sentence have the right to go outside their cell, to receive visits from their immediate family members and their lawyer, to receive medical treatment, and to perform research, artistic and cultural activities. However, according to HRW, the law did not specify the frequency with which prisoners would be able to exercise these rights and other important rights-related details.<sup>9</sup>

6. JS1 expressed concern about the cases of domestic violence and the insufficient measures in place to assist victims. Furthermore, the lack of statistics on domestic violence cases did not make it possible to have an objective overall view of the extent of the problem in the country.<sup>10</sup> It recommended that Rwanda (1) implement strategies to sensitise the population to the issue of rape; and (2) set-up protection measures for and provide sufficient assistance to victims of rape and domestic violence.<sup>11</sup>

7. JS1 stated that there were cases of people being held in prisons without being charged of a crime or being brought before a court. According to JS1, as of February 2010, 546 prisoners were illegally detained. JS1 indicated that many people belonging to vulnerable groups such as street children, beggars and prostitutes were often arrested and transferred to “unofficial detention centres”. People who were not in possession of identity cards, were also arrested and transferred to “unofficial detention centres”.<sup>12</sup>

8. Joint Submission 2 (JS2) indicated that children under the age of 16 years had been detained and especially homeless children and juvenile delinquents were arrested and regularly sent to “education camps” or prisons.<sup>13</sup>

9. JS2 stated that most cases of arbitrary arrests occurred in connection with unwanted criticism against state authorities or after political actions of opposition parties or NGOs and media. In June 2010, a number of participants in a pro-democracy demonstration had been arrested and their fate still remained unclear.<sup>14</sup> JS1 recommended Rwanda (1) ensure that police refrain from carrying out arbitrary arrests particularly of those belong to the vulnerable groups of the population; and (2) close all “unofficial detention centres” where the rights and guarantees of the detainees were not assured.<sup>15</sup>

10. JS1 stated that despite efforts to improve the penitentiary system, there remained serious problems, such as prison overpopulation. The capacity in Rwanda’s 14 prisons was 149 percent as of February 2010. According to JS1, accused persons were not always separated from convicted persons.<sup>16</sup>

## 3. Administration of justice, including impunity and the rule of law

11. HRW stated that there were a number of positive reforms in the judicial sector. The government has rebuilt the infrastructure of the judicial system, largely destroyed by the genocide and has enacted legal reforms aimed at *inter alia* improving the qualifications of lawyers and judges, and affording due process to accused persons.<sup>17</sup> At the same time, CHRI stated that political interference with the judiciary was observed particularly in trials of political interest and in cases where there were accusations of “divisionism”. Moreover, the Government had unconstitutionally intervened with judicial appointments. CHRI stated that there were concerns about the competence and levels of training that judges receive at all levels of the judiciary.<sup>18</sup> HRW recommended that Rwanda pursue reforms of its judicial

system, in particular, measures to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, and guard against corruption and political interference.<sup>19</sup>

12. According to HRW, community-based gacaca courts, which began trying genocide cases in 2002, were finally expected to close in 2010. Rwanda was facing the challenge of how to deal with outstanding or new genocide cases, both domestically and internationally. HRW stated that the gacaca courts have provided mixed experiences for individual Rwandans and for the country as a whole. According to HRW, the positive aspect included the fact that the gacaca courts have possessed a large number of cases and significantly reduced the prison population; they have involved the local population in the process of justice for the genocide; and some judges have delivered fair and objective judgments. The negative aspects were that: the gacaca courts have sometimes heavy sentences handed down on the basis of very little evidence; witnesses and judges were vulnerable to corruption which affected the outcome of trials and undermined the confidence in the gacaca courts; some defence witnesses have been afraid of testifying for fear of being accused of genocide themselves; and there were numerous allegations that the gacaca courts have sacrificed the truth to satisfy political interests. HRW recommended that Rwanda ensure that alleged miscarriages of justice are reviewed independently and where appropriate, rectified.<sup>20</sup>

13. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI) stated that individuals appearing before the gacaca courts were not permitted to be represented by lawyers, which was in violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.<sup>21</sup> CHRI further stated that there were no guidelines, standards, rules or laws of evidence, evidentiary procedure or witness testimony before the gacaca courts. The process of evidence gathering often relied on hearsay or other incomplete evidence and there were few opportunities for the accused to test the evidence. According to CHRI, until 2008 the officials of the Rwandan Patriotic Front played a significant role in evidence gathering.<sup>22</sup>

14. HRW stated that there were concerns about unfair trials, the abuse of the genocide ideology law to deter witnesses and lawyers' participation in the defence of genocide charges, other pressure on and intimidation of witnesses, corruption, and lack of judicial independence.<sup>23</sup>

15. UNPO stated that a 2008 Legal Aid Baseline Survey identified a number of factors inherent in the legal aid system that limited access to justice for the Batwa. According to UNPO, these factors included absence of enabling legal and regulatory framework, limited funding, the limited number of lawyers and their limited geographic reach, and also the lack of awareness of the availability of legal aid services. The lack of knowledge and access to the legal aid system has led to unavoidable problems for the Batwa.<sup>24</sup> UNPO recommended that Rwanda put in place legal aid for those in need.<sup>25</sup>

#### **4. Right to privacy, marriage and family life**

16. JS1 stated that the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual and intersex persons (LGBTI) were insufficiently guaranteed. Sexual minorities did not enjoy their rights and freedoms envisaged in the Constitution. JS1 stated the associations of LGBTI were not officially recognised. It recommended that Rwanda (1) prohibit all forms of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation; and (2) condemn harassment and all forms of abuses against LGBTI.<sup>26</sup>

#### **5. Freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly and right to participate in public and political life**

17. CHRI stated that Article 34 of the Constitution guaranteed freedom of the press and freedom of information but limited the exercise of free speech in accordance with the law.

This meant that freedom of speech must be interpreted in line with other laws, such as the laws that promoted racial harmony and banned genocide ideology, which made freedom of speech to be subject to a significant degree of interpretation by the government.<sup>27</sup> CHRI indicated that these restrictions along with a weak civil society and indigenous independent media led to weak culture of free speech within Rwanda.<sup>28</sup>

18. HRW indicated that, in April 2009, the government introduced a new media law, which placed unrealistic and burdensome restrictions on journalists, including extremely high registration fees for establishing a newspaper and levels of formal qualification which most Rwandan journalists did not have.<sup>29</sup> Article 19 asserted that the 2009 Media Law stipulated that all journalists must be authorised by the Media High Council to practice their profession and satisfy a number of requirements in this regard. It noted that this authorization system and the stipulated entry requirements were inconsistent with international freedom of expressions standards as they failed to recognise that the right to express oneself through the mass media was universal. Additionally, the Media Law imposed high media licensing fees which restricted people from setting up new companies and granted the Media High Council the power to suspend news papers. According to Article 19, the Law also required journalists to reveal their sources when authorities deemed it necessary to carry out criminal investigations or proceedings.<sup>30</sup>

19. According to Article 19, the 2001 Telecommunications Act, while conferring on Rwanda the full discretionary powers to guarantee the territorial integrity of the country, allowed for the suspension of private communications and broadcasting services, and the confiscation of broadcasting equipment in order to prevent communications which could endanger the safety of the State, or was contrary to law, public order or good manners. Article 19 opined that this formulation was vague and open to interpretation and therefore this legislation could be used as an instrument of intimidation.<sup>31</sup> Article 19 recommended that Rwanda review the system of media regulation and repeal all provisions that interfere with freedom of the media, and create and maintain an environment in which the media can work freely, effectively and independently from political influence.<sup>32</sup> JS3 called on Rwanda to identify and implement appropriate measures to reform the High Media Council and strengthen its credibility and independence.<sup>33</sup>

20. HRW stated that the Rwandan media was dominated by pro-government newspapers.<sup>34</sup> Article 19 noted that the Government retained a monopoly over television broadcasting.<sup>35</sup>

21. Article 19 submitted that the Rwandan Penal Code criminalised defamation and defamatory denunciation. The definitions of criminal offences were vague, unclear and broad, which allowed the legislation to be manipulated to repress free speech. According to Article 19, criminal sanctions were also imposed by the 2009 Media Law. It noted that this legislation had been used against government critics and the media and pointed out that the imposition of criminal penalties for acts of defamation created a chilling effect on expression and led to self-censorship.<sup>36</sup> Article 19 recommended that Rwanda (1) repeal all criminal defamation provisions and replace them with appropriate provisions in the civil law; and (2) review the 2009 Media Law, with a view to bringing it in line with international standards.<sup>37</sup>

22. CHRI stated that the Article 13 of the Constitution prohibited divisionism, negationism and trivialisation” but did not specify the substantive legal tests for such offences.<sup>38</sup> JS3 noted that Rwanda passed a new Law on Genocide Ideology in 2008 to complement the 2003 Law on Genocide, which criminalised genocide denial, revisionism and divisionism. While in principle the broad objectives of these laws might appear legitimate, their provisions had been used to stifle dissent and were invoked on a number of occasions against human rights defenders. The 2008 Law, in particular, contained an extremely broad definition of genocide ideology and acts constituting genocide ideology.

JS3 referred to the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders who stated that it (the Law) “would be likely to limit any opposition even moderate to government, and restrict the full enjoyment of the right of freedom of expression and opinion”.<sup>39</sup> HRW made similar observations and expressed concern about the absence of the requirement to prove “intent” and “causality” for this crime.<sup>40</sup> Article 19 noted that the penalties associated with the crimes under the Law were severe and included penalties for children under the age of twelve.<sup>41</sup> JS2 and HRW stated that while genocide ideology laws sought to condemn all form of ethnic incitement and to prevent hate speech that was witnessed before and during the genocide, in practice it became a tool to quash debate, to discredit government critics, and to attempt to a single version of Rwanda’s recent history.<sup>42</sup> HRW recommended that Rwanda review the Law on Genocide Ideology to ensure a more precise and narrow definition of the crimes in line with international norms, and require that intent to commit, assist or incite genocide be clearly demonstrated.<sup>43</sup>

23. Article 19 asserted that harassment and intimidation of journalists, through arrests and illegal detention and expulsion from events was an established pattern.<sup>44</sup> HRW made similar observations. It stated that in March 2009, the Human Rights Committee, when assessing Rwanda’s compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, expressed concerns about reports of intimidation and harassment of journalists critical of government policies.<sup>45</sup> According to Article 19, self-censorship by journalists was widespread, owing to the fear of harassment by government authorities or pro-government groups and individuals.<sup>46</sup> Article 19 recommended that Rwanda (1) conduct speedy, effective and impartial investigations of all cases of physical attacks against journalists; and (2) cease harassment of journalists and conduct an independent review of all cases of journalists imprisoned, fined or prosecuted in connection with their professional work, with a view to release those wrongfully imprisoned.<sup>47</sup> JS3 also called on Rwanda to conduct an independent inquiry into the source of all forms of intimidation, harassment and attacks directed towards human rights defenders and organisations.<sup>48</sup>

24. HRW stated that freedom of expression has been severely restricted for many years and that in the months leading up to the presidential elections there was further crackdown on independent voices.<sup>49</sup> HRW recommended that Rwanda allow journalists, including those with a record of criticising the government, to practice freely, to carry out investigations and to publish their findings and comments without reprisals.<sup>50</sup>

25. JS2 stated that in the year before the presidential elections in August 2010, the freedom of association has been repeatedly denied especially for those political parties outside the government coalition. Article 19 indicated that opposition political parties must register with the government, a process which required clearance from the police.<sup>51</sup> According to HRW, two of the new opposition parties seeking to stand in the 2010 elections had been prevented from registering and they were told that they had to provide police clearance and guarantees of security before they can be authorised to hold their congress.<sup>52</sup> CHRI noted that there was only one opposition party registered for the August 2010 elections.<sup>53</sup>

26. Article 19 expressed concern about multiple reports of intimidation of political opponents in the run-up to the August 2010 election. Article 19 indicated that in many instances, political opponents were labelled as criminals using the restrictive genocide ideology laws.<sup>54</sup> Article 19 recommended that Rwanda ensure that opposition voices were not excluded from Rwanda’s political process, compromising freedom of expression during a pivotal period in the country’s development.<sup>55</sup> HRW recommended that Rwanda (1) remove legal and de facto restrictions on political activities; (2) cease harassment of opposition party members; and (3) enable parties to freely register, carry out their activities and contest the elections.<sup>56</sup>

27. JS3 noted that the process of NGO registration was burdensome and NGOs were required to apply for registration each year. According to JS3, the registration process required that NGOs demonstrated that their activities were in line with government priorities identified in the government policies. Before obtaining authorisation from the central government, NGOs had to receive provisional authorisation from each district and zone where they intended to work. JS3 noted that the law required that quarterly financial statements and lists of staff and assets be submitted to the authorities.<sup>57</sup> JS1 made similar observations.<sup>58</sup>

28. JS3 stated that the space for independent human rights activism was limited, and self-censorship remained widespread within the human rights community. According to JS3, attacks against human rights organisations and individual human rights defenders had been recorded.<sup>59</sup> According to HRW, organisations trying to document human rights abuses in Rwanda faced constant threats and obstacles. HRW noted that the government officials had accused human rights activists of supporting individuals seeking to overthrow the government and armed groups linked to the genocide. International human rights organizations had been repeatedly criticized and discredited in the pro-government media.<sup>60</sup> JS3 called on Rwanda to respect the role played by international and national human rights organisations and to ensure that NGO registration procedure is not used to delay and hinder the legitimate work of human rights defenders.<sup>61</sup> HRW recommended that Rwanda ensure that national and international human rights organizations were free to carry out their work without hindrance or intimidation.<sup>62</sup>

29. According to HRW, the government urged Rwandan NGOs to join the officially sanctioned Civil Society Platform (CSP), marginalizing those who choose not to.<sup>63</sup> JS3 called on Rwanda to ensure that all human rights defenders are free to carry out their activities without persecution and harassment.<sup>64</sup>

30. JS1 stated that the fact that 56.25 percent of the members of Parliament were women was a notable achievement. However, representation of women in local government remained low. JS1 recommended that Rwanda redouble its efforts to support the participation of women in public life and in the private sector.<sup>65</sup>

## **6. Right to social security and to an adequate standard of living**

31. JS2 stated that at least 22 percent of households (2.2 million people) were food-insecure, and another 24 percent were highly vulnerable to food insecurity. Food utilization was also a problem, as reflected in high levels of maternal and child malnutrition in many parts of the country. According to JS2, over 50 percent of children were chronically malnourished, while one child in four was underweight.<sup>66</sup>

32. JS2 indicated that Rwanda adopted an Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS) for 2008–2012 which included an agricultural reform scheme called “Green Revolution” that aimed to transform the Rwandan agricultural sector from subsistence farming to export oriented cash crop production. Under the leadership and control of the Ministry for Agriculture MINAGRI, Rwandan farmers were instructed on the kind and quantity of crops and livestock they had to produce. Production schemes have been enforced vigorously, and single family owned farms had to be united with others to form cooperatives. According to JS2, numerous pieces of land have been expropriated and offered for larger agricultural production companies that produce cash crops for the global market such as tea, flowers and spices. This policy helped to increase the export rates of the Rwandese national agricultural economy, but left several thousand farmers without land and income.<sup>67</sup>

33. JS2 asserted that the government intended to reduce the percentage of citizens directly depending on subsistence farming from 85 percent (2009) to 50 percent in 2020.

But so far, while thousands of Rwandans were expropriated from the land that they have farmed in their families for generations, no alternative job opportunities have emerged, which left a growing number of citizens without income in the rural areas. Land scarceness, land consolidation, mechanization and the directives on seeds and cultivation have improved the income of some farmers, but left behind an increasing number of households in growing poverty and malnutrition.<sup>68</sup>

34. JS2 submitted that in the capital, Kigali, 80 percent of the inhabitants were living in informal settlements with hardly any basic infrastructure such as electricity, water, sewage and paved roads. In 2008 Rwanda adopted the “Kigali Conceptual Master Plan” to transform Kigali into business districts with building sites offered to local and international investors at reduced prices. As a consequence, local inhabitants in certain areas had to leave their homes and land. According to JS2, the municipality of Kigali determined fixed values for the expropriations, but these sums were rated far below the market value of the properties. Furthermore, in many cases, procedures were not respected, with households being displaced without receiving clear moving notices, which resulted in the inhabitants being homeless overnight, as their houses and belongings were suddenly destroyed. In other cases, home owners were informed that they had to leave their land, but were then left in uncertainty for months and years during which time they could not fully use or maintain their houses or farm their land. Tenants were left without any compensation, as indemnity was only paid to landlords, leaving many households without support and alternative housing. JS2 observed that this process affected some of the poorest and most vulnerable groups in Kigali, as the city centre was populated by households with very low incomes, single parents or persons without a broader social network. According to JS2, the government has not offered sufficient and adequate facilities for the displaced households. Besides one model-housing programme in Batsinda, no other social housing schemes have been implemented or planned, leaving thousands of inhabitants of Kigali’s poor area without shelter.<sup>69</sup>

35. JS1 recommended that Rwanda respect the right to appropriate compensation for those whose property has been expropriated; and to take measures to protect property rights that were envisaged by the Constitution and the International Convention on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.<sup>70</sup>

## **7. Right to education**

36. JS1 stated that Rwanda’s teaching reform of 2009, which provided that lessons must be exclusively in English, was discriminatory. This reform, which was in conflict with Article 5 of the Constitution, penalised those teachers who did not have the necessary skills to teach lessons in English and it also penalised French speaking pupils. JS1 recommended that Rwanda (1) promote multilingualism, in particular within the framework of teaching, in accordance with Article 5 of the Constitution.<sup>71</sup>

## **8. Minorities and indigenous peoples**

37. UNPO identified land ownership as the most pressing issue facing the Batwa, which was intrinsically linked to their right to movement, residence and protection of property. The semi-nomadic lifestyle of the Batwa with its forest-based existence was not conducive to the land regime in Rwanda which did not recognise the Batwa right to the land on which they live. According to UNPO, the Batwa lost much of their land to the thousands of people who returned from exile and they have not received compensation for the loss of their land and land settlements that would allow them to rebuild their lives.<sup>72</sup> JS1 made similar observations.<sup>73</sup>

38. UNPO stated that the increased economic activity in Rwanda has had detrimental implications of the Batwa. Additionally, logging and forest clearance for agriculture have



also displaced many Batwa and many of whom remained uncompensated and homeless. Parliament had enormous autonomy to pass laws to convert land from private to public use with little consultation. The Batwa faced systemic marginalisation in national planning processes and were not consulted on major land-use policy and the effects of these policies on their livelihoods. Rwanda's land policies disregarded cultural mapping and ignored Batwa claims to designated sites, specifically the wetlands. According to UNPO, the Batwa were unable to prevent degradation of their traditional forest lands and natural resources. As a consequence, the Batwa have been forced to change their traditional ways of life.<sup>74</sup>

39. UNPO stated that the Batwa had the highest incidence of poverty and the lowest access to social services from all Rwandans. Not only did the Constitution fail to recognise the economic, social and cultural rights of the Batwa, but the government has refused to recognise their traditional indigenous activities. Poverty has thus forced the Batwa into modern day slavery.<sup>75</sup> UNPO recommended that Rwanda take affirmative action to develop policies to initiate poverty reduction in the Batwa community.<sup>76</sup>

### III. Achievements, best practices, challenges and constraints

N/A

### IV. Key national priorities, initiatives and commitments

N/A

### V. Capacity-building and technical assistance

N/A

#### Notes

<sup>1</sup> The stakeholders listed below have contributed information for this summary; the full texts of all original submissions are available at: [www.ohchr.org](http://www.ohchr.org). (One asterisk denotes a non-governmental organization in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.)

#### *Civil society*

ECLJ	European Centre for Law and Justice, Strasbourg, France.*
HRW	Human Rights Watch, Geneva, Switzerland.*
UNPO	Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organization, The Hague, The Netherlands.
JS1	Association Rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des libertés publiques (ADL); Forum des activistes contre la torture (FACT/Rwanda); Institut Rwandais pour le Dialogue et la Paix (IRDP); Ligue des Droits de la personne dans la région des Grands Lacs (LDGL); Seruka; Human Rights Watch;* Ibarwa; Turengere Abana ; LIPRODHOR ; Rwanda Youth Network ; World Vision;* Communauté des potiers du Rwanda (COPORWA); Centrale Syndicale des Travailleurs du Rwanda (CESTRAR); FAAS ; and Association Nzambazamariya.
JS2	Ecumenical Network Central Africa, Berlin, Germany; Brot für die Welt, Stuttgart, Germany; Diakonie, Stuttgart, Germany; MISEREOR, Aachen, Germany; Pax Christi, Brussels, Belgium; Vereinte Evangelische Mission, Wuppertal, Germany;
JS3	Front Line, Dublin, Ireland;* East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defenders Project, Toronto, Canada.
CHRI	Common Wealth Human Rights Initiative, New Delhi, India.
Article 19	Global Campaign for Free Expression, London, UK.

- 2 UNPO, p. 1.
- 3 UNPO, p. 4.
- 4 Article 19, p. 5, para. 19.
- 5 JS3, p. 5.
- 6 UNPO, pp. 3–4.
- 7 UNPO, pp. 1–2.
- 8 JS1, p. 7.
- 9 HRW, p. 4.
- 10 JS1, p. 6.
- 11 JS1, p. 7.
- 12 JS1, p. 4.
- 13 JS2, p. 5.
- 14 JS2, p. 5.
- 15 JS1, p. 5.
- 16 JS1, p. 4.
- 17 HRW, p. 4 .
- 18 CHRI, para. 14.
- 19 HRW, p. 5.
- 20 HRW, p. 5.
- 21 CHRI, para. 16.
- 22 CHRI, para. 17.
- 23 HRW, p. 4.
- 24 UNPO, p.2.
- 25 UNPO, p. 4.
- 26 JS1, p. 8.
- 27 CHRI, para. 5.
- 28 CHRI, para. 4.
- 29 HRW, p. 3.
- 30 Article 19, p. 2, paras. 7–9, see also JS3, p. 4.
- 31 Article 19, p. 2–3, para. 10.
- 32 Article 19, p. 5, para. 21.
- 33 JS3, p. 5.
- 34 HRW, p. 3.
- 35 Article 19, p. 3, par. 12.
- 36 Article 19, pp. 1–2, paras. 3–5.
- 37 Article 19, p. 5, para. 21.
- 38 CHRI, para. 7.
- 39 JS3, p. 2.
- 40 HRQ, p. 1, see also CHRI, p. 3.
- 41 Article 19, p.5, para. 19.
- 42 JS2, pp. 5–6; HRW, p. 2, see also JS1, p. 2.
- 43 HRW, p. 5.
- 44 Article 19, p. 3, para. 15.
- 45 HRW, p. 3, see also JS1, p.1.
- 46 Article 19, p. 3, para.11.
- 47 Article 19, p. 5, para. 21.
- 48 JS3, p. 5.
- 49 HRW, p. 1.
- 50 HRW, p. 5.
- 51 Article 19, p. 4, para. 18.
- 52 HRW, p. 2, see also JS1, p.2.
- 53 CHRI, p. 4, para. 21.
- 54 Article 19, p. 4, para. 18.
- 55 Article 19, p. 5, para. 21.
- 56 HRW, p. 5.
- 57 JS3, p.3.

- <sup>58</sup> JS1, p.2.  
<sup>59</sup> JS3, p. 1.  
<sup>60</sup> HRW, pp. 3–4.  
<sup>61</sup> JS3, p. 5.  
<sup>62</sup> HRW, p. 5.  
<sup>63</sup> HRW, pp. 3–4.  
<sup>64</sup> JS3, p. 5.  
<sup>65</sup> JS1, pp. 6–7.  
<sup>66</sup> JS2, p. 3.  
<sup>67</sup> JS2, p. 3.  
<sup>68</sup> JS2, p. 3.  
<sup>69</sup> JS2, pp. 2–3.  
<sup>70</sup> JS1, p. 5.  
<sup>71</sup> JS1, p. 6.  
<sup>72</sup> UNPO, p. 2.  
<sup>73</sup> JS1, p. 7.  
<sup>74</sup> UNPO. p. 3.  
<sup>75</sup> UNPO, p. 3.  
<sup>76</sup> UNPO, p. 4.
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